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ABSTRACT 
For too many years, the public perception of violent crime has been viewed through the 
warped lens of media representations and reporting of mass killings, the likes of Columbine, 
Sandy Hook, and Parkland, while ignoring the body counts that rack up year after year in 
America’s own cities. Many pundits and politicians declare cultural decay and glorification of 
violence in video games as the main reason for mass shootings. However, these same voices fail 
to take the explanation any further to explain the eruptions of violence that rack up thousands of 
lives a year in large metropolitan areas. The question then, is a simple one. If violent video 
games are responsible for the recent upticks in mass public violence, then should it not also be 
true that violent video games have some causal connection to everyday violent crime? This study 
aims to answer this question and then some. Using the 100 most populous cities as sample, 
traditional criminological explanations for violent crime, such as poverty, income inequality, 
population density, segregation, divorce, and the contexts of our racialized past, will be 
compared to simple measures of video games prevalence, such as sales figures and surveys that 
detail video game preferences, in explaining homicide and aggravated assault rates in the cities 
over a five-year period. Using OLS regression analyses, the results suggest that video games, 
when taken by themselves, have a negative relationship with both homicide and aggravated 
assault rates, meaning that the more video games sold in any given city, violent crime is lower. 
However, when taken together with the traditional explanations of violent crime in the same 
model, video game related sales and public sentiments fall short of significance when compared 
to variables like poverty and historical racial segregation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Through TV and moving pictures a child may see more violence in thirty minutes than 
the average adult experiences in a lifetime. What children see on the screen is violence as an 
almost casual commonplace of daily living. Violence becomes the fundamental principle of 
society, the natural law of humanity. Killing is as common as taking a walk, a gun more natural 
than an umbrella. Children learn to take pride in force and to feel ashamed of ordinary sympathy. 
They are encouraged to forget that people have feelings” (Wertham, 1954; pg. 34). This quote is 
attributed to Fredric Wertham’s 1954 book, “The Seduction of the Innocent”. Wertham was the 
child psychiatrist who led the war against comic books in the 1950’ and 60s, claiming explicitly 
that the new medium was harmful to the minds of children. The quotes age may seem quaint in 
parts, but its sentiment lives on more than 60 years later. The villain who now corrupts the moral 
character of our youth takes a different form: video games.  
After the tragic shooting in El Paso, Texas in 2019, President Trump said in the press 
conference following the event, “We must stop the glorification of violence in our society…this 
includes the gruesome and grisly video games that are now commonplace. It is too easy today for 
troubled youth to surround themselves with a culture that celebrates violence” (Berenson, 2019). 
The familiarity of these quotes should be striking considering the years of change that separate 
the two. Let us not forget that while Fredric Wertham waged his war against comic books, 
people of color still could not drink from the same water fountains nor learn in the same 
classrooms as whites. 
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Just as Wertham failed to perceive greater threats posed to the society of his time, so too 
does Donald Trump fail to perceive sources of injustice in our time. In 2017 alone, there were 
17,284 homicides in the United States (Uniform Crime Report, 2017), and 346 of those 
homicides were from “mass shootings,” 0.02% of homicides in the U.S. (GVA, 2017). Also, in 
2017, the Las Vegas and Sutherland Springs church shootings occurred, claiming 59 and 27 
victims respectively, each accounting for 0.005% of homicides in the United States. The other 
mass shootings that remain branded in the public psyche, Columbine, Virginia Tech, Sandy 
Hook, and Stoneman Douglas, together claimed 92 lives across 19 years. The tragedies of these 
events should not be minimalized or forgotten. However, tragedies of this scale occur every year, 
more than once, in some of the United States’ largest cities, and the names of the victims go 
unsung in the annals of history.  
In 2017, the homicide rate in St. Louis, Missouri was 64 per 100,000, in Birmingham, 
Alabama it was 52.7 per 100,000, in Baltimore, Maryland it was 51.1 per 100,000, in New 
Orleans, Louisiana it was 40 per 100,000, in Chicago, Illinois, it was 20 per 100,000 (UCR, 
2017). To put this into perspective, in 2016 San Salvador had a homicide rate of 136 per 
100,000, Guatemala sat at 70.8 per 100,000, and Tijuana, Mexico had a rate of 49.8 per 100,000. 
Some of these cities and countries have been defined as active war zones (Muggah & Tobón, 
2017). In St. Louis, a homicide rate of 64 per 100,000 translates into 205 lives, in Baltimore, 342 
lives, in Birmingham, 110 lives, and in New Orleans 157 lives, and in Chicago, a jaw dropping 
653 lives (UCR, 2017).  Listed here are only five cities in only one year. In one year in five 
cities, 1,467 lives were lost. At first glance, it is almost insulting that the 92 lives lost in public 
shootings over the past 19 years have managed to overshadow the 1,467 lives lost in one year 
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alone. Only when placed side by side does it become clear that larger problems loom over the 
United States. Unfortunately, public mass shootings attract the media and violent crime in major 
metropolises slide into shadow. Even worse, some public representatives tend to draw attention 
even further away from places like St. Louis or Chicago and lure the spotlight towards the 
“culture of violence.”  
In the wake of public rampage shootings, many of the questions that percolate into view 
include: What was the motivation? Who was the shooter? How many died? Did the shooter play 
violent video games? Despite many years and a vast collection of research suggesting that video 
games are not significantly related to violent crime (Bensley & Eenwyk, 2001; Ward, 2011; 
Markey et. al., 2014; Cunningham et. al., 2016; Stacey, 2016; Markey & Ferguson, 2017; 
DeCamp & Ferguson, 2017; Przybylski & Weinstein, 2019), the public’s perception that violent 
video games have some causal relationship with violence persists. A 2017 Pew report suggests 
that as many as 60% of adults in the U.S. believe that gun violence in video games is a 
significant contributor to gun violence in the real world (Parker et. al., 2017).  
Much of the research done investigating the “problem” of violent video games has been 
firmly planted in psychology laboratories. This research has proven invaluable in showing that 
the effects of video games are complex. Research shows that the effects vary depending on the 
type of video game being played, how long it’s being played, why it’s being played, who is 
playing, and who it is being played with. Different video game studies have at once shown that 
games can increase aggression, increase prosocial thinking, increase cognitive functioning, and 
decrease cognitive functioning all depending on the question being asked (Gentile, Bender, & 
Anderson 2017; Boot, Blakely, & Simons, 2011; Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2010; Gentile, 2009). 
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The hypothesis that video games are responsible, or at least partly responsible, for the recent 
trends in mass shootings is unsubstantiated thus far (Ferguson, 2008; Ferguson, Coulson, & 
Barnett, 2011; Karnedy, 2016; Markey & Ferguson, 2017). But the idea that violent video games 
are a significant risk factor in influencing potential mass shooters has implications not just for 
mass murder, but for violent crime in general. If violent video games can push individuals to 
commit violent criminal acts, the massive popularity of video games around the world should 
have brought about a violent crime explosion the likes of which have never been seen before. 
This study is an attempt to identify the far-reaching effects that video games may (or may 
not) have on violent crime rates in the United States’ largest cities. Some of these cities are home 
to violent crime rates higher than anywhere else in the United States. Violent crime does not 
exist in a vacuum, just as video game culture does not. The phenomena that impact violent 
crime, such as concentrated poverty, income inequality, high divorce rates and population 
density have been described as the “structural covariates of homicide” (Land, McCall, & Cohen, 
1990; McCall, Land, & Parker, 2010). If it is true that violent video games impact criminal 
behavior, it should also be true that high crime areas should be home to a thriving video game 
culture. There may also be “structural covariates of gaming”: necessities in an area that allows 
for a thriving video game community. Factors include the availability of video game stores, 
quality of internet, availability of internet, percentage of the population owning a gaming device, 
and so on. The question is this, which has a more powerful influence on violent crime, the 
structural covariates of violent crime or the structural covariates of gaming?  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Why Video Games? 
 
Before unveiling links in the chain of causation between violent crime, video games, and 
social environment, we must first ask, why video games? This seemingly arbitrary pastime has 
garnered a lot of attention for itself in the decades since its inception. In 1992 and 1993, two 
video games made their debut to the excitement and mortification of the general public: Mortal 
Combat (Midway Games, 1992) and DOOM (id Software, 1993). These two games made waves 
in entertainment for three reasons. The first reason is obvious, the blood and the gore. Even in a 
pixelated form that would seem quaint to us today, the ability to blow off a demons head in 
DOOM or rip out the spine of your opponent in Mortal Kombat was edgy in the 1990’s video 
game market. Mortal Kombat is the seed that germinated the Entertainment Software Rating 
Board (ESRB) which operates to this day to help prevent underaged youth from buying video 
games for mature audiences. The second reason is that you, the player, could activate the carnage 
yourself. Sure, you could watch RoboCop (1987) stick a sharp blade into Kurtwood Smith’s neck 
or in the same film watch Paul McCrane melt alive in toxic waste, but you couldn’t commit the 
deed yourself. The third reason video games ignited panic in parents is because kids wanted to 
play them. Most of the marketing campaigns were directed towards children. The threat of 
morally corrupting kids is and always has been a cardinal sin in the eyes of parents, and the 
backlash that ensued reflected as much.  
 "We're talking about video games that glorify violence and teach children to enjoy 
inflicting the most gruesome forms of cruelty imaginable", (Washington Post, 1993). This is 
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from an interview with Senator Joseph Lieberman following an incident involving his son’s 
exposure to Mortal Kombat for the first time in 1993. If the quote seems familiar, it’s because its 
echo has been heard in recent years. Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin had this to say after the 
Stoneman Douglas High School massacre, “There are video games that…celebrate the slaughter 
of people. There are games that literally replicate and give people the ability to score points 
for…finishing someone off who's lying there begging for their life. We are desensitizing young 
people to the actual tragic reality and permanency of death” (Leland Conway Show, 2018). What 
this goes to show is that not much has changed in the minds of many public representatives, nor 
has it necessarily changed in the eyes of the public. A 2017 Pew report suggests that as many as 
60% of adults in the U.S. believe that gun violence in video games is a significant contributor to 
gun violence in the real world (Parker et. al., 2017). If this was true, one begins to wonder how 
many gamers have transformed into violent lunatics after “exposure” to this cultural pestilence. 
 As of 2019, 75% of US households have at least one “gamer” in the household who plays 
3 or more hours of video games per week and 65% of Americans play some form of video game 
every day, from Solitaire, to Candy Crush, to World of Warcraft (ESA, 2019). Sixty percent of 
“gamers” play on their smart-phone, 52% play on a personal computer, and 49% have a 
dedicated game console, such as a PlayStation or and Xbox, since many gamers play on multiple 
devices (ESA, 2019). Let’s put this into perspective. Sixty-five percent of the United States is 
equivalent to around 200 million people. When Europe, Asia, Australia, and the rest of the world 
are added, conjecture puts the number of gamers in the world somewhere around 2.5 billion 
(Gough 2019). Total consumer spending on video games and their associated technologies such 
as consoles, controllers, etc., for the United States went from $35 billion in 2018 to $43.4 billion 
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in 2019. It is also true that the US video game industry has added $11.7 billion to the country’s 
GDP (ESA 2018, 2019). There doesn’t appear to be any sign that video games will lose 
popularity any time soon.  
According to the same 2019 Entertainment Software Association report, 20.9% of video 
game sales are in the “shooter” genre and 7.8% are in the “fighting” genre. Let’s pretend for a 
moment that each of those genre-specific sales represents a single gamer. This is probably 
inaccurate because the same gamer can, and likely does, buy more than one type of game (ESA 
2018, 2019). But for the sake of argument, let’s play along. Those genre-specific sales translate 
into 57.6 million people in the United States playing shooting and fighting games. If these 
figures are similar around the world, that translates into around 700 million people playing 
shooting and fighting games. If the theory that violent video games desensitize people to the 
point where they, “forget that people have feelings,” and are motivated to commit appalling 
violent crimes, there should be legions of gamers out there committing atrocities every day in 
multiple countries around the world.  
On an episode of Fox & Friends, commenting on the El Paso Walmart shooting, Dan 
Patrick the Lieutenant Governor of Texas, claims to, “look at the common denominators”, and 
asks, “what has changed in this country? We’ve always had guns, we’ve always had evil… but I 
see a video game industry that teaches young people to kill” (Patrick, 2019). Unfortunately for 
this claim, violent crime rates have seen a steep decline in the United States since DOOM and 
Mortal Kombat debuted in the 1990s, and non-war related homicide deaths seem to be slowly 
declining around the world as well (Eisner, 2003; GHDE 2017). There must be some reason why 
violent video games and other violent media are not doing the corrupting work that people like 
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Dan Patrick, Matt Bevin, Donald Trump, and Joseph Lieberman say they are doing to today’s 
youth. The question is, why not? 
Violent Video Games, Aggression, and Violence 
 
Following the 2018 Sante Fe High School shooting that claimed the lives of ten students, 
the lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick had this to say on CNN, “97%... of teenagers view video 
games, and 85% of those video games are violent. ...what are these games showing you how to 
do? Kill people. ... The vast majority [of psychologists and psychiatrists] will tell you it leads 
them to become numb to violence, to have less empathy to their victims and be more aggressive” 
(Simon, 2018). These are very particular claims. Teenagers will become, “numb to violence”, 
they will have, “less empathy to their victims”, and they will, “be more aggressive” after, 
“viewing video games”. What does it mean for a violent video game, or any piece of violent 
media for that matter, to influence a person to such a degree that they are motivated to physically 
assault or even murder another human being? Let’s take this one step at a time. First order of 
business is understanding how a person’s aggression is influenced or influenceable. To do this, 
the General Aggression Model (GAM) will be discussed. Second, what role does violent media 
playing the causal chain that leads to an aggressive behavior or thought? Lastly, conflicting 
evidence will be considered regarding aggression, violent crime, and the path between the two. It 
is important to understand the potentially important differences between criminal violence, like 
assault and homicide, and laboratory aggression. 
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The General Aggression Model 
 
The General Aggression Models (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall, 
Anderson, & Bushman, 2011) is defined as a social-cognitive model and attempts to bridge the 
gap between neuroanatomical, psychological, and sociological forces that play important roles in 
the production of aggressive and violent behaviors. As a testament to its ambitions, the model 
was designed to incorporate social learning theory, script theory, cognitive neo-association 
theory, excitation transfer theory, social information processing theory, and the 
cognitive/behavioral processes underlying systematic desensitization therapy (Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002; 2018). It suggests an explanatory power that can illuminate the processes of 
violence that occur not just within university facilities, but outside of a laboratory context and in 
short or long terms time horizons. This theoretical framework turns on two definitions that are 
often emphasized and defined in the studies and papers that apply the GAM. The two definitions 
are aggression and violence. Aggression is often defined as, “behavior intended to harm another 
person who does not want to be harmed” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Violence then is defined 
as behavior intended to do extreme physical harm, such as injury or death (Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002). GAM operates on three fundamental stages that help explain a, “single episodic 
cycle of aggression” (See Figure 1; DeWall, Anderson, & Bushman, 2011). 
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Figure 1. The General Aggression Model 
 
The stages are, (1) the individual and the situational inputs (personality predisposition, mood, 
provocation, violence exposure), (2) internal states (arousal, cognition, general affect), and (3) 
the outcome of the decision-making process (thoughtful or impulsive).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. GAM - Proximal & Distal Causal Factors 
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What solidifies a pattern of behavior in the GAM is the feedback loop that perpetuates it. 
This means that when an aggressive encounter occurs (shoving, shouting, thinking aggressive 
thoughts, exposure to violent images, etc.), it exists to prime the individual to react in a similar 
way given a comparable context in either of the stages to behave the same way in the future. 
Under the light of GAM, violent media such as television, movies, music, and video games seem 
to be part of the mechanism that propels certain individuals, with certain predispositions, under 
certain circumstances, to lash out in a litany of ways. Presentation matters as well. “…How 
violence or aggression is presented can alter its meaning for the audience and may moderate 
viewers’ behavioral, cognitive, and emotional reactions” (Anderson et al., 2003). This means that 
the differences between cartoonish aggression such as Bowser bumping a Mario Kart (1992) off 
a cliff and realistic violence such as ripping your human opponent in half in Mortal Kombat 11 
(2019) may well be significant, even though both are described as aggressive in studies of media 
violence (Thompson & Haninger, 2001; Gentile et al., 2007).  It is within the framework of the 
General Aggression Model (GAM) that the research in the next section is situated. 
Early Research on Media Violence & Aggression 
 
Aside from being deployed usefully in understanding suicide, intimate partner violence 
(IPV), and intergroup violence (DeWall, Anderson, & Bushman, 2011), GAM has been 
implemented to understand the subtle, but real, effects that media violence exposure can have on 
human aggression (Plante & Anderson, 2017). At first, the primary focus of media violence 
studies was television and movies. There are, in fact, differences in effect based on the type of 
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engagement with violent media (Greenfield, 2014). For instance, violent movies, television, and 
music are consumed passively. That is, the user does not add input to the media that could affect 
it. Video games on the other hand, are active in that the user does ad input to the system which 
changes the engagement with the medium. One cannot change the lyrics of a song or a scene in a 
movie (besides turning it off) but one can choose not to pull the trigger or make other equivalent 
decisions in video games.  
Short-term, experimental methodologies consisted of exposure and effects over time 
periods ranging from minutes to days. The experiments often played out in a typical fashion, 
where randomly assigned groups would watch either a non-violent or violent movie or television 
episode, and then the subjects would be observed. What was being observed or recorded varies 
from study to study. There are studies where physical violence is expressed after exposure to 
violent media. The logic is that the best predictor of violence in the future is violence in the past 
(Huesmann & Moise, 1998; Tremblay, 2000), and since children around the age of seven have 
more trouble than older children distinguishing reality from fiction (Davies, 1997), it seems 
important to take seriously the occurrence of aggressive feelings and thoughts following 
experience and exposure with violent media of all types, especially in children. 
For example, in one early study (Josephson, 1987) a group of young boys aged seven to 
nine were split in two, where one group watched a violent movie and the other a non-violent 
movie. After watching the movie, the children played a floor hockey game and were observed 
for the number of times each boy hit, knocked, tripped, or shoved another boy during the game. 
Results showed that the boys who watched the violent movie were moderately more likely than 
the boys who watched the non-violent movie to act in these aggressive ways. There is another 
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longitudinal study done between 1977 and 1992, where TV consumption and peer-nominated 
aggression were associated with aggressive behavior later in life (Huesmann, Moise, Podolski, & 
Eron, 2003). However, in much of the research on aggression and media, what is recorded is not 
real violence per se, but aggressive feelings and aggressive thoughts (Anderson et al., 2003),  
Aggressive thinking is usually a belief set or posture towards a given stimulus that is 
aggressive or violent. Aggressive thinking can occur without the emotions of anger, disgust, or 
embarrassment. Aggressive emotions are just that, the feelings inside that prime an individual to 
lash out. Emotions and thinking influence each other. For instance, many high-octane action 
sequences, scenes of violence, or sexually explicit scenes in television and video games increase 
physiological arousal. Physiological arousal is measured by increases in heart rate, blood 
pressure, and activity in the region of the brain responsible for fight or flight (Gentile, Bender, & 
Anderson, 2017; Anderson & Bushman, 2018). Aggressive and violent acts in media will 
stimulate these same arousal circuits in the brain, increase the heart rate and increase blood 
0pressure. When thinking about GAM, the arousal prompted by violent imagery has the potential 
to reinforce these same responses, thus making it more likely (in theory) that someone with 
repeated exposure to violent stimuli will be more likely to react aggressively under similarly 
provocative circumstances in the real world. As evidence of this link, one paper describes 
instances of imitation, e.g., copycat crimes (Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007). For instance, in one 
anecdote: “A teenager who is arrested for delinquency and taken to a police station suddenly 
grabs an officer’s gun, shoots him, walks down the corridor of the station shooting others 
systematically, steals a police car, and races away. The scene closely mimics a scenario from the 
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video game Grand Theft Auto, which [the teenager] has been playing over and over” (pg. 555, 
Huesmann & Kirwil, 2007). The real question is, how many others have done the same thing? 
One metanalysis summarizing most of the research up until 2001 found that most 
methodologically valid studies published on the topic of violent video game exposure and 
aggressive cognition (thoughts) and aggressive affect (feelings) reported small, but significant 
results correlating them (Anderson & Bushman, 2001). There is also cross-cultural evidence 
supporting the link between violent media of all types and short-term aggressive effects in 
multiple countries including Australia, China, Croatia, Germany, Japan, Romania, the United 
States (Anderson et al. 2017). This study in particular used questionnaires that measured self-
reported aggression such as, “if someone pushes me, I would push back,” verbal aggression, “I 
can’t help but getting into arguments with people who disagree with me,” and relational 
aggression, “I sometimes spread rumors that may hurt someone,” and found positive 
relationships between these measures and violent media exposure. 
Desensitization, Empathy, & Consensus 
 
 Besides aggression and violence, many researchers and parents find the 
phenomenon of desensitization to violence and reductions in empathy just as important in the 
causal framework of real-life aggression. The common definition of desensitization is, “the 
process through which a person’s emotional reactions to some stimulus habituate and diminish 
over time with repeated exposures to that stimulus (Anderson & Bushman, 2018; Wolpe, 1958). 
It is important to recognize that desensitization to violence is not always a necessarily negative 
thing. Surgeons, police, soldiers, or even homicide researchers need to have some degree of 
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desensitization to operate, but it is often perceived as negative for young children. 
Desensitization, or dehumanization, is also present on the list of relevant influences in the 
General Aggression Model.  
Early research attempted to evaluate exposure to violent video games and desensitization 
to images of real-world violence by measuring heart rate and galvanic skin response as measures 
of physical responsiveness (Carnagey, Anderson, & Bushman; 2007). The results showed 
significant deviations in heart rate and galvanic skin response between participants who played a 
violent video game for 20 minutes before viewing real violence and those who played non-
violent video games. In 64 gamers who played 25 minutes violent video games and were 
subjected to an EEG (electroencephalogram) scan to measure desensitization to violent imagery,  
participants who did not respond as much to the violent imagery were also more likely to play a 
louder noise blast in the years of an opponent who lost a reaction time task (Engelhardt et al., 
2011). Desensitization to violence through violent video games has also been linked to 
reductions in helping behaviors (Bushman & Anderson, 2009). In this study, a group of college 
students (320) played either a violent video game or a non-violent one and were left to deal with 
a staged fight outside of the experiment room. In the study, participants who played the violent 
video game took longer to interject and help. In the same paper, similar results were found 
following a violent movie.  
Desensitization also has an indirect impact on a person’s potentially aggressive reaction. 
Instead of impacting aggression directly, exposure to violent media may reduce empathy with 
others, thus leading to more aggressive or violent impulses going uninhibited. Empathy, or lack 
thereof, has also been linked to aggressive behavior (Eisenberg, 2000; Marshall & Marshall, 
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2011). Empathy is described as, “the intellectual identification with, or vicarious experiencing of 
the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of another; the imaginative ascribing to an object, as a natural 
object or work of art, feelings, or attitudes present in oneself” (Zinn, 1993).  
In 2003 a research team (Funk et al., 2003) administered a questionnaire to a group of 
thirty-five 8-10 year olds who were asked how much they played video games and the types of 
video games they played. Funk et al. took measures regarding attitudes towards aggression and 
empathy and presented vignettes in images that depict acts of aggression that should elicit 
empathy. For instance, one vignette had a little girl tripping, falling, and injuring her knee. Long-
term exposure to violent video games was associated with lower empathy score responses to 
these images. A meta-analysis was conducted testing the validity of many of the claims 
discussed thus far, such as the impacts of short versus long term violent video game exposure on 
desensitization, empathy, aggression, and arousal in studies from the United States to Japan 
(Anderson et al., 2010). Once all studies were accounted for based on rigorous inclusion 
parameters, there were 221 effect size estimates and over 130,000 participants across all of the 
studies. Regarding empathy and desensitization, violent video games were significantly 
associated with lower empathy despite differences in methodologies and culture. Similar findings 
in this study were reported for aggressive cognition and behavior.  
In 2017, the American Psychological Association Task Force decided to take on the 
violent video game debate. They investigated studies published between 2009 and 2013 and 
other existing literature surrounding the debate about the adverse effects of violent video games 
on society. The team ultimately concluded that there are, “robust correlations between violent 
video game use and aggressive behavior…violent video game use is associated with growth in 
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aggressive behavior over time…outcomes demonstrate clear and consistent adverse effects of 
violent video game exposure on the social and cognitive behaviors of children, youth and adults” 
(Calvert et al., 2017, pg. 137-138). The team also investigated empathy and desensitization, 
concluding that there is a, “decrease in positive outcomes such as pro-social behavior, empathy, 
and sensitivity to aggression” (Calvert et al., 2017, pg. 141). Despite all the evidence 
surrounding aggression, the task force also concluded that it, “did not find sufficient studies to 
evaluate whether there is a link between violent video game use and criminal behavior” (Calvert 
et al., 2017, pg. 141). This comment matters more than all of the violent video game research 
combined and will be discussed further in later sections.  
For now, one thing is certain regarding the topic of video games and their effects on 
behavior and thinking: there are impacts. What matters is the thinking surrounding the problem. 
Discussion of causality often gets muddled in the media, even if the relationships discussed are 
elaborated on and have important caveats attached to them. It is a matter of probabilistic 
causality. This topic is touched on beautifully by Bushman & Anderson (2015, pg. 1810), 
“The old “necessary and sufficient” rules of causality commonly taught in introductory 
logic courses do not apply in most of modern medical, behavioral, and social science. As 
an example, the scientific community has known for decades that habitual tobacco 
smoking causes lung cancer. Even the general public now accepts this fact. However, 
not all people who smoke get lung cancer, and some people who do not smoke get lung 
cancer. The former violates the “sufficiency” rule, whereas the latter violates the 
“necessity” rule. In short, smoking is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of lung 
cancer. Yet we “know” that smoking causes lung cancer. The resolution to this paradox 
is simple. Causality in this context is probabilistic. The short statement, “Smoking 
causes lung cancer,” really means, “Smoking causes an increase in the likelihood of 
contracting lung cancer.” Similarly, when media violence researchers say that “Violent 
media cause aggression,” they mean that “Violent media exposure causes an increase in 
the likelihood of aggression.” 
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The real question then becomes, how much of an increase in the likelihood of aggression does 
exposure to violent video games induce? What forces increase, reduce, or deadlock the effects 
discussed thus far? The “consensus” on violent video games have been thoroughly challenged in 
multiple arenas and the conversation is far from over.  
Critiques & Contradictory Evidence 
  
 The general thrust of the research discussed thus far is an indirect attempt to help 
explain real world violence. There is no denying the swath of evidence linking exposure to 
violent media and aggressive behavior in the long and the short term (Plante & Anderson, 2017). 
Most, if not all, of the research reviewed up to this point and the mountain of research not 
included have used seemingly well-designed experimental, longitudinal, and cross-cultural 
methodologies to measure aggressive behavior. It may seem like the case is closed and that video 
games may indeed be the villain of this story of human aggression. But one would be mistaken 
for jumping to conclusions. There is an entire wing of research that presents evidence that 
contradicts the “consensus” discussed thus far. This research creates complications in the 
discourse surrounding the truly complex causal mechanism between a human being, their 
environment, and the commission of a violent criminal offense.  
Much violent video game research relies on measures and methodologies of aggression 
that have remained hitherto unmentioned but cannot be understated or overlooked when 
discussing connections being made between violent video games and aggression. One cannot ask 
study participants to commit violence in the name of science, so indirect methods are the only 
paths by which laboratory and correlational research can be accomplished. This is not a dig at the 
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research or the researchers who have worked diligently and with good intentions to illuminate 
the relationships between human aggression and violent media. On the contrary, the evaluation 
of the evidence has been in a good faith attempt to engage with the merits of such research and 
engage it on its own terms, illustrating the claims with vivid examples of the connections drawn. 
The studies dealt with thus far have used questionnaires (parent, peer, teacher, and self-reports) 
to detail the degrees of aggressive cognition, affect, and behavior primarily among youth. The 
measures include feelings, thoughts, and acts of aggression directed at friends, peers, parents, 
and teachers after being exposed to violent media for various periods of time measuring ranges 
from minutes to years.  
However, the limits of laboratory and correlational methodologies have and will continue 
to be a weakness in social science despite the best intentions and methodological designs. 
Critique is both necessary and warranted in science to achieve the clearest picture of reality. In 
social science, this task is made difficult by the whirlwind of variables that confound and confuse 
attempts to draw such pictures. In the pages that follow methodologies will be criticized and 
evidence will be presented that will blur the picture in very significant ways by detailing 
pathways and effects that can change the influences that violent video games can have on an 
individual. From reductions in aggression to the promotion of prosocial behavior, increases in 
empathy and maybe even a reduction in crime, video games are not corroding the fabric of 
society as the previous research suggests.  
With that in mind, the first order of business is critiques of methodologies. As stated a 
moment ago, scientists cannot ask participants to commit violence in the conventional sense of 
injuring or killing another human being. Proxy measures are the only route into the phenomenon 
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before the threshold of liability is crossed. One such proxy is known as the Taylor Competitive 
Reaction Time Test (TCRTT) also used and labeled as the Competitive Reaction Time Test 
(CRTT). It is used in a multitude of research causally connecting video game aggression and 
“real-life” aggression (Anderson et al., 2004; 2007; Bartholow, Sestir, & Davis, 2005; Anderson 
& Carnagey, 2009; Bartlett et al. 2009). 
The TCRTT is arranged to create the illusion that a participant is competing with another 
person in a competition to see who can press a button faster. The confederate is often not another 
participant, but an illusion to allow for the next stage of the test. The “winner” of the competition 
gets to punish the other “participant” with a noise blast (between 0 dB and 95 dB) or a splash of 
hot sauce for their opponent who doesn’t like spicy food. Aggressive behavior is indicated by the 
volume of the sound or amount of hot sauce prescribed by the winner for the “loser”. These 
methods are well worn and defended in psychological research regarding tendencies toward 
aggressive behavior (Anderson & Bushman, 1997; Giancola & Parrott, 2008) but they are also 
heavily criticized (Ferguson et al., 2008; Ferguson & Rueda, 2009; Adachi & Willoughby, 2011; 
Elson et al., 2014). 
 For instance, there is more to a violent video game than just violence. There is pacing, 
character scripts, objectives, and degrees of frustration, skill, or competitiveness. These 
confounding factors are almost never accounted for in video game aggression studies and if they 
are, inconsistently accounted for. When understanding violence in the framework of the General 
Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002), there have been attempts to account for things 
like difficulty and frustration (Anderson & Carnagey, 2009). This is convoluted when one 
remembers that video game violence is supposed to influence aggressive behavior by provoking 
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physiological arousal, aggressive thoughts, and aggressive feelings. “Thus, some of the video 
game dimensions that Anderson and colleagues have attempted to match are not actually 
characteristics of the video games themselves, but instead are variables related to one's internal 
state” (Adachi & Willoughby, 2011, pg. 58). 
 Adachi & Willoughby (2011) also raise the issue of competitiveness in both the TCRTT 
and violent video games. Many video games are incentivized to gain high scores, points, and 
ranks in order to move forward and become more powerful. Be it against artificial enemies like 
in DOOM or “real enemies” like in Fortnite (2017), the root of violent video games is essentially 
competitive. Therefore, “if the main intent for participants to deliver intense punishments to their 
opponents is to gain an advantage in the competition, instead of to actually cause harm to their 
opponents, then the TCRTT would actually be measuring competitiveness rather than 
aggression. Furthermore, participants may not even consider the fact that they could be causing 
harm to their opponents, depending on how immersed they become within the competition” 
(Adachi & Willoughby, 2011, pg. 60). In one test of the TCRTT, Feruson et al. (2008) found that 
scores on the test were not related to aggressive personality traits, commission of domestic 
violence, or violent criminal behaviors. 
 What these observations do to the conversation is not trivial. Understanding that errors in 
methodology and spurious correlations are not the results of incompetent research design, 
incompetent researchers, or malicious intent to mislead on the part of violent video game 
researchers who are confident in the dangers of violent video games. What it does mean is that 
the issues surrounding violent video games are misunderstood due to the incompleteness in the 
research. As stated previously, video games are incredibly complex technologies. Nothing like 
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video games has ever permeated the human condition before. Agency, decision making, 
emotional storytelling, violence, realism, entertainment, competition and cooperation have never 
been bundled together into diverse experiences until the last few decades, and the games keep 
getting better. A single video game can encapsulate all these things, while some video games 
capture only a few, yet they are all lumped into the same category in the public eye.  
 Just like books, there are genres. A horror game like Dead Space (2008), where 
you are a lone engineer on a spaceship taken over by a zombie-like alien force and left to fend 
for yourself against hordes of human corpses taken over by the alien couldn’t be more different 
from an open world RPG like Fallout 4 (2015). Set in post-nuclear-war Boston, you play a 
mother (or father) hell bent on finding your missing son somewhere out there in the nuclear 
wasteland, taking out zombies, monsters and raiders that get in your way, forging alliances, and 
making moral decisions that impact other people in the wasteland. Both games use firearms (or 
tools that shoot projectiles) and melee weapons to take out enemies; some zombies, some 
humans, some monsters. Yet the motivations, goals, settings, tones, pace, and style are wholly 
different. In one, you are stuck on a ship with tight corridors, in the other, you have all of Boston 
to explore. In one, you can make friends, in the other you are alone. In one, the fate of the 
wasteland comes down to decisions you make, in the other, your decisions are limited to 
survival. Yet in both games, you can blow heads off and severe limbs. To claim that “violent” 
video games is a distinguishable definition that encapsulates all that matters in a video game is 
missing most of the picture. Complexity and sociality are but two dimensions in which video 
games can be differentiated (see Figure 3). Even still, violence is present in multiple games in 
each quadrant. 
23 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The people that play violent video games are just as diverse as the games themselves. 
Even worse, these diverse people, playing various games, play for different reasons, in different 
contexts, and for different periods of time. With the variability at play here it is difficult not to 
look at video games as Daphne Bavelier does. As Bavelier puts it, “One can no more say what 
the effects of video games are, than one can say what the effects of food are” (Bavelier et al., 
2011, p. 763). With this idea in tow and since the majority of the analysis thus far has focused on 
the complexities of the “violent video games make for more aggressive people” argument, equal 
focus will be allotted to the lighter side of the video game debate: the benefits of video games. 
 
Figure 3. Game Genres - Complexity & Sociality. Conceptual map of video game genres based on 
levels of complexity and social interaction (Granic, Lobel, Engels, 2014) *MMORPG: Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game 
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The Benefits of Video Games 
  
With the discussion surrounding video games being predominantly situated into context 
of fear and societal risk, it seems prescient to redirect the spotlight. To set the stage, a 
qualification is in order. The potentially positive effects of video games do not cancel the 
potentially negative effects discussed thus far. What it does do is complicate the conversation 
about the causal mechanism between a video game and real-world violence. Of course, 
proponents of the media aggression – real-world aggression link never make this claim, it is 
often digested by the public incorrectly. 
In 2014, a meta-analysis reviewed 98 independent studies attempting to coax out the 
different effects that different types of games can have on behavior (Greitemeyer & Mügge, 
2014). This meta-analysis focused on the differences between anti-social, violent video games 
and prosocial, helping video games in their effects on aggression and prosocial behaviors. It 
found that, “video gameplay can both negatively and positively affect the player” (pg. 581) and 
that, “…the overall effect sizes of violent video game exposure (r = .18) and prosocial video 
game exposure (r = .22) were relatively similar in terms of their magnitude” (pg. 583). The 
analysis both confirmed that video game aggression does increase aggressive cognition and 
“behavior” (in the form of the TCRTT) and that prosocial video games increase prosocial 
behavior and decrease aggressive cognition (Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2014). What does this 
mean? It means that video games can and do have an impact on social conduct, no matter how 
minutely.  
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 The following section will be scaffolded onto a literature review titled, “The Benefits of 
Playing Video Games,” by Isabela Granic, Adam Lobel, and Rutger Engels (2014). The positive 
aspects of video games are divided up into four subsections: cognitive, motivational, emotional, 
and social. Cognitive benefits consist of visual-spatial and problem-solving skills. In many video 
games, particularly fast-paced shooters, fast reflexes, quick attention allocation, boosted mental 
rotation abilities, and high spatial resolution processing are the skills needed to win and succeed. 
It turns out that gamers who regularly play shooting and action games have these skills in spades 
when compared to non-gamers (C.S. Green & Bavelier, 2012) and these skills are comparable to 
collegiate level training courses designed to produce the same effects (Uttal et al., 2013). Even 
more impressive and important for real-world outcomes, these same spatial skills predict 
achievement in STEM (Science Technology Engineering Math) fields (Wai, Lubinski, Benbow, 
& Steiger, 2010). Outside of shooters and action games, many video games have puzzles or 
puzzle-like game mechanics that are left for the player to deal with little to no instruction on how 
to accomplish the puzzles. This is often the realm of strategy and role-playing games like World 
of Warcraft (2004) or StarCraft (2017). One longitudinal study showed that adolescents who 
reported playing strategic video games also reported better problem-solving skills and had better 
academic grades over a year’s time (Adachi & Willoughby, 2013). This is just the beginning.  
 Motivational benefits are also in the repertoire of positive video game effects. 
Motivational benefits usually take the form of persistence and effortful engagement in the face of 
challenge, adversity, and failure (Dweck & Molden, 2005). Video games are home to many 
motivational and goal-oriented incentive structures, yet failure seems to be the most important 
when it comes to valuable skills that can be taken away from the virtual environment. Just about 
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every video game on the market and in the past have fail states, where one does not accomplish a 
given challenge and therefore must try all over again. The essential message that is expressed by 
the incentive structures of most video games is, “persistence in the face of failure reaps valued 
rewards” (Granic, Lobel, & Engels, 2014, pg. 6; Ventura, Shute, & Zhao, 2013), a lesson as 
useful as it is timeless.  
Yet another benefit of video gameplay comes in the form of emotional regulation. A 
great deal of research has been done exemplifying the ability of gamers who play games of their 
own preference allows them to increase positive emotions, improve mood, encourage relaxation, 
and even fend off anxiety (Ryan, Rigby, & Przybylzki, 2006; Russoniello, O’Brien, & Parks, 
2009; 2009; McGonigal, 2011). As an adaptation and emotional regulation strategy, video games 
have been documented as a common tactic to help regulate emotions (Olson, 2010). Positive 
emotional regulation strategies such as acceptance and problem-solving in concert with positive 
emotion have been linked to social support and reductions in symptoms of depression and 
anxiety (Aldao, Nolen-Hocksema, & Schweizer, 2010). 
The final and arguably most important potential benefit extracted from video games are 
social in nature. The ESA 2019 report holds that 63% of adult gamers play with others online for 
an average of 4.8 hours per week or in-person for an average of 3.5 hours per week. The most 
popular shooter on the market currently is the infamous Fortnite (2017) which drops you either 
alone or with a team onto a map with 100 others, where you must coordinate and compete to 
eliminate all other players to claim victory. The other very famous online open-world RPG is of 
course, World of Warcraft (2005) which pits you in a massive open world with hundreds of other 
players with differing skill sets to either cooperate to take down legendary monsters or compete 
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alone or together in guilds in massive battles. World of Warcraft still captures the attention of 
around 3 million gamers around the world, where Fortnite now dominates the hearts and minds 
of 250 million gamers! Even humble Farmville on Facebook boasts millions of daily users.  
What these games have in common is not just social interaction but design that 
encourages cooperation and helping behaviors There is an entire class in MMORPG’s 
(Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games) and other socially-oriented games called 
the “healer” or “medic,” a class specifically designed not to fight but to heal teammates and 
revive them in times of defeat. One important longitudinal study consisting of participants 
ranging from 5th to 8th graders in Japan and Singapore, and college students in the U.S. showed 
that prosocial video game content, as opposed to strictly uncooperative violent video game 
content, resulted in increased prosocial actions known as helping behaviors (Gentile et al., 2009; 
See Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Prosocial vs. Violent Video Games. Helpful and hurtful behavior as a function of type 
of video game. Helpful behavior defined as choosing easier tasks for partners, hurting defined as 
choosing difficult tasks. (Gentile et al., 2009) 
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 There is also evidence suggesting that prosocial video gameplay increases the 
availability of prosocial thoughts (in the form of anagram lexical decision tasks), increases 
empathy, and extraordinarily, deceases Schadenfreude (Greitemyery, Osswald & Brauer, 2010; 
Greitemeyer & Osswald, 2011). Schadenfreude is the German world for, “taking joy in others 
pain”. One would be forgiven for expecting that prosocial gameplay without violence is the only 
style of video game capable of producing such effects. One would again be mistaken for thinking 
this. There is research that shows that cooperation is the key element when discussing prosocial 
outcomes, even in violent video games. 
In one study, players engaged either cooperatively or competitively in a popular online 
shooter Halo II (Ewoldsen et al., 2012). Players who played cooperatively were more likely to 
make fair exchanges compared to players who played competitively. Similar results were 
produced but with the added element of cooperating with an outgroup member (member wearing 
a rival university t-shirt), and results showed that cooperative gameplay even in violent settings 
produced fairer exchanges even between outgroup members when compared to competitive play 
(Velez et al., 2014). In another case (Ferguson & Garza, 2011), 873 youth between ages 12 and 
17 were screened for violent video game exposure, parental involvement in gaming, youth civic 
engagement (e.g., “I have volunteered in my community”), and online prosocial behavior (e.g., 
“When you play computer or console games, how often do you help or guide other players?”). 
Results showed that violent video gameplay was moderated by parental involvement and 
cooperative online behaviors, while also showing that community engagement was not 
significantly affected by violent video gameplay even when all other variables were controlled 
for.  
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What this goes to show is that video games, even violent video games, are layered by so 
many complex interaction styles and moderating effects that violence cannot alone produce the 
aggression expected from well-done laboratory research. The next questions that emerge take the 
analysis one step farther: what effects do video games produce on real-world violence? It is a 
very important question, one that begins to show where the rubber does or does not meet the road 
on societal risk that violent video games do or do not pose. Remember that the American 
Psychological Task Force (Calvert et al., 2017) failed to produce evidence that video games have 
any significant impact on the commission of violent criminal acts. The following section will 
explain why the team came to that conclusion.  
Video Games and Crime in the Real World 
 
Injury and death are by far two of the most consequential negative outcomes that 
determine public and private policy decisions. Whether it is in a factory, in a neighborhood, or at 
the gym, injury and death are the metrics which almost all rules are defined to avoid and protect 
against. When discussing potential danger to the social fabric, these two variables are the first to 
be discussed. Disease, war, natural disaster, nutrition, pharmaceuticals, guns, on-the-job risk, 
insurance, and government policy are just a few nouns whose discussions orbit injury and death. 
It follows then that an analysis of violent video games should also revolve around death and 
injury to determine the true threat that society is faced with. It turns out that there is not much to 
go on thus far. 
Recall the validity of the competitive reaction time test as it relates to real-world 
aggression. Ferguson et al. (2009) attempted to validate the Taylor Competitive Reaction Time 
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Test and instead found that the test results had almost nothing to do with violent crimes such as 
domestic abuse, assault or homicide. Instead, trait aggression, family violence, and male gender 
were far better predictors of violent crime compared to violent video games (Ferguson, Rueda, 
Cruz, & Ferguson, 2009). Other research on the topic of violent crime and violent video games 
have been done to substantiate the claim that video games have a miniscule and transient impact 
on the likelihood that a human being will murder or assault another human being. Of course, a 
statement of this magnitude needs to be caveated with the statement: depending on the person. 
 Following the sales figures of violent video games and juxtaposing them against violent 
crime rates would seem like a fitting start when attempting to draw a line between video games 
and violence. Remember that 27% of video game sales are in the “action” genre, 21% are in the 
“shooter” genre, 11% are in the sports genre, and 8% are in the “fighting” genre. That is 67% of 
video games with competitive, aggressive, and violent themes. Not to mention 11.3% are in the 
Role-Playing Game (RPG) genre, which consists of games like The Elder Scrolls: Skyrim 
(2012), Fallout 4 (2015) and The Witcher 3: Wild Hunt (2015), some of the top-grossing RPG’s 
in the 21st century, where players have the ability to decapitate and maim enemies with swords or 
firearms. With RPG’s added, there are potentially 78% of game sales in genres with violent 
themes. Let’s also remember that potentially 200 million people are playing video games in the 
United States as of 2019. Seventy-eight percent of 200 million gamers is 156 million gamers 
playing games that involve fighting, competing, shooting, maiming, or injuring. If the hypothesis 
that violent video games indeed make players more aggressive and therefore prone to violence, 
these facts should translate into violent crime rates skyrocketing in the United States and 
countries around the world. 
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 Following this logic, Markey, Markey, & French (2014) pull crime data from the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and juxtapose them against the video game sales between 1978 
and 2011. The team also compared sales between 2007 and 2011 on a monthly basis. They found 
no relationship between video game sales and homicides or assault. (See Figure 5 & Figure 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Annual changes in video game sales, homicide & aggravated assault rates between 1978-2011 
were negatively correlated (r (32) = -.84, p < .01). (Markey, Markey, & French, 2014) 
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Cunningham, Engelstatter, & Ward (2016) used the National Incident Based Reporting System 
(NIBRS) and the UCR between 2005 and 2010 to compare sales figures of all video games and 
“intensely violent” video games while also including variables like time on market, game 
quality, play data on play since purchase, and peak buying seasons (like Christmas) to calibrate 
their analysis. They not only found that violent crime and video game sales covariates are 
Figure 6. Monthly change in video game sales, homicide rates, and assault rates between 2007 and 2011. 
Changes in sales were unrelated (r (58) = -.15, p = .25) to homicide rates. (Markey, Markey, & French, 2014) 
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unrelated, but in some cases inversely related, where crime went down after popular video game 
releases.  
Ward (2011) uses video game stores and related establishments per county in the U.S. 
between 1994 and 2004, monthly unemployment rates, Law Enforcement assaulted or killed, all 
major crimes ranging from homicide to motor theft to burglary, County Business Patterns (CBP) 
for employment and payroll data, mortalities between the ages of 10 and 25, earnings per captita, 
and a host of other variables to show that crime tends to decrease with more video game 
establishments per county. The results also provide evidence that other factors, such as poor 
economic standing, percentage population aged 15-24, and unemployment rates are far better 
predictors of violent crime than any video game-related variables, a discussion that will be 
expanded upon later.   
In a paper presented at the Homicide Research Working Group (Segal, 2019), homicide 
rates in the United States 100 largest cities were plotted against WalletHub’s Best Cities for 
Gamers ranking (McCann, 2018). The rankings were based on a scoring system that considered 
three main variables: gaming environment, gaming opportunities, and Internet Quality/Speed. 
These are labeled by Segal as the structural covariates of gaming (SCG). The SCG, as opposed to 
the structural covariates of homicide (SCH; McCall, Parker, & MacDonald, 2008; McCall, Land, 
& Parker, 2010) are made up of variables like video game stores per capita, share of households 
owning a computer or smartphone, video game job openings, video game-related college 
degrees, internet access, internet speed and lots more. These variables were scored based on a 
proprietary algorithm unique to WalletHub, and then cities were rank ordered as the best to worst 
gaming cities. For instance, the best gaming city was Seattle, Washington, where the city was 
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ranked as having the 5th best gaming environment, 5th best internet quality, and 3rd best gaming 
development opportunities. The worst city for gaming was Detroit, coming in with the worst 
gaming environment and internet quality, and ranked 82nd for gaming opportunities. Segal (2019) 
then plotted these ranks against the homicide rates of the same 100 cities. When environment, 
opportunity, and internet scores are compiled into one score then plotted against homicide rates, 
the cities with lower gaming scores were significantly associated with higher homicide rates (See 
Figure 7).  
 
 
However, once disaggregated, the gaming opportunity and environment had no 
significant relationship to homicide rates (r = .156, p < .126; r = .038, p < .708). Instead, internet 
Figure 7. Gaming Rank vs. Homicide Rates in 100 Largest U.S. Cities. Aggregated gaming scores 
ranked from 1 – 100 where 100 is the poorest gaming score and 1 is the best. Plotted over 2017 
homicide rates from the Uniform Crime Report. Gaming rank significantly related to higher homicide 
rates (*r = .282, *𝜒2 = 18.25, *p < .01) (Segal, 2019). 
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access and quality, a common proxy measure for socioeconomic status (Howard, Busch, & 
Sheets, 2010; Witte & Mannon, 2010; Robinson et. al., 2015), were the most important variables 
in the SCG (See Figure 8). 
 
What this means for the conversation about violent video games and their relationship to 
crime is deeply important. What the research presented suggests is that other variables are far 
more important in predicting violence than all measurements of video games and video game 
related activity (thus far). Trait aggression, history of family violence, income, and internet 
access (a proxy for SES) were far more powerful variables in predicting violence. This implies 
that violence is more than media exposure.  
Figure 8. Internet Rank vs. Homicide Rates in 100 Largest U.S. Cities. Cities ranked by internet quality and 
coverage from 1 – 100, where 100 is the poorest internet score and 1 is the best.  Plotted over 2017 homicide 
rates from the Uniform Crime Report.  Internet quality and access significantly related to higher homicide 
rates (*r = .450, *𝜒2 = 37.6, *p < .001) (Segal, 2019) 
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 Recall that most of the violence in the United States takes place in just a few 
cities: St. Louis, Baltimore, New Orleans, Birmingham, Detroit, and the like. All have hundreds 
of deaths combined each year. Not due to disease, car accidents, heart attacks or obesity, but 
from gun related homicides (Messner, 1982; McCall, Land, & Parker, 2010; Wintemute, 2015). 
The section that follows examines the trajectory of violence through history, through the research 
surrounding the causal mechanisms of lethal and non-lethal violence, and how these explanations 
are far more powerful predictors of violence than any media exposure studies to date. The 
implications of this chapter and the next will show why the conversation about violent video 
games as it relates to rampage shootings is wasted energy when compared to the violence 
problems in cities like St. Louis and Baltimore, which very often go undiscussed. 
Violence in the Real World 
 
 Human violence has been a subject of horror and spectacle throughout written history. In 
fact, one would be hard pressed to open any history book without encountering some reference to 
violence or war. Some of our oldest stories, from the Epic of Gilgamesh to the Iliad and the 
Odyssey, are replete with violence. The most well known form of violence, due to its finality, is 
homicide: the deliberate and unlawful killing of one person by another (Oxford English, 1884). If 
it went unnoticed, unlawful is the key word. “Justified” killing, in the form of war, defense, and 
punishment has been the status quo for most of history. Tribes raided and pillaged neighbors, 
kings sacked cities, and nations collided in some of the most horrific displays of violence known 
to the animal kingdom. 
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 Wars and atrocities throughout history are well-known illustrations of the darkness that 
lurks inside the human mind. The 20th century is particularly well known for its violence, for 
within its 100-year spread 142 million lives met their end from war and government atrocity. The 
years 1900 through 1999 are home to the First and Second World Wars, claiming 15 million and 
55 million lives respectively, the Chinese and Russian Civil Wars, claiming three million and 
nine million lives, and the reigns of Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, claiming 20 million and 40 
million lives (Pinker, 2011). Trying to imagine 142 million people is almost unfathomable. To 
understand the scale an illustration is in order. Every 12 years, 120 million people gather for the 
Kumbh Mela festival in India and the gathering can literally be seen from space (Bagla, 2019). 
Killing on a massive scale for reasons of policy or conquest never seemed to foster sensations of 
horror in the general public until the 20th century when the industrial war machines of the most 
powerful nations on earth were capable of annihilating thousands of lives in the span of a few 
hours with the mere goal of capturing a hill or a town.  
 Luckily, citizens and tribespeople around the globe for millennia have scorned the act of 
unjustified killing not motivated by hatred of another group. Killing within the group, that is 
killing one’s countrymen, neighbors, or leaders without just cause, has almost always resulted in 
immediate action against the killer (Devine, 1978; Boehm, 2012). Unfortunately, “just cause” 
can be redefined to fit the needs of whoever wields the sword. The earliest known laws to be 
recorded, The Code of Hammurabi, written somewhere between 1795 and 1750 BC, prescribes 
prohibitions against killing in one form or another. The punishments for these crimes, of course, 
are also murder or some form of injury. The code has it that if a man or woman murders another, 
the punishment is impalement. If a physician accidentally kills a patient, his hands will be cut 
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off. If an architects’ building fails and kills the inhabitants, the builder is put to death. The 
hierarchies of the time also have it that the killing of a peasant, slave, or livestock results in the 
punishment of replacement or repayment. Unfortunately, the human appetite for violence and 
punishment almost always gets out of hand, resulting in the punishments of crimes that are not 
particularly harmful.  
Flash-forward two thousand years to the Roman empire, where criminals, vagrants, 
slaves, and prisoners of war would be thrown into the famous Colosseum to maim each other or 
be maimed by exotic animals to the delight of massive crowds (Futrell, 2006). Between games 
and races, blasphemers, Christian martyrs, and other criminals (murderers, thieves, rapists, 
enemies of the state, etc.) would be publicly executed in the most horrible ways possible. In one 
particularly horrid example, the criminals would be seated on a seesaw, yes, the same seesaw 
found in a children’s playground, and the “show” would begin.  
Jump another two thousand years to England in the 17th and 18th centuries, where “The Bloody 
Code” punished more than 200 violent and non-violent offenses with death. One could not steal, 
commit adultery, be in the company of gypsies, nor show “particularly strong evidence of malice 
between the ages of 7 and 14”, without facing the hangman (Godfrey & Lawrence, 2005). These 
executions and spectacle’s, from the time of Hammurabi to 19th century England, were held in 
public for the citizens and their children to watch as a reminder of what befell those who broke 
“With a flourish, trapdoors in the floor of the arena were opened, and lions, bears, 
wild boars and leopards rushed into the arena. The starved animals bounded toward 
the terrified criminals, who attempted to leap away from the beasts' snapping jaws. 
But as one helpless man flung himself upward and out of harm's way, his partner on 
the other side of the seesaw was sent crashing down into the seething mass of claws, 
teeth and fur” - Cristin O’Keefe Aptowics, 2016 
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the law. The great and horrible irony is that in each of these places and times, “murder” was 
against the law. Even to this day, the death penalty is legal in 20 states in America. The good 
news is, hundreds of citizens would be executed under “The Bloody Code” and thousands in the 
Colosseum, only 25 were executed in the U.S. in 2018 (Execution Database, 2018). There is 
another great factor that these times had in common as well.  
 Violence in the world and across history has a single variable that is the one great 
universal in the study of human violence. It is by far the biggest risk factor that exponentially 
increases both your likelihood of being a violent criminal and being violently victimized. No, it 
is not guns, though that does increase chances of a deadly encounter (Branas et al., 2009). No, it 
isn’t drugs, alcohol, bullying, abuse, or violent media. It isn’t even your genetics per se. It’s 
being a male. Violent crime is a notoriously male enterprise all over the world. In every human 
culture, males commit between 70 to 95% of all violent crime and are also between 70 and 95% 
the victims of these violent crimes (UNODC, 2019). In almost every human culture studied, 
males (more than females) are more prone to play-fight in youth and adulthood, bully others, 
fight, carry weapons, fantasize about killing, actually kill, rape, start wars, and fight in wars 
(Goldstein, 2001; Pinker, 2002; Archer, 2004; Buss, 2005; Archer, 2006, 2009; Geary, 2010; 
Pinker, 2011).  
The fact that this trend emerges everywhere on the planet and throughout almost all of 
history leads many scholars to believe that there is, in fact, a biological element at play (Wilson 
& Daly, 1985, Daly & Wilson, 1983, 1988, 2017; Pinker, 2002). Though socialization and 
cultural notions of masculinity most certainly play huge roles, “the first domino is almost 
certainly biological” (Pinker, 2011, pg. 517).  Even in our closest cousins, the chimpanzee, 
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gorilla, and orangutan, the male half of the population commits 90 to 95% of the violence 
(Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Wilson et al. 2014). This is offset of course by the wonderful 
bonobos, who buck this trend (Sommit, 1990; De Waal, 1995; Hare, Wobber, & Wrangham, 
2012). Even non-state, tribal, and preindustrial societies fall victim to this unfortunate trend, 
where war and lethal violence are overwhelmingly male habits (Nivette, 2011; Fry & Söderberg, 
2013; Whyte, 2015).   
It isn’t up for debate: males, on average, commit more violence than females. This of 
course doesn’t mean that women can’t be violent or are not capable of incredible violence, they 
most certainly are, and culture does play an important role in how this manifests around the 
world (Law, 1993; Jones, 2009). However, these occurrences are few and far between. The fact 
is simply that all the evidence gathered so far points to women being less lethally violent on 
average across almost every human population when compared to men. In the nature v. nurture 
debate regarding the violence difference between the sexes, the ball is in nurtures’ court. Until 
societies emerge where these trends are counteracted – where men and women are equally 
responsible for violence or women are committing the majority of violence – the consensus will 
stand. Until that fateful day, being male is a risk factor that accounts for almost all violence 
throughout the world. 
One could be forgiven for interpreting this information as a particularly dark 
representation of human nature. To “demonize” half of the human population may seem crass or 
even irresponsible. To claim any inherent human nature seems to clash with the ideals that we 
have the power to change. However, there is a different way of looking at this issue that doesn’t 
force us to ignore the facts, but also allows us to focus on the variables that are within our power. 
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The only way to solve a problem is to understand all the elements at play. One cannot 
successfully design a skyscraper without knowing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
components that one is working with. In this way, we cannot address human violence without 
incorporating the ugly facts that seem to show no signs of going away. However, one need not 
try to change human nature to deal with the problem of human violence. Society has been 
chipping away at the problem for centuries, and the data might surprise you. 
The Surprising Decline in Violence 
 
Watching the evening news alone could lead anyone to have the impression that the 
world is getting more violent as time progresses. With tales of beheadings, chemical weapons, 
government oppression, drug wars, human trafficking, police brutality, political riots, public 
mass shootings, and the rise of white nationalism, it is difficult not to see the world as a seething 
pot on the brink of overflowing. Global tensions do seem to be ramping up given many recent 
political events in the United States, the European Union, China, North Korea, Russia, Syria, 
Africa, Central and South America over the last five to ten years (Global Trends, 2015). The 
world does seem to be getting more dangerous. 
 From a long-term historical perspective, however, the trend lines seem to tell a different 
story. Since the unleashing of the hydrogen bombs on Japan in 1945 and the subsequent Cold 
War that brought the world to the brink of collapse, no world power has confronted another on 
the battlefield, apart from the Korean War (Levi & Thompson, 2011). What caused the utter 
chaos of the two world wars was the industrial capacities of the richest and most powerful 
nations diverting almost all their resources to manufacture and sustain ground and armored 
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combat that was fought by millions of combatants in some of the world’s largest cities. Nothing 
on that scale has even come close to occurring since. The rate of battle deaths in state-based 
armed conflicts show impressive signs of decline when compared to the world wars (PRIO, 
2008; UCDP, 2016; Roser, 2016; See Figure 9).  Despite the horrors of the proxy wars between 
the United States and other world powers and their impacts on Asia and the Middle East (which 
are inexcusable), the mayhem caused and life lost have not even come close to approaching the 
toll of the world wars. This is not to say that then next world war isn’t right around the corner, 
but so far, we are on the right track. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When it comes to violent crime, the trends are in much the same direction depending on 
where you are (Eisner 2003). In most of Europe, violent crime has been and continues to be 
distinctively low when compared to the rest of the world. For instance, almost all of Europe has 
a homicide rate lower than 2 per 100,000 with the exception of the Netherlands, Latvia, 
Figure 9. Battle-related deaths in state-based conflicts since 1946, by world region. The region refers not to 
the location of the battle but to the location of the primary state or states involved in the conflict (see 
'Sources' tab). Only conflicts in which at least one party was the government of a state and which generated 
more than 25 battle-related deaths are included. The data refer to direct violent deaths (i.e. excluding 
outbreaks of disease or famine). (Roser, 2016; Our World in Data: War and Peace) 
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Lithuania, and Estonia (Eurostat, 2017). As of 2017, Canada, Australia, China, Japan, and Peru 
all had homicide rates below 4 per 100,000 (Global Burden of Disease, 2017; UNODC, 2019). 
Unfortunately, the trend in reduced violence has not caught on in many parts of Africa, Russia, 
the Caribbean, Central and South America. In 2017 Russia had a homicide rate of 14.8 per 
100,000 (Global Burden of Disease, 2017), in 2014 Africa sat at 12.5 per 100,000 (UNODC, 
2014). It is clear that the majority of the homicide in Africa is in the Southwest where South 
Africa, Mozambique, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan reside. As of 
2017, Mexico, Venezuela, El Salvador, Brazil, Honduras, and Columbia account for 25% of all 
homicides committed around the world (Muggah & Tobón, 2017).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As far as the undeveloped world is concerned (where the data is available and reliable), violent 
crime is still a very serious problem, especially in terms of absolute number of victims, but 
historically speaking, the developed and developing world are very slowly inching in the right 
Figure 10: Homicide trends, by region and subregion 1950-2015 (58 countries) and 1990–2015 
(116 countries; Africa not included). (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019) 
44 
 
direction. But among the developed world, one country stands in league of its own, with violence 
rates that soar above its peers in every time zone: the United States.  
A Brief History of Violent Crime in the United States 
 
 It should come as no surprise to anybody that the United States is the odd one out, 
especially regarding violent crime. Recall that the majority of Europe had a homicide rate below 
2 per 100,000, and Canada looked much the same at 1.51 per 100,000 in 2017 (GBDCN 2017). 
Even India (if the data is reliable), one of the most densely populated countries in the world, sat 
at a homicide rate of around 3.22 per 100,000 (GBDCN, 2017). The United States had a 
homicide rate of 5.3 per 100,000 in 2017 (Uniform Crime Report, 2017) which fell to a solid 5.0 
per 100,000 in 2018 (UCR, 2018) When it comes to violent crimes in general, including 
aggravated assault, robbery, and rape, the U.S. currently sits at a rate 368.9 per 100,000, which is 
3.9% lower than 2017 (UCR, 2018) and the lowest it’s ever been. Aggravated assault, the 
underrecognized crime which sits in the shadow of homicide, makes up 66.9% of all violent 
crime in the United States. Fortunately, homicide rates in the U.S. have been declining since its 
most recent peak of 9.8 per 100,000 in 1991 (Cooper & Smith, 2011), and violent crime rates in 
general have been doing much the same (UCR, 2018, See Figure 11).  
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The fact remains that the United States stands out amongst its contemporaries as both the 
richest country in the world and the most violent. Many theories have been presented to explain 
the unique nature of violence in the United States. The farther back into history one goes, the 
more interesting the theories become. Some ideas hold that cultures of honor paired with the 
widespread availability and legality of firearms fueled the culture now known as the, “Wild 
West” and the honor culture of the South. Much of the country west of the Mississippi up until 
the 19th century was not under competent government rule. Much of the criminal justice 
infrastructure (or lack thereof) was completely incompetent, underfunded, and understaffed 
(Courtwright, 1996). The only methods of defending your honor, your livestock, or your trade 
goods was to do it yourself. The cliché “wild west” was in fact not far off the bullseye. Homicide 
rates in Dodge City were 100 per 100,000 and Witchita is estimated to have a rate of 1,500 per 
100,000 (Courtwright, 1996; Roth, 2009)! Even logging, railroad, and mining towns even further 
west were estimated to have average homicide rates of 83 per 100,000 (Courtwright, 1996). It all 
makes sense when one realizes that the majority of fortune seekers headed west to strike gold or 
Figure 11: Violent crime rate trends in the United States between 1988 and 2018. 
(Uniform Crime Report, 2018) 
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start a new life were single men and there was no substantial law enforcement that could enforce 
the law effectively (Courtwright, 1996). Violence in the West did not begin to decline until 
civilization finally caught up after the Civil War. But the Civil War started its own problems in 
the East, particularly in the South. 
The Civil War is oft remembered as the worst bloodbath on American soil (minus the 
elimination of the Native Americans of course). The war was between the Northern Union and 
the Southern Confederacy due to the conflicts stirred by the abolishing of slavery. The divide 
between the north and the south was no coincidence or matter of chance. The financial stability 
of the two regions were distinctively different, where the north relied heavily on urban 
development and industry while the south relied on more agrarian exploitations. This divide sets 
the stage for the next explanation for American exceptionalism in violence: the culture of the 
South. Like the wild west, government positions on violence were lukewarm at best, leaving the 
duty of law, order, revenge, and self-veneration to the mob or to vigilante justice. Eric 
Monkkonen (1989) diagnoses the situation eloquently,  
 
“the South had a deliberately weak state, eschewing things such as penitentiaries in favor of 
local personal violence…most killings…in the rural south were reasonable, and in the sense that 
the victim had not done everything possible to escape from the killer, that the killing resulted 
from a personal dispute, or because the killer and victim were the kinds of people who kill each 
other”  - pg. 94, pg. 157 
 
This is among the better snapshots of what a culture of honor looks like. In cultures of 
honor, instrumental or predatory violence, like getting someone out of the way so you can open 
your plantation on their land or killing for no reason at all is a no-go. What is greenlit is when 
someone insults your intelligence, abilities, or prowess. Then, all bets are off, draw you 
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yellowbelly. What accentuated this culture was the uniquely American Second Amendment of 
the Constitution. European countries had and has no such thing. As Steven Pinker (2011) puts it, 
“Americans in the South and West never fully signed on to a social contract that would vest the 
government with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force” (pg. 99). Homicide rates were 
particularly high in the South when compared to the North due to confrontational duels and 
otherwise antagonistic behavior towards rivals (Roth, 2009).  
The culture of honor managed to survive to this day. Studies have tried to understand the 
elevated homicide rates in the Southern United States by attempting to decouple the culture of 
honor from factors like poverty, but to no avail (Huff-Corzine, Corzine, & Moore, 1986). There 
are critiques of the subculture theory, showing that higher quality statistical analyses reduce the 
significance of the subculture explanation, however, they are not eliminated, leaving plenty of 
room for explanation for the subculture theory (Whitt, Corzine, & Huff-Corzine, 1995; Huff-
Corzine et al., 2001). Two studies illuminate the subculture of the south in impressively creative 
ways.  
In one study, fake letters regarding interest in jobs were sent to Northern companies and 
Southern ones. The letters contained an anecdote specifying a felony charge. The felony detailed 
in the letter admits of a fight started in a bar by a drunkard claiming to have slept with the letter 
writers wife and laughing in their face about it, which leads to a scuffle outside resulting in the 
use of pipe to murder the drunkard. Companies in the North did not respond with a job 
application, many companies in the south did (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997). In one other, a laboratory 
study was set up with participants who go to college in the north but were born and raised in the 
South. On the way to the “study” participants were run into by a confederate. No, a confederate 
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is not a Southern sympathizer, a confederate is a person planted by the experimenter to run into 
the real participant on purpose. When the confederate engages the participant, the confederate 
mutters, “asshole” at the participant. Blood samples were then drawn from the participants. 
Students who grew up in the South showed higher levels of testosterone and cortisol (stress 
hormones) and even shook the experimenter’s hand harder (Cohen et al., 1996)!  
The history of American violence is rooted in long periods of untamed and lightly 
governed terrain where young males were encouraged to defend themselves at the slightest 
glance of disapproval or whiff of challenge. Even women were slightly more likely to take out 
their frustration on their adulterous lovers (Roth, 2009). From the wild west to the rural south, 
cultures of honor permeated the land and law enforcement was either complacent or complicit in 
the fair and worthy settling of a score where the stronger or faster man successfully defended 
themselves against an interloper or vagrant of one sort or another. The culture of the south, and 
the west, frankly, can be summated in this quote about the culture’s infiltration on the power 
dynamics of politics: 
“Public men with the loftiest of political ambitions were the most likely to fight, since they 
needed to preserve their standing and protect their reputations. When William Crawford, the 
future U.S. senator and secretary of the Treasury, was an aspiring young politician in Georgia, 
he was asked by a group of speculators to join their latest venture. He wanted nothing to do with 
these men, who had been involved in the Yazoo scandal, so he spurned their offer publicly. Peter 
Van Allen, one of the speculators, challenged Crawford to a duel. Crawford killed Allen and 
became a political star”. – Roth, (2009), pg. 213  
 
Roth’s primary purpose in American Homicide (2009), wasn’t to push the southern 
culture of violence theory, though it is interwoven into his larger thesis. Rather Roth believes 
that cultures of honor were and are symptoms of deeper root causes. Contrary to the narrative 
that will be spun in future sections, Roth does not entirely buy into the idea that poverty and 
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unemployment have as much effect as they are made out to throughout American history. He 
explains that during the Great Depression in the 1930’s, when these two variables were at their 
most extreme, homicide rates actually fell in many cities, “from New York to New Orleans to 
San Francisco” (pg. 9). Roth instead suggests that there are four macro variables that play the 
biggest roles in the ebb and flow of American and Western European violence all the way back 
to the founding of the nation to the current status quo. The fluctuations are based less on current 
societal and economic conditions and more on the realm of public opinion, the zeitgeist. 
The first variable that Roth points to is “the belief that the government is stable, and that 
its legal and judicial institutions are unbiased and will redress wrongs an protect lives and 
property” (pg. 18). When the government is unstable, it lacks authoritative pull. This can happen 
during civil war, revolution, or military occupation. Even more common is when government 
leaders are factionalized and reduced to infighting over the reins of power. In these 
circumstances, citizens take justice upon themselves, form coalitions based on identity or 
political party, label outsiders, and the escalation to violence begins. If this sounds strangely 
familiar, it is because we are living through one of these very moments right now. Identity 
politics has seized the land, be it by race, gender, or political party, and the oval office is 
occupied by one of the most polarizing figures in recent political memory. In the past six years, 
there have been three government shutdowns, two of those occurred under the current president’s 
administration, costing the government seven billion dollars (Hicks, 2013; Congress Budget 
Office, 2019) . Stability would not be the word used to describe the current era. The second 
process, which interacts strongly with the first, is trust in the government and its legitimacy.  
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When people think that the government represents them and their ideals, people trust 
their local institutions more and by extension their neighbors. Roth walks through the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries in America as the government failed to establish itself as trustworthy in 
many communities, particularly the South and the urban North (Roth, 2009, pg. 21). Trust in the 
government has been eroding quickly in recent years thanks to countless corruption scandals and 
the ascension of misinformation warfare. As test of Roth’s theory, the current political climate 
represents the ticking of the first two boxes: instability and illegitimacy. Counter to Roth’s 
expectations, things appear to be going well when refereeing to most violent crime trends (See 
Figure 11 above).  However, it is difficult for one to avert their eyes from the political divide that 
continues to grow between republicans and democrats in the United States. It is even harder not 
to see the rise of public mass shootings (Lankford, 2016; Pan, 2018; Rocque & Duwe, 2018). 
Public sentiment is split on the “problem of immigration”, and a few have already begun taking 
the law into their own hands, take the recent El Paso shooting for example. Only time will tell 
how much longer ‘til the powder keg is lit. 
The third historical constant in Roth’s checklist is patriotism and kinship with fellow 
citizens (pg. 21). Like the previous two, trust and respect, a sense of community and solidarity is 
essential in keeping a society together as long as that community incorporates a large enough 
percentage of the population. Tribes are a great example of successful solidarity. No, not hunter 
gatherer tribes, though that also fits the model. The tribes being referred to here are more like 
teams. A sense of identity is staked to a variable that connects you to others whom you 
automatically share an important connection with. The best way this works is when people stake 
their identity to a thread that is shared by everyone in sight, like humanity or nationhood. 
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However, as Roth rightly points out, this is double edged sword, and in all likelihood most 
people don’t fit into your tribe, and that is when things often get ugly for “others”. Roth put it 
succinctly, “when men draw the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a way that excludes a 
substantial portion of the population, the potential for homicide is high” (pg. 22). This occurs in 
American history quite a lot, obviously during and after the Civil War, during many woman’s 
liberation movements, during the Civil Rights movement, and right now between democrats and 
republicans. 
The last variable is different from the other three in that it does not rise and fall “in 
lockstep” with the other three variables. It is the belief that the social hierarchy is legitimate. 
Roth claims that this variable does not influence homicide as much as the other two, but in the 
modern climate, this may not be true. It certainly wasn’t true in 1945 China, 1917 Russia, 1789 
France, or 1776 America when entire revolutions erupted as a reaction to perceived inequalities. 
In more recent eras, Roth documents spikes in homicide when men were threatened by women’s 
liberation movements and when white men were threatened by the Emancipation Proclamation 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Throughout history,  
“if men are insecure about their standing (or prospective standing) in society – if they have no 
hope of winning respect, if they are embittered by a sudden loss of standing, or if the criteria for 
respect suddenly change or become a matter of dispute – they are more likely to become violent, 
because every insult, every challenge, and every setback takes on greater significance. Disputes 
with peers, no matter how trivial they might seem to an outsider, become defining moments in 
which reputations can be permanently damaged” – Roth, pg. 24 
 
 If this sounds familiar to anyone, it’s because it is a mirror image of the masculinity 
cultures that emerge in disadvantaged cities of urban America. Modern American gangs and drug 
rings, especially from the crime boom in the 80’s and early 90’s, take on exactly this shape and 
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form (Diamond, 2001; Barid, 2012). Thanks largely to socioeconomic forces that will be 
discussed in the next section, many disenfranchised men in poor urban and suburban 
environments seek meaning in the status hierarchies of the area. Roth even describes a story 
about two teenagers who gun down their old “colleague” for taking more than his fair share of a 
burglary. This happened in 1995 Columbus, Ohio, which Roth later describes as abandoned by 
deindustrialization processes that left the area, “blighted by unemployment, empty storefronts, 
abandoned houses, deteriorating schools, and the toxins the factories left behind” (pg. 24), the 
perfect environment for crime rates to skyrocket, as we will discuss later. Even worse, in the 
current political environment, knowledge about the growing wealth and income inequality gap in 
the United States (Keister & Moller, 2000; Saez & Sucman, 2016) is allowing this ideal to spread 
outside of disenfranchised, high crime rate areas, and into the public conversation (Picchi, 2019; 
Telford, 2019). Things are not looking up for the United States according to Roth’s list of 
variables. The United States currently checks all four boxes, unstable government, distrust in the 
government, lack of patriotic solidarity, and the growing sentiment of an illegitimate social 
hierarchy. What could go wrong? 
The Structure of Modern American Violence 
 
Since the days of the Wild West and Civil War, the nature of violent crime and our 
understanding of it has drastically changed. Among the more important advances has been in the 
direction of understanding. The modern view of violent crime does not just incorporate the 
psychology of a violent criminal. As the trends discussed earlier show, violence is in retreat. 
Since there hasn’t been enough time for evolution to change the genomes of Homo Sapiens, 
social structures and values must have changed. Since the Civil War, the demographics of 
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American work has changed thanks to first and second wave feminism and the Civil Rights 
movement. Since the Second World War, American industries have changed and continue to 
change in response to technological or organizational developments. These changes impact 
American communities and households in positive and negative ways. Through these changes, a 
few elements of American life have proved to be more important in explaining crime than any of 
these changes combined. These are structural variables that emerge due to the confluence of 
industrial and economic changes that impact families all over the country. 
These systemic, societal causes of violent crime are now thought to stem from things like 
economic deprivation, income inequality, broken families in poverty, divorce, population 
density, and unemployment. These are identified as the structural covariates of homicide (Land, 
McCall, & Cohen, 1990; McCall, Parker, & MacDonald, 2008; McCall, Land, & Parker, 2010). 
These variables have been identified as particularly stable predictors of increased violent crime 
rates at multiple levels of analysis, from cities, to counties, to states through multiple decades 
spanning all the way back to the 1960’s. What this social-ecological framework allows is the 
explanation of the place-based nature of crime. It’s clear that violent crime clusters in space for 
non-random reasons (Baller et al., 2001; Stretesky, Schuck, & Hogan, 2004; Weisburd, Groff, & 
Yang, 2012). What this means is that the circumstances in areas with high crime rates seem to 
follow similar patterns, and the most potent of these patterns is resource deprivation and 
concentrated poverty (Wilson, 1987; Sampson et al., 1997).  
The exodus of industrial manufacturing jobs in the 70’s and 80’s, known as industrial 
restructuring, left many lower-class workers both unable to relocate or find jobs. This process set 
the stage for the modern phenomena where poverty and disadvantage are spatially determined, 
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where communities are deprived of resources like quality health care, local business, and 
employment networks (Wilson 1987). These factors reinforce each other and produce isolated 
cultures that react to scarcity by finding ways to cope that are outside the mainstream methods. 
Resource deprivation sets the stage for future generations while efforts to reverse the process 
become harder and harder. 
“In structurally disorganized slum communities it appears that a system of values emerges in 
which crime, disorder, and drug use are less than fervently condemned and hence expected as 
part of everyday life. These ecologically structured social perceptions and tolerances in turn 
appear to influence the probability of criminal outcomes and harmful deviant behavior.”  
- Sampson & Wilson, 1995; pg. 47 
East St. Louis is a tragic model for this style of urban decay. East St. Louis was among 
the major midwestern cities that African Americans flocked to during the Great Migration 
between 1916 and 1970, escaping the oppression of Jim Crow laws. This process was met with 
no shortage of racist controversy, but the city managed to hold together. East was booming with 
job opportunities in the 1950’s, at one point dubbed an “All-American City” and “Pittsburgh of 
the West”. Throughout the 60’s and 70’s, however, manufacturing and railroad industries began 
relocating, leaving behind the (majority black) citizens who could not afford to relocate with 
them. Between 1960 and 1990, East St. Louis went from a population of 81,000 to 40,000, where 
it remains 97% African American (US Census, 2018). There are many places like East St. Louis 
out there, including Detroit, Baltimore, Birmingham, and New Orleans (cities we will become 
familiar with very soon) that take on the same narrative. The story starts with an influx of 
African American’s following the Great Migration, the industrial boom followed by industrial 
restructuring, residential segregation of lower-class African Americans, then punctuated by the 
outmigration of the affluent middle class.  
55 
 
In a situation where few jobs are available and public institutions like public schools and 
underfunded and unkept, people are forced to hold down multiple menial jobs in retail or 
hospitality, barely capable of dealing with transportation issues, health care, or child rearing and 
often dropping out of high school to live with extended family, join a gang or prostitution ring 
(Hamer, 2011). It follows that the so called, “code of the street” (Anderson, 1999) which 
emerges organically as a reaction to the lack of opportunity and isolation.  In these circumstances 
many turn to “off the books” methods by profiting off illegal drugs and prostitution which fuel 
gang-style fractioning and cycles of retributive violence between them, sending the violent crime 
rates into the stratosphere, where violence is tantamount to status (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).  
Further exasperation of these circumstances manifests in very high incarceration rates 
which systematically remove young men from the population, forcing the burden of child 
rearing, home care, and financial stability onto the shoulders of single mothers and their 
extended family, thus producing the connection between single motherhood, fatherless homes, 
and violent crime (Messner & Sampson, 1991). Men who are released from prison often fall 
right back into the routines of the subculture of crime due to their unemployability as ex-
convicts, thus producing the high recidivism rates seen in the same disadvantaged areas (Kubrin 
& Stewart, 2006; Bellair & Kowalski, 2011). These same forces produce another side effect that 
pushes this feedback loop even further down the hole, it produces higher rates of divorce (one of 
the primary covariates of homicide).  
Divorce in the household has been shown to increase the potential suicide, domestic 
violence, and violent crime rates in general (Gruber, 2004; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2006; 
Stolzenberg & D’Alessio, 2007; Ca´ceres-Delpiano & Giolito, 2012). Domestic violence 
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happens to account for 21% of violent victimization not including homicide (Truman & Morgan, 
2015). Even children in the household who are exposed to divorce tend to marry earlier and are 
more likely to get separated, thus increasing the chances of suicide and domestic abuse down the 
line (Manzingo, 2000; Gruber, 2004). It should come as no surprise then to find that domestic 
abuse is significantly higher in African American and white communities that are afflicted with 
high rates of poverty, poor job stability and poorer educational institutions (Benson et al., 2004). 
This brings up another topic that is often overlooked. The conversation surrounding violent 
crime is often situated in the context of black communities, which is warranted due to the fact 
that this community is disproportionately afflicted by these ailments for reasons explained 
earlier. However, it turns out that the same structural factors have been shown to impact white 
and Hispanic populations in similar socioeconomic circumstances (Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Lee, 
2000; Wheelock, 2006). The primary differences between these populations of lower-class 
citizens is geographic concentration. We find that poverty and crime rates are spatially 
distributed differently between these groups, where African American and Hispanic poverty rates 
are often far more concentrated where white poverty rates are more geographically distributed 
(Lee, 2000).  
The covariates of violent crime also include another important note, population size and 
population density, particularly at the city-level of analysis (Messner, 1982; Bailey, 1984; Land, 
McCall, & Cohen, 1990; James, 2018). Population and population density are linked 
logarithmically, which essentially means that relationships are exponential and can only be 
linearized by changing the graphical scale in orders of magnitude. However, crime and 
population trends have shifted, making population a bit less powerful predictor of violent crime. 
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For instance, violence increases rose together between 2014 and 2015 despite differences in city 
sizes, from 1 million or more down to fewer than 50,000 (James, 2018; See Figure 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Large cities are also known for having relatively stable crime trends over the course of 
multiple years and even decades (McCall, Parker, MacDonald, 2008), where smaller, more rural, 
cities and towns have violent crime rates that can fluctuate wildly due to the change in crime rate 
that a few crimes can exact on the data.  
In large cities, a single crime among hundreds will change the rate slightly. Take for 
example a hypothetical city with a population of 250,000, where 300 crimes are committed in 
one year and 310 are committed in the next, the crime rate changes from 120 per 100,000 to 124 
per 100,000, a reasonable fluctuation. If in a smaller place with a population of 25,000, one year 
there are 3 violent crimes, and in the next there are 6, the rate goes from 12 per 100,000 to 24 per 
Figure 12: Violent crime rates by city size in the United States between 1990 and 2016. 
(James, 2018; FBI, Crime in the United States, 1990-2016) 
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100,000. In these cases, the rates are unreliable indicators of the real level of crime. This is why 
cities are better laboratories for violent crime when compared to smaller towns. This does not 
discount the different causal frameworks at work in smaller more rural area, nor does it disregard 
the importance of understanding violence in those circumstances. It is simply a matter of scale 
that makes cities more dangerous in terms of lives lost, and therefore more pertinent to study.  
A complicated methodological debate has been waged trying to effectively separate many 
of these predictors from each other in multiple-regression analyses, a phenomenon called 
multicollinearity. Collinearity throws off statistical inferences and significance due to the 
interaction and confounding effects that these variables all have on each other (Land, McCall, & 
Cohen, 1990). For example, the existence of the racial component of crime in the United States 
is intercorrelated (therefore, collinear) with other components like absolute and relative 
economic deprivation, percentage of households where both parents are not present, or female 
lead households with children. What this means is that the structural covariates of homicide: 
economic and resource deprivation, percentage of divorced males, population density, and 
percentage of children not living with both parents, cut across racial lines and explain violence in 
the United States on a larger scale and at multiple levels of analysis (cities and states). 
A Brief Digression on Aggravated Assaults 
 
The majority of the discussion thus far has been framed in context of homicide and 
killing. Though homicide is the most salient violent crime, it is certainly not the only crime that 
characterizes violence. Earlier in the paper, we remember that most violent crime is not murder, 
but aggravated assault. Among all the violent crimes, homicide is the rarest across cultures and 
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history (Wolfgang, 1958; Daly & Wilson, 2017). Aggravated assault is defined as, “an attack by 
one or more persons on another with the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury (FBI, 2018). 
In 2018, homicide accounted for 1.3% of violent crime in the U.S., where aggravated assaults 
make up 66.9% of violent crime followed by robbery at 23.4% (UCR, 2018). 
In 2018, there were a total of 807,410 assaults in the United States (UCR, 2018), which 
seems like a lot until you realize that for the past three decades, assault rates have been 
descending with all of the other violent crimes, even as the population has been growing (See 
Figure 13).Unfortunately, not much research seems to surface that focuses primarily on 
aggravated assault.  
 
Figure 13: Aggravated Assault & Population Trends in the U.S.1994-2018. Number of aggravated 
assaults (dark line) for the years 1994 through 2018 plotted against the U.S. population (light line) for 
the same years. Data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1994 – 2018, and Census Bureau 1994 – 2018. 
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The work that has been done has been restricted to case studies in specific places like 
Dallas, Texas (Harries & Stadler, 1986), Little Rock, Arkansas (Drawve & Barnum, 2018), and 
Miami-Dade County, Florida (Bunting et al., 2018). In Little Rock, the most important predictive 
factors of assault were proximity to public high schools, motels or hotels, lottery retailers, and 
bus stops (Drawve & Barnum, 2018). In Miami-Dade, factors like time (the middle of the night), 
day of the week (weekends), poverty rates, ethnic diversity, and median age (younger) were the 
most significant (Bunting, et al., 2018). In Dallas, heat and time of the year (summer) interacted 
with socioeconomic variables like poverty to increase the aggravated assault rates (Harries & 
Stadler).  
When the research focus isn’t on assault, it is often lumped together with the other violent 
crimes like robbery, rape, and homicide. Fortunately, this research also points in the same 
directions that homicide research does. Poverty and income inequality are the biggest predictors, 
but assaults are also influenced by illegal drug markets, gang activity, number of bars and 
entertainment venues in certain locations. (Blau & Blau, 1982; Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Short, 1997; 
Fajnzylber, Lederman, & Loayza, 2002; Martinez, Rosenfeld, & Mares, 2008; Drucker, 2011). 
Not much is needed to separate the structural covariates of homicide from the structural 
covariates of aggravated assault, as they seem to respond to the same suite of environmental 
factors. 
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A Brief Glance at Violence in Large American Cities 
 
It now seems appropriate to take a brief glance at the current state of affairs in some of 
America’s largest cities. Of the 100 largest cities, the ten most violent are St. Louis, Missouri, 
Birmingham, Alabama, Baltimore, Maryland, New Orleans, Louisiana, Detroit, Michigan, Baton 
Rouge Louisiana, Cleveland, Ohio, Kansas City, Missouri, Memphis, Tennessee, and Newark 
New Jersey. Detroit had the fifth highest homicide rate clocking in at a rate of 39.2 per 100,000, 
which translated into 261 murders.  
Detroit also had an aggravated assault rate of 1,490 per 100,000, which translates into 
9,920 reported assaults. The smallest of the top ten, Birmingham, had a homicide rate of 41.8 per 
100,000 and an aggravated assault rate of 1,336 per 100,000, which translates into 88 murders 
and 2,816 assaults. Of the top ten, St. Louis had the highest homicide rate of 61.4 per 100,000 
and an aggravated assault rate of 1,174 per 100,000, which translates into 187 murders and 3,577 
assaults. Baltimore has a homicide rate of 51.4 and assault rate of 892 per 100,000, coming in at 
309 deaths and 5,364 assaults. The record in 2018 for most murders goes to Chicago, with a 
shocking 563 murders and a whopping 15,312 assaults. Due to its large size, a population of 
2,719,151, the homicide rate does not represent the bloodshed, coming in at 20.7 per 100,000 
and an assault rate of 563 per 100,000. The top 20 most violent large cities in 2018 can be seen 
in Table 1, organized by homicide rate. 
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Table 1. Top 20 Homicide Rates in U.S. Cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If this doesn’t concern you yet, remember only five cities have been discussed thus far. 
Of these five cities, there were 1,408 murders and 36,989 assaults, which account for 8.7% of 
nationwide homicides and 4.5% of nationwide aggravated assaults. When the rest of the top 
twenty are added, 3,087 murders and 90,712 assaults are added to the list, making up almost one 
of every five homicides and one of every ten assaults in the entirety of the United States. It’s is 
also apparent at a glance that violence tends to spill over into assault rates as well, though not 
reliably.  
 Twenty cities with the highest homicide rates (per 100,000 citizens) in the U.S. Also included are 
the total number of homicides, assaults, and assault rates (per 100,000) in each city. Data from FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports 2018. 
 
City Homicide Rate Homicides Assault Rate Assaults 
St. Louis 61.42 187 1,174 3,577 
Baltimore 51.4 309 892 5,364 
Birmingham 41.76 88 1,336 2,816 
Detroit 39.2 261 1,490 9,920 
New Orleans 37.2 147 649 2,564 
Baton Rouge 34.88 79 524 1,187 
Memphis 28.6 186 1,378 8,947 
Kansas City 27.7 137 1,145 5,665 
Newark 26.5 75 408 1,155 
Cleveland 22.5 86 853 3,257 
Philadelphia 22 351 490 7,712 
Chicago 20.7 563 563 15,312 
Cincinnati 19 57 430 1,288 
Pittsburgh 18.8 57 289 877 
Indianapolis 18.8 162 842 7,250 
Milwaukee 16.9 99 946 5,549 
Oakland 16.5 70 551 2,338 
Tulsa 14.9 60 739 2,982 
Louisville 12.9 80 ? ? 
Stockton 10.6 33 945 2,952 
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It is for these reasons that the largest cities in the United States will be used for the 
current study. After all this talk of violence, it is important to remind readers that this thesis is 
about the effects that video games may or may not have on the types of real-world violence just 
reviewed. 
 
Research Question 
 
How do the measures of gaming prevalence compare to the structural covariates of 
violent crime in explaining violent crime in the 100 most populated cities in the United States?  
 
H1: Video game sales will have no significant associations with violent crime rates 
H2: Video game attitudes and habits will have no associations with violent crime rates 
H3: Poverty rates will be significantly associated with violent crime rates 
H4: Divorce rates will be significantly associated with violent crime rates 
H5: Population density will be significantly associated with violent crime rates 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Selection of the cities to construct the dataset to be analyzed was done by identifying the 
100 largest cities based on the 2017 Census population estimates. The year, 2017 was chosen 
because the data used for gaming identifiers, violent crime, and the covariates of crime are 
between the years 2013 and 2017. The list of the most populated cities in 2017 can be seen in 
Table 2. Violent crime in these cities were measured by the homicide and aggravated assault 
rates per 100,000 citizens from the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Uniform Crime Report for 
the years 2013 through 2017. The six variables that acted as our structural covariates of violent 
crime are population density, percentage population with incomes at or below poverty levels, 
marital statuses for populations aged 15 years or older, percentage population black, the Gini 
Index measure of inequality, and the dissimilarity index for racial segregation, which were pulled 
from the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates, from the data service 
SocialExplorer, and from a 2010 dataset on segregation done by DeWitt & Frey (2018) from the 
University of Michigan Ann Arbor. The ACS 5-year estimate survey started in 2013 and ran 
through 2017 and samples every census block group in the United States and Puerto Rico. In 
order to measure poverty, the Census Bureau uses a combination of income variables and family 
demographic indicators to determine who is in poverty. Earnings, public assistance, debt, 
alimony, child support, and veteran benefits are paired with demographics such as the number of 
persons over age 65 and/or under 18 years of age in the household and the overall number of 
persons in the household to determine poverty.  
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To identify the popularity, presence, or otherwise potential impact that video games 
played in these cities, the SimmonsLOCAL US surveys between the years 2013 and 2017 was 
used and accessed through the online data service, SimplyAnalytics. The 2013 through 2017 
SimmonsLOCAL US full year consumer survey samples were collected in the Fall seasons of the 
years 2013 – 2016, where fielding ends late fall and data is released to the marketplace in the 
spring of the following years. The surveys measure 30,000 participants across 210 American 
Designated Market Areas (DMA’s; including 100 largest cities in the US) with data estimated 
down to the block group level using samples for ages 18+ with detailed analysis for brand level 
and media usage behavior. The 210 DMA’s are selected by the Nielsen Company to estimate the 
cost of advertising. The DMA’s include the largest cities in the United States.  
The questions pulled from the 2013 through 2017 SimmonsLOCAL US survey will 
include: “Do you spend more time playing video games than watching TV?”, and, “Would you 
consider video games your main source of entertainment?” Percentages of the sample that agreed 
with either of these statements is the proxy measure for the presence of gamers in the cities. To 
further substantiate the presence of video games, The Easy Analytic Software, Inc. Consumer 
Expenditures Database (EASI CEX) was employed, accessed through the data service 
SimplyAnalytics. The EASI Consumer Expenditures Database compiles data from multiple 
sources, including: the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer 
Expenditure surveys (2013-2016) and the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year, 3-year, 
and 1-year estimates. The variables pulled from the EASI CEX include the household average 
spending on video game related software, hardware, and accessories for or from the Nintendo 
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Wii, Gameboy, GameCube, PlayStation, Nintendo DS, Xbox, and PlayStation Portable in the 
years 2013 through 2017. 
Table 2. Top 100 Most Populous Cities in the U.S. 
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Population Measures 
 
 The populations of the 100 largest cities do not fluctuate wildly across the 2013 – 2017 
time span. For instance, in 2013 and 2017, the most populated city in the United States (by a 
wide margin) is New York City, with a population of 8,396,126 in 2013 and a population of 8, 
616,333 in 2017. The least populated of the 100 cities in 2017 was Birmingham, Alabama, with a 
population of 210,710. The lower rungs of the population list exchange places often, where cities 
drop off and back onto the list by year. To stay consistent, Birmingham was used for the years 
2013-2016, though technically it did not belong on the list in those years. Across 2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016, and 2017, thirty-five to thirty-seven cities are within the population range of 200,000 
to 299,000, sixteen to seventeen cities are within the population range of 300,000 to 399,000, 
twelve to thirteen cities are within the population range of 400,000 to 499,000, three cities are 
within the 500,000 to 599,000 range, ten to twelve cities are within the 600,000 to 699,000 
range, only one or two cities are within the 700,000 to 799,000 range (no city is in this range in 
2015), five to six cities are within the 800,000 to 899,000 range, and two to three cities are 
within the 900,000 to 999,000 range. When entering range of millions in population, five cities 
lie within the one million to two million range and two cities lie within the two million to three 
million range. Los Angeles alone goes from high three million to four million between 2014 and 
2017, and New York sits alone in the eight million range.  
The American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates produce a population density 
per square mile estimate that ranges from 175 person per square mile (Anchorage, Alaska) to 
28,284 persons per square mile (New York City). Twelve cities range between 175 and 1,999 
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persons per sq. mile, twenty-six cities range between 2,000 and 2,999 persons per sq. mile, 
twenty-three cities range between 3,000 and 3,999 persons per sq. mile, eleven cities range 
between 4,000 and 4,999 persons per sq. mile, eight cities range between 5,000 and 5,999 
persons per sq. mile, nine cities range between 6,000 to 9,999 persons per sq. mile, and eleven 
cities range between 10,000 to 28,000 persons per sq. mile.   
The ACS-5-year estimates also take stock of the Gini index, another one of our measures 
for economic hardships within our 100 cities. The Gini index is designed to measure income 
inequality. The distribution of income within a city, county, state, or nation can be one of three 
things: equally distributed amongst the inhabitants within any given boundary (measured as 0 on 
the Gini index), completely focused in the hands of one person or group of persons (as measured 
as 1 on the Gini index), and everything in between zero and one. The idea of the Gini index to 
measure how far away society is from an imagined “perfect” income distribution. Among our 
sample of 100 cities, the Gini measures range from a low of 0.38 in Gilbert, Arizona to a high of 
0.58 in Atlanta, Georgia. Twenty-five cities have Gini index measures between the low of 0.38 
and 0.45, forty-three cities sit between 0.46 and 0.49, and thirty-two cities lie between 0.5 and 
the high of 0.58. 
Lack of internet access affects both gamers and non-gamers and is suggestive of poor 
socioeconomic standing. Thus, percentage of the populations within our big 100 without internet 
access is another population variable in this analysis. The data comes again from the ACS 5-year 
estimates. The city with the smallest percentage of its population without internet access is 
Gilbert, Arizona, coming in at 4%, while the city with the largest percentage of its population 
without internet access is Laredo, Texas, coming in at 35% of its population without internet 
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access. Thirteen cities have between 4% and 9.9% of the population without internet, twenty 
cities have between 10% and 14.9% of the population without internet, thirty-six cities have 
between 15% and 19.9% of its population without internet, seventeen cities have between 20% 
and 24.9% of its population without internet, and fourteen cities have between 25% and 35% of 
its population without internet. 
Structural Covariates of Violent Crime 
 
 The ACS 5-year also produces estimates on racial composition across the five-
year time span, and percentage of the population that is African American will be the primary 
racial measure for this analysis. The percentage of black Americans across the 100 cities ranges 
from 0.42% in Laredo, Texas to 79.12% in Detroit, Michigan. There are twenty cities that have 
between 0.42% and 4.9% Black populations, twenty cities with between 5% and 9.9%, eighteen 
cities with between 10% and 19.9%, twenty with between 20% and 29.9%, thirteen cities with 
between 30% and 49.9%, and nine cities with between 50% and 79.12%.  
 The ACS 5-year estimate produces poverty estimates as well, which are also presented in 
the form of percentage of population that falls below poverty level within a census place. 
Percentages of the population that fall under the poverty line range from 3.18% in Fremont, 
California to 32.17% in Detroit, Michigan. There are sixteen cities with between 3.18% and 
9.49% of the population below the poverty line, sixteen cities between 9.5% and 11.99%, fifteen 
cities between 12% and 13.4%, nineteen cities between 13.5% and 15.9%, sixteen cities between 
16% and 18.9%, and seventeen cities between 19% and 32.17%.  
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 Next on the list of variables accounted for by the ACS 5-year estimates is the percentage 
of the population aged fifteen years and older that is divorced. Divorced populations range from 
a low of 6.18% in Fremont, California to 15.77 percent in Spokane, Washington. There are 
fourteen cities with percentage of divorced population between 6.18% and 8.99%, eighteen cities 
between 9% and 10.29%, eighteen between 10.3% and 11.09%, nineteen cities between 11.1% 
and 12.29%, fifteen cities between 12.3% and 13.19%, and sixteen cities between 13.2% and 
15.77%.  
As discussed previously, income distribution, and therefore crime distribution, fall on 
racial lines. In 2010, John Paul DeWitt and William H. Frey from the University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor Population Studies Center produced a dataset detailing racial distribution in many 
United States metropolitan areas, including our big 100. To do this, they deployed the 
dissimilarity index. The dissimilarity index measures the relative separation or integration of 
groups across all neighborhoods of a city or metropolitan area. If a city's white-black 
dissimilarity index or white-Hispanic dissimilarity index were 55, that would mean that 55% of 
whites in a given city would need to move to other neighborhoods to create even racial 
distribution. Like the Gini index, a score of 100 equals perfect segregation, while a score of zero 
equals perfectly integrated. Considering the differences of racial composition of minorities 
across the United States, measures of dissimilarity for both black and Hispanic populations will 
be used.  
Regarding the dissimilarity index for Black-White disparity, the lowest dissimilarity 
score belongs to Gilbert, Arizona with a score of 20.3, while the largest score belongs to 
Chicago, Illinois, with a score of 84.3. Twenty-six cities have score between 20 and 39, eighteen 
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cities have scores between 40 and 49, twenty-eight cities have scores between 50 and 59, nine 
cities have between 60 and 69, seventeen cities have between 70 and 79, and only two cities, 
New York and Chicago, have scores above 80. Regarding the index for the Hispanic-White 
disparity, the lowest dissimilarity score belongs to, again, Gilbert, Arizona, which sits at 13.6, 
while the highest score belongs to Oakland, California, with a score of 67.9. Thirteen cities have 
scores from 13 to 29, twenty-two cities have scores between 30 and 39, thirty-four cities have 
scores between 40 and 49, twenty cities have scores between 50 and 59, and eleven cities have 
scores between 60 and 68. 
Video Games as Preferred Entertainment 
  
Moving away from population demographics, we will now go over the data regarding 
video game spending and video game related habits in the 100 cities. First is survey data from 
the SimmonsLOCAL US survey of the 210 DMA’s which include our 100 most populated cities. 
The two questions used to estimate the percentages of the population that are interested in video 
games include: “Would you consider video games to be your main source of entertainment?” 
and, “Do you spend more time playing video games than watching TV?”. Questions were 
answered with a Likert Scale which consisted of answers ranging from, “agree a lot”, “agree a 
little”, “don’t know”, “disagree a little”, and “disagree a lot”. For this analysis, the percentage of 
participants who answered either “agree a lot” or “agree a little” to either of these questions will 
be considered as part of the population that prefers video games over other sources of 
entertainment, thus providing a useful proxy measure for the presence of gamers in any given 
city. If necessary, five-year mean values will be calculated.  
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Up first is the question, “Would you consider video games to be your main source of 
entertainment?”. In 2013, the city with the lowest percentage of the sampled population that 
agree that video games could be considered their main source of entertainment was Scottsdale, 
Arizona at 4.46% agreement, where the city with the highest percentage was Newark, New 
Jersey at 16.28%. Twenty cities had between 4.46% and 6.49% of the sample agree with the 
statement, thirty cities had between 6.5% and 7.49% agreement, twenty one cities had between 
7.5% and 8.49% agreement, seventeen cities had between 8.5% and 9.49%, and twelve cities 
have had between 9.5% and 16.28% agreement that video games would be considered their main 
source of entertainment.  
In 2014, the city with the lowest percentage who agreed with this statement was San 
Francisco, California at 4.16%, where the city with the highest percentage was Norfolk, Virginia 
at 11.7% agreement. Eighteen cities had between 4.16% and 5.9% of the sample agree with the 
above statement, twenty-three cities had between 6% and 6.79% agree, sixteen cities had 
between 6.8% and 7.39% agree, twenty-one cities had between 7.4% and 7.96% agree, twelve 
cities had between 8% and 8.49% agree, and ten cities had between 8.5% and 11.7% agree that 
video games could be considered their main source of entertainment.  
In 2015, the city with the lowest percentage of the sampled population that agree that 
video games could be considered their main source of entertainment was Anaheim, California at 
5.3%, and the city with the highest percentage who agreed was Riverside, California at 12.34%. 
Eighteen cities had between 5.3% and 6.9% of the sample agree, eighteen cities had between 7% 
and 7.59% agree, fourteen cities had between 7.6% and 7.9% agree, seventeen cities had 
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between 8% and 8.78% agree, sixteen cities had between 8.8% and 9.4% agree, and seventeen 
cities had between 9.5% and 12.34% agree with the statement.  
In 2016, the city with the lowest percentage of the sampled population that agreed that 
video games could be considered their main source of entertainment was Hialeah, Florida at 
4.35%, where the highest percentage belongs again to Norfolk, Virginia sitting at 13.77% of the 
sampled population in agreement. Seventeen cities had between 4.35% and 6.7% agreement, 
nineteen cities had between 6.8% and 7.79%, twenty-one cities had between 7.8% and 8.49%, 
eighteen cities had between 8.5% and 8.99%, thirteen cities ha between 9% and 9.99%, and 
twelve cities had between 10% and 13.77% agreement.  
For 2017, the city with the lowest percentage of agreement that video games could be 
considered their main source of entertainment belongs to Laredo, Texas which sat at 5.06%, 
where the highest percentage of agreement went to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania which sat at 
13.94%. Eighteen cities had between 5.3% and 7.6% agreement, nineteen cities had between 
7.7% and 8.69%, eighteen cities had between 8.7% and 9.39% agreement, seventeen cities had 
between 9.4% and 9.99% agreement, sixteen cities had between 10% and 11.4% agreement, and 
twelve cities had between 11.5% and 13.94% agreement.  
The second question on the SimmonsLOCAL U.S. survey asked participants whether 
they agreed that they spent more time playing video games than watching TV. In 2013, the city 
with the lowest percentage of agreement that they prefer video games to television of 
entertainment was Anaheim, California with 5.47% agreement, and the city with the highest 
percentage of agreement was Boston, Massachusetts with 13.81% agreement. Twenty-one cities 
had between 5.47% and 7.9% agreement, twenty-nine cities had between 8% and 8.9% 
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agreement, twenty-one cities had between 9% and 9.9% agreement, seventeen cities had between 
10% and 10.9% agreement, and eleven cities had between 11% and 13.81% agreement that the 
spent more time playing video games compared to watching TV.  
In 2014, the city with the lowest percentage of agreement that they prefer video games to 
television of entertainment belongs to Scottsdale, Arizona at 5.16%, where the highest 
percentage of agreeing participants goes to Norfolk, Virginia at 14.3%. Sixteen cities had 
between 5.16% and 7.4% agreement, thirteen cities had between 7.5% and 7.99%, twenty cities 
had between 8% and 8.8%, twenty cities had between 8.9% and 9.49%, sixteen cities had 
between 9.5% and 9.9%, and fourteen cities had between 10% and 14.3% agreement.  
In 2015, the city with the lowest percentage of agreement was Birmingham, Alabama at 
5.71%, where the city with the highest percentage was Riverside, California at 11.83%. Eighteen 
cities had between 5.71% and 7.4% agreement, eighteen cities had between 7.5% and 8.29%, 
nineteen cities had between 8.3% and 8.79%, eighteen cities had between 8.8% and 9.49%, 
fourteen cities had between 9.5% and 10.49%, and thirteen cities had between 10.5% and 
11.83%.  
In 2016, the city with the lowest percentage of agreement was Hialeah, Florida at 4.63%, 
where the city with the highest percentage of agreement was Buffalo, New York. Thirteen cities 
were between 4.63% and 6.9% agreement, twenty-two cities were between 7% and 7.9%, sixteen 
cities were between 8% and 8.49%, fifteen cities were between 8.6% and 8.99%, eighteen cities 
were between 9% and 9.99%, and sixteen cities were between 10% and 13.7%.  
In 2017, the city with the lowest percentage of agreement was Laredo, Texas at 6.61%, 
where the city with the highest percentage of agreement was Detroit, Michigan at 16.92%. 
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Sixteen cities had between 6.61% and 8.99% agreement, fourteen cities had between 9% and 
9.4% agreement, nineteen cities had between 9.5% and 10.49%, twenty-one cities had between 
10.5% and 11.49%, seventeen cities had between 11.5% and 12.9%, and thirteen cities had 
between 13% and 16.92% agreement. 
Video Game Spending 
 
Next up is video game related hardware spending per household between 2013 and 2017. 
Again, hardware consists of consoles (PlayStation 4, Xbox One, Nintendo Switch, etc.), 
controllers, chargers, headsets, and other accessories. Each year is very different in where the 
cities fall on their spending in this area, which means that five-year averages will be the 
necessary metric here. For instance, the lowest average household spending per year ranges from 
$19.33 in Detroit, Michigan for 2013, to $33.15 in Hialeah, Florida for 2014, to $18.32 in Detroit 
for 2015, to $45.54 in Detroit for 2016, to $23.33 in Detroit for 2017. Regarding the most 
spending, numbers range from $62.83 in Fremont, California for 2013, to $65.94 in Fremont, 
California for 2014, to $136.46 in Fremont for 2015, $78.10 in Fremont for 2016, and $61.64 in 
Gilbert, Arizona for 2017.  
For the year 2013, nineteen cities averaged between $19.33 and $34 per household 
spending on video game hardware, fifteen cities averaged between $35 and $39 in hardware 
spending, twenty-nine cities averaged between $40 and $44.99, twenty-five cities averaged 
between $45 and $49.99, and twelve cities have averaged between $50 and $62.83 in hardware 
spending. 
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For the year 2014, nineteen cities averaged between $30.00 and $39.99 per household 
spending on video game hardware, twenty-two cities averaged between $40.00 and $44.99 per 
household, twenty-two cities averaged between $45 and $47.99, thirteen cities averaged between 
$48.00 and $49.99, eleven cities averaged between $50.00 and $54.99, and thirteen cities 
averaged between $55.00 and $66.00 on hardware.  
For the year 2015, nineteen cities averaged between $18.32 and $34.99 per household, 
seventeen cities averaged between $35 and $39.99, twenty cities averaged between $40 and 
$42.99, sixteen cities averaged between $43.00 and $49.99, seventeen cities averaged between 
$$50.00 and $64.99, and eleven cities averaged between $65.00 and $136.50 in average 
household spending on hardware.  
For 2016, nineteen cities averaged between $45.00 and $50.99 in household spending on 
gaming hardware, twenty-one cities averaged between $51.00 and $52.99, nineteen cities 
averaged between $53.00 and $54.99, nineteen cities averaged between $55.00 and $56.99, 
eleven cities averaged between $57.00 and $59.99, and eleven cities averaged between $60.00 
and $79.00.  
For 2017, nineteen cities average between $23.00 and $39.99 household spending on 
video game hardware, eighteen cities averaged between $40.00 and $44.99, sixteen cities 
averaged between $45.00 and $47.99, nineteen cities averaged between $48.00 and $50.99, 
twelve cities averaged between $51.00 and $52.99, and sixteen cities that averaged between 
$53.00 and $62.00.  
This leads us to the next economically related variable in this analysis, average household 
spending on video game related software. This can be defined as game sales, both physical and 
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digital, in-game purchases, such as micro-transactions, and subscriptions. Just like hardware 
sales, software sales vary from year to year, thus rendering five-year averages necessary. In 
2013, the highest average software sales were $2.47 in Laredo, Texas, in 2014, the highest sales 
sat at $7.82 per household in Fremont, California, in 2015 it was $12.19 in Gilbert, Arizona, in 
2016 it was 14.55 again in Gilbert, and in 2017 it was in Washington, D.C. at $14.92 average 
spending per household. On the lower end of the scale in 2013 sits Detroit, Michigan at $0.96, in 
2014 it’s Hialeah, Florida with $2.55 average software sales per household, in 2015 its Detroit 
again with $7.27, in 2016 its Honolulu with an average of $8.35, and in 2017 its Hialeah again 
with $11.50 average household spending on video game related software.  
In 2013, fourteen cities averaged between $0.96 and $1.49 in software spending per 
household, nineteen cities averaged between $1.50 and $1.69, fourteen cities averaged between 
$1.70 and $1.79, sixteen cities averaged between $1.80 and $1.89, fifteen cities averaged 
between $1.9 and $1.99, and twenty-two cities averaged between $2.00 and $2.47 in software 
spending.  
In 2014, fifteen cities averaged between $2.55 and $3.55 in software spending per 
household, sixteen cities averaged between $3.56 and $4.00, fifteen cities averaged between 
$4.00 and $4.55, eighteen cities averaged between $4.56 and $5.00, nineteen cities averaged 
between $5.00 and $6.00, and seventeen cities averaged between $6.00 and $8.00. In 2015, 
fourteen cities averaged between $7.27 and $9.00 in average household spending on video game 
related software, seventeen cities averaged between $9.00 and $9.49, twenty-one cities averaged 
between $9.50 and $10.00, twenty-one cities averaged between $10.00 and $10.39, seventeen 
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cities spent between $10.40 and $10.69, and ten cities averaged between $10.70 and $12.20 in 
household spending on video game software.  
In 2016, eleven cities averaged between $8.35 and $10.99 in average household spending 
on video game software, twenty-one cities averaged between $11.00 and $11.99, twenty cities 
averaged between $12.00 and $12.49, twenty-six cities averaged between $12.50 and $12.99, 
eleven cities  averaged between $13.00 and $13.29, and ten cities averaged between $13.30 and 
$14.55 in household spending on video game related software.  
In 2017, fourteen cities averaged between $11.50 and $12.60 in average household 
spending on video game related software, eighteen cities averaged between $12.61 and $12.99, 
twenty-one cities averaged between $13.00 and $13.29, twenty cities averaged between $13.30 
and $13.59, fourteen cities averaged between $13.60 and $13.99, and thirteen cities averaged 
between $14.00 and $14.99.  
Violent Crime 
 
Our last set of variables are of the dependent variety: violent crime. As stated previously, 
homicide and aggravated assault data were pulled from the publicly available FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR) from the years 2013 through 2017. Let’s begin with homicides rates from 
2013 through 2017. It is important to note that the crime listed in the UCR are reported crime, 
thus rendering all unreported crime invisible from the analysis. Considering that many homicide 
rates don’t fluctuate in large cities quite as much as they would in less populated areas, it is still 
possible to see quite large fluctuations. Also, throughout the five-year time span, there are cities 
with unavailable homicide data. In 2013, there are three cities with unavailable homicide data: 
Honolulu, Hawaii, Columbus, Ohio, and Durham, North Carolina. In 2014, there are four cities 
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with unavailable homicide data: Wichita, Kansas, Fort Worth, Texas, Glendale, Arizona, and 
Scottsdale, Arizona. In 2015, the cities are: Cleveland, Ohio, Newark, New Jersey, and Portland, 
Oregon. In 2016 nor in 2017 is there any missing data. With this in mind, five-year averages will 
be used as measures for the violence in our 100 cities. 
Homicide Rates 
 
In 2013, the homicide rates ranged from a low of 0.44 per 100,000 in Gilbert, Arizona 
and a high of 45.15 per 100,000 in Detroit Michigan. Twenty cities had homicide rates that 
ranged between 0 and 2.9 per 100,000, twenty-three cities had rates between 3 and 5.9 per 
100,000, nineteen cities had rates between 6 and 7.9 per 100,000, nineteen cities had rates 
between 8 and 15.9 per 100,000, and sixteen cities had rates between 16 and 45.15 per 100,000. 
In 2014, the homicide rates ranged from a low of 0 per 100,000 in both Gilbert, Arizona 
and Irvine, California to a high of 49.9 in St. Louis, Missouri. Sixteen cities ranged from rates of 
0 to 2.9 per 100,000, sixteen cities ranged from rates 3 to 4.49 per 100,000, fifteen cities ranged 
from 4.5 to 5.9 per 100,000, seventeen cities ranged from 6 to 8.49 per 100,000, sixteen cities 
ranged from 8.5 to 16.5 per 100,000, and sixteen cities ranged from 16.6 to 49.9 per 100,000. 
In 2015, the homicide rates ranged from a low of 0 .36 per 100,000 in Lincoln, Nebraska 
to a high of 59.3 in St. Louis, Missouri. Eighteen cities ranged from rates of 0.36 to 2.99 per 
100,000, seventeen cities ranged from rates 3 to 5.49 per 100,000, fifteen cities ranged from 5.5 
to 6.9 per 100,000, seventeen cities ranged from 7 to 10.9 per 100,000, fifteen cities ranged from 
11 to 17.9 per 100,000, and fifteen cities ranged from 18 to 59.3 per 100,000.  
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In 2016, the homicide rates ranged from a low of 0 per 100,000 in Fremont, California to 
a high of 59.8 in St. Louis, Missouri. Seventeen cities ranged from rates of 0 to 2.99 per 100,000, 
eighteen cities ranged from rates 3 to 5.99 per 100,000, twenty cities ranged from 6 to 8.9 per 
100,000, eighteen cities ranged from 9 to 14 per 100,000, thirteen cities ranged from 15 to 22 per 
100,000, and fourteen cities ranged from 23 to 59.8 per 100,000.  
In 2017, the homicide rates ranged from a low of 0 per 100,000 in Lincoln, Nebraska to a 
high of 66.1 in St. Louis, Missouri. Fourteen cities ranged from rates of 0 to 2.99 per 100,000, 
twenty cities ranged from rates 3 to 5.99 per 100,000, twenty cities ranged from 6 to 8.9 per 
100,000, fifteen cities ranged from 9 to 12.49 per 100,000, sixteen cities ranged from 12.5 to 
18.9 per 100,000, and fourteen cities ranged from 19 to 66.1 per 100,000.  
The five-year averages for homicide rates should come as no surprise then, with St. Louis 
coming in at number one with an average homicide rate of 54.5 per 100,000, while the lowest 
average homicide rate, 0.52 per 100,000, falls in Fremont, California. 
Aggravated Assault Rates 
 
Moving on to aggravated assault rates, it is important to make some caveats. First, 
different states and even different jurisdictions within the same states can have different 
definitions for aggravated assault, some even have different names for the crime, such as battery 
or assault. Thus, the aggravated assault data are not as reliable as our homicide data, where the 
definition is the same across all jurisdictions: dead by murder. The crimes listed in the UCR are 
reported crimes, thus rendering all unreported crime invisible from the analysis. Many 
aggravated assault rates don’t fluctuate in large cities quite as much as they would in less 
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populated areas, however it is still possible and known to see quite large fluctuations across even 
a five-year time span. Also, throughout the five -year time span, there are cities with unavailable 
assault data. In 2013, the cities are Chicago, Illinois, Honolulu, Hawaii, Durham, North Carolina, 
and Columbus, Ohio. In 2014, the cities are Wichita, Kansas, Fort Worth, Texas, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, Glendale, Arizona, and Scottsdale, Arizona. In 2015, the cities are Cleveland, Ohio, 
Newark, New Jersey, and Portland, Oregon. In 2016, there is no missing data, but in 2017, 
Lubbock, Texas is missing.  
In 2013, aggravated assault rates ranged from a low of 25 per 100,000 in Irvine 
California to a high of 1,256 per 100,000 in Detroit, Michigan. Seventeen cities had aggravated 
assault rates between 25 and 199 per 100,000, twenty cities had rates between 200 and 299 per 
100,000, twenty-two cities had between rates between 300 and 399 per 100,000, twelve cities 
had rates between 400 and 499 per 100,000, sixteen cities had rates between 500 and 699 per 
100,000, and nine cities had rates between 700 and 1,256 per 100,000. 
In 2014, aggravated assault rates in our large cities ranged from a low of 23 per 100,000 
in Irvine, California to a high of 1,342 per 100,000 in Detroit, Michigan. Eighteen cities had 
rates between 23 and 210 per 100,000, sixteen cities had rates between 211 and 289 per 100,000, 
seventeen cities had rates between 290 and 369 per 100,000, seventeen had rates between 370 
and 489 per 100,000, thirteen cities had rates between 490 and 649 per 100,000, and fourteen 
cities between 650 and 1342 per 100,000.  
In 2015, aggravated assault rates ranged from a low of 22.5 per 100,000 in Irvine, 
California to a high of 1,163.2 per 100,000 in Memphis, Tennessee. In nineteen cities, rates 
ranged from 22.5 per 100,000 to 199.9 per 100,000, in sixteen cities rates ranged from 200 per 
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100,000 to 299 per 100,000, twenty cities ranged from 300 per 100,000 to 399 per 100,000, 
seventeen cities ranged from 400 per 100,000 to 499 per 100,000, eleven cities ranged from 500 
per 100,000 to 699 per 100,000, and fourteen cities ranged from 700 per 100,000 to 1163.2 per 
100,000.  
In 2016, aggravated assault rates ranged from a low of 21 per 100,000, again in Irvine, 
California, to a high of 1,475.7 per 100,000 in Detroit, Michigan. In seventeen cities, rates 
ranged between 21 per 100,000 and 199 per 100,000, seventeen cities had rates between 200 per 
100,000 and 299 per 100,000,  twenty-two cities had rates between 300 per 100,000 and 399 per 
100,000, eighteen cities between 400 per 100,000 and 549 per 100,000, fourteen cities between 
550 per 100,000 and 799 per 100,000, and twelve cities between 800 per 100,000 and 1,475 per 
100,000.  
In 2017, aggravated assault rate ranged from a low of 24 per 100,000, once again in 
Irvine, California, to a high of 1,519.6 per 100,000, once again in Detroit, Michigan. Eighteen 
cities had rates that ranged between 24 per 100,000 and 199 per 100,000, sixteen cities had rates 
that ranged between 200 per 100,000 and 299 per 100,000, fifteen cities had rates that ranged 
between 300 per 100,000 and 399 per 100,000, twenty one cities that ranged between 400 per 
100,000 and 499 per 100,000, sixteen cities ranged between 500 per 100,000 and 749 per 
100,000, and thirteen cities ranged between 750 per 100,000 and 1,519.6 per 100,000.  
The five-year average for aggravated assault should also come as no surprise, where the 
highest aggravated assault rate is in Detroit, Michigan, with a rate of 1,343 per 100,000 
inhabitants, while the lowest rate, 23.26 per 100,000, is in Irvine, California. 
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Analysis 
 
Basic frequencies and descriptive statistics, such as means and standard deviations, were 
run in order to characterize the dataset used in this analysis. Correlations were run for all the 
variables in order to determine the strength of the relationships among the variables and how 
they are affecting the regression analysis. An OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) Regression was 
used because the dependent variables, homicide and aggravated assault rates, are rates rather 
than counts, which assume linear correlations. Three separate models will be produced in order 
to compare the potency of each relevant or potentially relevant explanations for homicide and 
assault rates in the 100 cities that make up our data set.  
The first model consists of the classic criminological and sociological explanations for 
violent crime: percentage of the population in poverty, percentage of the population that is black, 
percentage of the population that is divorced, percentage of the population without internet 
connection, Black/White segregation as measured by the Dissimilarity index, Hispanic/White 
segregation as measured by the Dissimilarity index, the Gini index, and population density. The 
second model consists of our measures for video game prevalence: percentage of the population 
that prefers video games to television, percentage of the population that identify video games as 
their main choice in entertainment, hardware sales, and software sales. The third model combines 
all our predictor variables into one. Each model was run separately for homicides and assaults, 
considering the potentially different causalities for each. Collinearity diagnostics, such as 
tolerance tests and variance inflation factors (VIF) were run to determine collinearity among the 
variables. The VIF cutoff used for this analysis will be four, following Fischer and Mason 
(1981). Basic correlations will be run among the variables to determine underlying relationships 
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that are influencing the regression analysis. Five-year averages will be used for all the variables 
in this analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 Taking a quick glance at the data will give a clearer picture of the 100 cities and how they 
all relate to our variables (see Table 3). The average homicide rate is 10.73 per 100,000, two 
times higher than the national average of 5 per 100,000 (SD = 10.37; FBI, 2018), where the 
average aggravated assault rate is 414.3 per 100,000, also two times higher than the country’s 
average of 246 per 100,000 (SD = 255.35; FBI, 2018). The average percentage of the population 
in poverty for the cities was 14.3% (SD = 5.75) where the national average in 2018 was 11.8% 
(Census Bureau, 2018), population divorced was 11.23% (SD = 2.07), population without 
internet was 17.59% (SD = 6.61) which is more than double the national number in 2012, which 
was only 6% (FCC, 2012). The percentage of the city’s population of African American was 
20.24% (SD = 17.83), also above the national average of 13% (Census Bureau, 2018). 
Black/White Dissimilarity scores, remember act as a measure for segregation, showed an average 
of 52 (SD = 15.45), which again means that 52% of the White population would have to move 
into Black neighborhoods, or vis versa, to create equal distribution. In other words, many of our 
cities are highly segregated. The average Hispanic/White dissimilarity index for our cities is 
43.78 (SD = 12.07), which again means that in order to achieve “perfect integration”, 43% of 
white households would have to move into Hispanic neighborhoods, or vis versa. The average 
Gini coefficient measure of economic inequality for the sample of cities is 0.47 (SD = .039), just 
below the nation average of 0.49 (Duffin, 2019). Again, this means that income distribution is 
about halfway between perfect equality (a score of 0) and perfect inequality (a score of 1). The 
average population density in the 100 cities is 4,819 persons per square mile (SD = 4,203) and 
the average population of the sample is 635,149 (SD = 961,438).  
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 When it comes to video game prominence within the cities, there was an average of 
$47.24 in household spending per year on video game related hardware (SD = 6.87) and an 
average spending of $8.37 on video game related software (SD =0.34). When it comes to the 
average percentage of the population within these cities that prefer video games over television 
or prefer video games as their main source of entertainment, 9.22% of the sampled populations 
agreed that they prefer video games to TV (SD =1.17) and 8.13% agreed that video games are 
their main source of entertainment (SD =1.05). Next, let’s take a look at how all of the variable 
relate to one another.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation 
Homicide Rate 5-Year Avg.  10.73 per 100,000 10.37 per 100,000 
Aggravated Assault Rate 5-Year Avg.  414.3 per 100,000 255.35 per 100,000 
Video Games as Main Source of Entertainment 8.13% Agree 1.05% 
Video Games Preferable to Television 9.22% Agree 1.17% 
Video Game Hardware Spending 5-Year Avg.  $47.24  $6.87  
Video Game Software Spending 5-Year Avg.  $8.37  $0.34  
% Population w/o Internet 17.59% 6.61% 
% Population Divorced 11.23% 2.07% 
% Population in Poverty 14.33% 5.75% 
% Population African American 20.24% 17.83% 
Gini Index Scores 0.47 0.039 
Black/White Dissimilarity Scores 52 15.45 
Hispanic/White Dissimilarity Scores 43.78 12.07 
Population Density 4,819.43 / sq. mile 4,203.26 / sq. mile 
Population 5-Year Avg.  635,149 961,438 
Population Density Nat. Log 13.01 0.68 
Population Nat. Log 8.2 0.73 
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Video Game Spending & Entertainment Preference 
 
 The two survey questions, whether video games are considered a main source of 
entertainment and whether video games are preferable to watching TV, relate to each other and 
video game related spending in important and counter-intuitive ways (See Table 4). For starters, 
the two survey questions are highly correlated with one another (r = .933, p < .001), which 
means that they should, in theory, be measuring the same phenomenon: percentage of the 
population that likes (and likely plays) video games. When a person answers that they prefer 
video games to TV, it is likely, though not certain, that the same person will also answer that 
video games are their main source of entertainment (a detail that will become important down 
the line). Immediately things get interesting when glancing at the relationship between video 
game spending and video game preferences.  
Both video game related hardware and software spending is negatively related to both 
entertainment questions. Hardware spending and preference for video games over television and 
preference for video games over other sources of entertainment are opposed significantly            
(r = -.278, p < .01; r = -.250, p < .01). The same can be said, but to a lesser extent, regarding 
video game related software spending (r = -.062; r = -.051). What this means is two-fold. For 
starters, it means that video game related spending does not necessarily assume that video games 
are the preferred form of entertainment. Thus, illuminating a variable that needs to be taken stock 
of that is potentially more important than spending and preferences: time spent playing video 
games. All four variables used in this analysis are proxy measures for video game popularity in 
our big cities, not direct measurements. Parents buy their children video games, yet the children 
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do not answer these survey questions nor do the parents necessarily play the video games they 
buy. People buy video games as gifts. Even more, people buy and play video games, yet still 
prefer TV, movies or music over them. Spending and entertainment preferences do not share a 
one-to-one relationship. Secondly, what this means moving forward, all results should be taken 
with a healthy grain of salt, as the measurements here are not reliable measurements of video 
game playing within a given area. With all of this in mind, let’s see how these variables relate to 
our violent crime measures: average homicide and aggravated assault rates between 2013 and 
2017. 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
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Things start to get weird again when seeing the strange differences between spending and 
entertainment preferences as they related to violent crime rates (see Table 5). Counter to 
expectations, percentage of the population that prefer video games over TV and other forms of 
entertainment are positively correlated with increased homicide rates and aggravated assault rates 
to a significant degree (r = .309, p < .01; r = .293, p < .01). What this means cannot be entirely 
discerned because all the assumptions that follow based on those relationships get thrown into 
the air when video game related spending is considered. Both hardware and software spending 
are negatively related to homicide rates (r = -.747, p < .001; r = -.402, p < .001) and aggravated 
assault (r = -.62, p < .001; r = -.394, p < .001) and with higher degrees of significance. This 
means that the higher the sales figures in a given city, the lower the corresponding violent crime 
rates were.  
Table 5. Correlations - Violent Crime & Video Games 
 
 
Even further, the strength of the correlations regarding spending are far stronger than the 
relationships to entertainment preferences. What this means cannot be entirely determined either 
until regressions are run. What this does do is invite a degree of uncertainty. The positive 
relationship of entertainment preferences to violent crime can mean a great deal of things that 
have nothing to do with video games leading to violence.  
* p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Then again, the same can be said for the negative relationship to video game spending. One 
needs to first ask how our video game variables relate to our crime-related variables.  
Structural Covariates of Violent Crime 
 
 Considering the years of criminological and sociological research on violent crime, it 
should come as no surprise that many of the hypotheses and theories discussed in the paper thus 
far are validated in this study. Almost every single predictor of violent crime is significantly 
associated with both homicide rates and aggravated assault rates (see Table 6). Only two 
variables, population density and population, are insignificantly related to violent crime rates. 
Due to the non-linearity of population and population density within the 100 cities, both 
variables were naturally logged to account for their exponential nature. Still, no relationship 
could be found to violent crime. 
Table 6. Correlations - SCVC vs. Video Games 
 
 
     * p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001 
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The most potent variables among all of the structural covariates as they relate to homicide 
were the percentage of the population that is black or African American (r =  .793, p < .001), 
followed closely by Black/White Dissimilarity scores (r = .718, p < .001), and poverty (r = .706, 
p < .001). Though these three variables were extremely potent, this should not downplay the 
extreme significance of the other variables. Percentage of the population without internet (r = 
.694, p < .001), Gini index scores (r = .587, p < .001), Hispanic/White Dissimilarity scores (r = 
.414, p < .001), and percentage of the population divorced (r = .215, p < .05) are all significantly 
correlated with increased homicide rates as well as aggravated assault rates. When it comes to 
aggravated assault, these seven variables lose a small degree of association, but retain 
significance levels below .001 (see Table 6). The only variable that has a greater association to 
aggravated assaults than to homicide is percentage of the population that is divorced (r = .267,    
p < .01). The next question to ask is, how do all our variables relate, and how might the impact 
each other. 
Video Gaming vs. Structural Covariates of Violent Crime: Correlations 
 
 To understand the results of regressions, we must first understand how all our variables 
relate to each other. For instance, remember that preferring video games as your main source of 
entertainment was positively correlated with higher homicide and aggravated assault rates. 
Preference for video games as the main source of entertainment is positively correlated with 
some of the structural covariates of violent crime as well, which may explain the connection to 
higher violent crime rates. It is significantly related to percentage of the population in poverty (r 
= .254, p < .05), percentage of the population African American (r = .340, p < .01), and 
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Black/White Dissimilarity scores (r = .229, p < .05). However, preference for video games over 
TV, rather than preference for video games over all forms of entertainment, is not significantly 
associated with poverty (r = .179) though it is still significantly associated with African 
American population (r = .330, p < .01)  and Black/White Dissimilarity (r = .238, p < .05).  
This gets flipped on its head once more by video game related hardware and software 
spending, which are negatively correlated with all but two of the structural covariates of violent 
crime (population and population density), and to a much more powerful extent. In other words, 
the positive correlations between video game/entertainment preferences and the structural 
covariates are far weaker than the negative correlations between video game related spending 
and the structural covariates.  
For instance, video game hardware spending is negatively correlated with Black/White 
Dissimilarity (r = -.601, p < .001), percentage African American (r = -.666, p < .001), the Gini 
measure of economic inequality (r = -.523, p < .001), poverty (r = -.631, p < .001), population 
divorced (r = -.494, p < .001),  and percentage of the population without internet (r = -.724, p < 
.001) to a more significant degree than a general preference for video games is related to the 
same variables. The structural covariates of violent crime are also highly intercorrelated, which 
will play a significant role in the decisions to come as we whittle down our variables for our final 
regression analysis.  
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Collinearity 
 
 Earlier in the paper we discussed the issue of collinearity in the social science, and in 
particular violent crime studies. As we stated earlier, collinearity throws off statistics when 
multiple variables interact in the same direction thus confounding significance values and 
confusing the analysis (Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990). To deal with collinearity, tolerance tests 
were run in order to detail the degree of collinearity in this data set before we run our regressions 
(see Table 7). Since the final model will include every variable, tolerance tests were run on all of 
the variables. As stated previously, the standard, but conservative, VIF cutoff in criminology is 
four (Fischer and Mason, 1981).  
The initial tests for collinearity are detailed in Table 7. Unfortunately, many variables 
appeared to be collinear, thus forcing a decision on which variables to keep and which variables 
to toss out. The variables with collinearity were three of the four video game variables: video 
games as main source of entertainment (VIF = 9.24), video games preferred to TV (VIF = 8.6), 
hardware spending (VIF = 4.76), percentage of the population without internet (VIF = 7.4), 
percentage of the population in poverty (VIF = 7.06), and Black/White dissimilarity (VIF =5.12).  
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Table 7. Collinearity - All Variables 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In order to dissect out the important variables, we will refer once more to the correlations 
to determine what is worth keeping and what is not. Let’s begin with the video game variables, 
particularly related to entertainment preference. The difference between preferring video games 
over TV (VIF = 8.6) and preferring video games as your main source of entertainment (VIF = 
9.24) was slim, as these two variables are among the most highly intercorrelated variables in the 
dataset (r = .933, p < .001) and thus are collinear together. This means that one of the two 
variables must go. Choosing which variable to let go was a difficult decision. Preference for 
video games as a primary source of entertainment, rather than just over TV, holds more 
theoretical water because preferring video games over all other sources of entertainment has 
greater implications. If one prefers video games over any other entertainment source, the 
likelihood that that person plays more video games than a person who prefers video games over 
TV but not movies or sports, is greater. On this basis the variable of preferring video games over 
TV will be removed.  
 
Tolerance VIF 
Video Games as Main Source of Entertainment .108 9.24* 
Video Games Preferable to Television .116 8.6* 
Hardware Spending 5-Year Avg.  .21 4.76* 
Software Spending 5-Year Avg.  .455 2.2 
% Population w/o Internet .135 7.4* 
% Population in Poverty .142 7.06* 
Gini Index Scores .364 2.74 
% Population African American .367 2.75 
Black/White Dissimilarity Scores .195 5.12* 
Hispanic/White Dissimilarity Scores .519 1.92 
% Population Divorced .322 3.104 
Population Density .389 2.57 
Population 5-Year Avg.  .543 1.84 
 
*VIF > 4 
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 The next issue of collinearity is between the two variables: percentage of the population 
without internet (VIF = 7.4) and percentage of the population in poverty (VIF = 7.06). Again, 
these two variables were highly correlated (r = .846, p < .001), and thus collinear. This decision 
was much easier to make than the first on the simple basis that it has already been discussed. 
Percentage of the population without internet has been used as a proxy measure for 
socioeconomic status before (Howard, Busch, & Sheets, 2010; Witte & Mannon, 2010; Robinson 
et. al., 2015), thus making this variable redundant. Percentage of the population without internet 
will be removed from the final analysis.  
 The next and final issue of collinearity is between Black/White Dissimilarity scores (VIF 
= 5.12), our measure for racial segregation, and the percentage of the population that is African 
American (VIF = 2.75). It is important to realize that though percentage of the population that is 
African American does not have a VIF score above four, correlations tell us that Black/White 
Dissimilarity is highly correlated with it (r = .752, p < .001). Although these two variables 
measure distinctly different things, it is no mistake that areas with a high percentage of African 
Americans and high homcide rates (r = .793) also have a significantly high degree of racial 
segregation (r = .718), for the same reasons discussed previously in the literature review. Since 
percentage of the population that is African American acts as solid racial metric and dissimilarity 
scores essentially point to the same general phenomenon, Black/White Dissimilarity scores will 
be dismissed in the final analyses. Our other measure for segregation, Hispanic/White 
Dissimilarity, will be kept as it is our only other racial measure for differing demographics across 
the United States. Failure to include a measure for percent non-white Hispanic is a mistake that 
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should be remedied in future studies. The final list of variables and their correspondent VIF 
scores are represented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Collinearity - Final Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Eagle-eyed readers will immediately notice a slight oversight on one particular variable, 
hardware spending, which has a VIF noticeably above the established cutoff of four. The reason 
why it will remain in the analysis where other variables have been removed is two-fold. For one, 
it is one of the most significant variables in the whole analysis. Secondly, the reason it is 
collinear is because it is negatively associated with almost every structural covariate of violent 
crime, as discussed in a previous section. It is for these reasons that it will remain in the analysis. 
Now the final regression analyses are ready to be run.  
 
 
 
 
Tolerance VIF 
Video Games as Main Source of Entertainment .817 1.22 
Hardware Spending 5-Year Avg.  .222 4.5* 
Software Spending 5-Year Avg.  .51 1.96 
% Population in Poverty .339 2.95 
Gini Index Scores .467 2.14 
% Population African American .436 2.23 
Hispanic/White Dissimilarity Scores .475 2.11 
% Population Divorced .332 3.01 
Population Density (Nat.Log) .526 1.901 
Population 5-Year Avg. (Nat.Log) .566 1.76 
 
   * VIF > 4 
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Video Games vs. Structural Covariates of Violent Crime: Regressions 
 
 
 In order to answer the fundamental question that this thesis poses, our video game related 
variables will have to be integrated with the structural covariates of violent crime to determine 
which factors hold the most weight when trying to explain violence our 100 most populous 
cities. To do this, three models will be run for homicide rates and aggravated assault rates 
separately, as they are separate (though subtly connected) phenomena. The first model will 
include the three video game variables: percentage of the population that prefers video games as 
their main source of entertainment, the five-year spending average on video game-related 
hardware, and the five-year spending average on video game-related software. The second model 
will include the remaining structural covariates of violent crime: percentage of the population in 
poverty, Gini index of income inequality scores, the percentage of the population that is African 
American, Hispanic/White Dissimilarity scores (to measure Hispanic segregation), percentage of 
the population that is divorced, the naturally logged versions of population density, and the 
naturally logged versions of the five-year average populations. Finally, the third model will 
include all of the variables together and the wheat shall be sorted from the chaff.  
Homicide 
 
 Model 1 is meant to see how our video game variables fair in explanatory power by 
themselves without any of our structural covariates of violent crime as controls (see Table 9). We 
can see that video game related hardware spending stands immensely significant in the negative 
direction (β = -.498, p < .001), which means that the more video game related hardware sales in 
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any given city, the lower the homicide rates are likely to be. Software related spending also 
registered significant in the negative direction as well (β = -.185, p < .05), though to a lesser 
extent. Interestingly, the percentage of the population that prefers video games as their main 
source of entertainment fell out of the realm of significance and into the realm of irrelevance. 
And this even before our controls are added to the model. Where the basic correlations showed a 
potentially worrying positive correlation (r = .309, p < .01) to higher homicide rates, this 
regression nullifies those relationships. Overall, Model 1 still had a relatively high adjusted R2 of 
.389 (F = 22.04). Keep these values in mind when we discuss their changes when they interact 
with our structural covariate controls.  
 Model 2 describes the structural covariates and paints an interesting picture. Only two 
variables come out as having significant impact on the regression analysis: percentage of the 
population in poverty (β = .207, p < .01) and percentage of the population that is African 
American (β = .683, p < .001). The adjusted R2 is astronomically high, coming in at a whopping 
.701 (F = 34.09). What this essentially means is that Model 2, the structural covariates of violent 
crime, supposedly accounts for 70 percent of the variance that causes homicide rates to go up. 
Luckily this is not entirely unprecedented, as the seminal piece on the structural covariates of 
violent crime by Land, McCall & Cohen (1990) also produced adjusted R2 values as high as .896 
(pg. 941) using most of the same variables.  
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Table 9. OLS Regressions – Homicide (N = 100) 
 
 
 
Now finally, Model 3 will present the coup de grâce1 on the idea that video games have 
anything to do with real violence in the real world, at least in this dataset. What significance 
hardware sales once had in this analysis swiftly disappears (β = .074) when paired with the 
traditional sociological and criminological explanations for violent crime. In fact, percentage of 
 
1. coup de grâce: a decisive finishing blow, act, or event 
 
  
Homicide 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
β β β 
Video Games as Main Source of Entertainment .134 
(.798) 
 
- .033 
(.605) 
Hardware Spending  - .498*** 
(.132) 
 
.074 
(.177) 
Software Spending  - .185* 
(2.592) 
 
- .048 
(2.36) 
% Population in Poverty 
 
.207** 
(.133)  
.217* 
(.172) 
Gini Index Scores 
 
.049 
(19.75)  
.047 
(21.17) 
% Population African American 
 
.683*** 
(.043)  
.718*** 
(.049) 
Hispanic/White Dissimilarity Scores 
 
- .028 
(.067)  
- .016 
(.069) 
% Population Divorced 
 
.081 
(.337)  
.094 
(.480) 
Population Density (Nat.Log) 
 
.035 
(1.03)  
.025 
(1.08) 
Population 5-Year Avg. (Nat.Log) 
 
- .024 
(1.10)  
- .03 
(1.16)    
R2 .408 .722 .726 
Adj. R2 .389 .701 .696 
F 22.044 34.09 23.61 
 
     * p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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the population in poverty (β = .217) and percentage of the population that is African American   
(β = .718) grow in explanatory power when paired with the video game variables. The adjusted 
R2 also went down when all of the variables were added together (R2 = .696, F = 23.61), which 
implies that the introduction of the video game related variables reduced the explanatory power 
of the model, even though the reduction was miniscule. Not let’s see how aggravated assaults 
fair.  
Aggravated Assault 
 
 Model 1 looks very much the same with aggravated assaults as it did with homicides. The 
Model shows decent promise with an adjusted R2 of .353 (F = 19.03). Though the weight is 
mostly carried by hardware spending, which shows itself as immensely significant (β = -.477, p 
< .001) in the negative direction, where software spending is also significant in the negative 
direction (β = -.183, p < .05) but to a lesser degree. Once more, the percentage of the population 
who prefer video games over other forms of entertainment (β = .116) is wholly irrelevant in this 
analysis.  
 Model 2, on the other hand, falls in line once again with our expected outcomes. Though 
the adjusted R2 is noticeably lower than its homicide counterpart (R2 = .499, F = 15.07), it 
remains more significant than Model 1. The same variables play the largest role as well, poverty 
(β = .298, p < .01) and African American population (β = .394, p < .001). There is one 
peculiarity with aggravated assaults, however. One variable rises to significance here where it 
did not with homicide rates: percentage of the population that is divorced (β = .176, p < .05). 
Though of lowly significance, the emergence of this variable points to the well-known 
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connections between rates of domestic abuse and divorces discussed earlier in the paper (Gruber, 
2004; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2006; Stolzenberg & D’Alessio, 2007; Ca´ceres-Delpiano & 
Giolito, 2012). 
Table 10. OLS Regressions - Aggravated Assault (N = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Aggravated Assault 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
β β β 
Video Games as Main Source of Entertainment .116 
(20.23) 
 
.072 
(19.18) 
Hardware Spending 5-Year Avg.  - .477*** 
(3.34) 
 
.036 
(5.619)  
Software Spending 5-Year Avg.  - .183* 
(65.69) 
 
- .126 
(74.85) 
% Population in Poverty 
 
.298** 
(4.25)  
.249* 
(5.44) 
Gini Index Scores 
 
- .022 
(629.50)  
- .037 
(670.72) 
% Population African American 
 
.394*** 
(1.38)  
.385** 
(1.55) 
Hispanic/White Dissimilarity Scores 
 
.186 
(2.12)  
.221* 
(2.19) 
% Population Divorced 
 
.176* 
(10.74)  
.147 
(15.2) 
Population Density (Nat.Log) 
 
- .132 
(32.98)  
- .172 
(34.23) 
Population 5-Year Avg. (Nat.Log) 
 
.027 
(35.153)  
.022 
(35.35)    
R2 .373 .534 .547 
Adj. R2 .353 .499 .496 
F 19.03 15.07 10.75 
 
   
        * p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses 
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Model 3 produces the same style of results that it did with homicide rates. With the 
combination of all the predictor variables, the adjusted R2 fell subtly from .499 in Model 2 to 
.496 in Model 3 (F = 10.75). All three video game related variables are reduced to irrelevance in 
the presence of the structural covariates, while poverty (β = .249, p < .05) and percent African 
American (β = .385, p < .001) remain the most significant variables. Another peculiarity 
emerges, however. Divorce percentages fall out of significance in Model 3, where 
Hispanic/White Dissimilarity scores emerge into the light of significance (β = .221, p < .05). It 
turns out that Hispanic household are significantly more likely than other racial demographics to 
experience domestic violence of one form or another (DeCasas, 2003; Cummings et al. 2013), 
particularly in lower income households (Frias & Angel, 2005). In any case, all three video game 
variables proved ineffectual when compared to the tried and true predictions of criminology and 
sociology at explaining violence in the 100 most populous cities in the United States, just as 
predicted.  
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion and Limitations 
 
With both homicide and aggravated assaults, all three video game variables were reduced 
to irrelevance when paired with the structural covariates of violent crime. In fact, two variables, 
percentage of the population in poverty and percentage of the population that is African 
American, were the only variables that achieved significance in the final models for both 
homicide and aggravated assaults. Income inequality, divorce, population density, and 
population seemed to have no relationship whatsoever to the violent crime rates within this 
sample of cities. This of course does not mean that they are not significant elsewhere, nor does it 
mean that poverty and race play the same role under different circumstances. 
 What these results do show is supportive of the previous research done thus far on the 
societal impact video games have on violence: they seem to do nothing at all. When compared to 
other more potent pieces on the chess board of violence, video games seem to be merely pawns 
against the queens and rooks of poverty and racial segregation. An important caveat needs to be 
made regarding the specific variables that were chosen to represent video games in these cities. 
Video game related spending already proved itself in direct conflict with basic opinions about 
video game related habits in this analysis. Recall that video game spending was powerfully 
correlated, in the negative direction, to both homicide and aggravated assault rates. However, 
opinions about video games as a main source of entertainment were positively correlated with 
both violent crime rates. Further still, video game related spending was negatively correlated 
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with the opinions themselves. Meaning that higher video game related sales were negatively 
associated with positive opinions about video games, which makes no sense.  
This basic contradiction cannot be overlooked and quite frankly casts doubt on the basic 
variables that were chosen to represent video games in this analysis. There does exist a variable 
that could cut through this complication with ease: time spent playing video games. On a city or 
county wide level, basic measurements for time spent playing video games would be a godsend 
for this type of analysis and would likely have much more explanatory power. Time spent 
playing is a direct measurement. Recall that all four variables used in this analysis are proxy 
measures for video game popularity in our big cities, not direct measurements. Parents buy their 
children video games, yet the children do not answer these survey questions nor do the parents 
necessarily play the video games they buy. Parent may buy their kids (or themselves) video game 
consoles and extra controllers, only to have them go unused. People buy video games as gifts, 
regardless of the fact that they might not be played. Even more, people buy and play video 
games, yet still prefer TV, movies or music over them.  
Spending and entertainment preferences do not share a one-to-one relationship in the 
slightest. More importantly, video game spending may be more closely related to financial 
freedom and stability, than the habit of playing video games regularly. In the correlations, video 
game related spending was negatively correlated to percentage of the population in poverty to a 
very high degree. This means that video game spending goes down the more people are in 
poverty. If it were more apparent it would rival the sun in obviousness. And the fact that poverty 
was one our most significant variables connected to violent crime could explain video game 
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spending’s’ strong negative relationship to violent crime.  Again, it would be far better if time 
spent playing video games was a variable in this analysis.  
Despite this glaring issue, this analysis still holds nuggets of light that may yet still be 
shown in the direction of truth. Although video game related hardware spending cannot be 
trusted, percentage of the population that prefers video games to all other forms of entertainment 
points in an uncomfortable direction, but one that should not be ignored. Percentage of the 
population that agreed to the question: “Would you consider video games your main source of 
entertainment?” was positively correlated to both homicide rates and assault rates, as well as our 
most potent variables associated with violent crime: percentage of the population that is black 
and percentage of the population that is in poverty. Although our regressions show that these two 
variables dwarf preference for video games as an entertainment source, this strange relationship 
deserves a bit of discussion. It is incredibly difficult for one to avert their eyes from this 
peculiarity. Our one variable that is closest to measuring amount of video game play within a 
community, be it very large communities, is positively correlated to violent crime and violent 
crimes most potent predictors. What does this mean? 
It could mean a great deal of things that this analysis is not prepared to answer but can be 
enlightening to future research on the topic. Let us play a bit of speculation. But first, let’s 
dispense with one detail that will allow us to zero in on the main issue. It is no secret that on 
average across the United States Black Americans have higher poverty rates than all other 
demographics besides Native Americans (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). The results found in this 
analysis reflect this basic fact, where the correlation between percentage African American and 
percentage of the population in poverty is a whopping .511. As discussed previously this 
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situation is a direct result of the political environment in the United States for the past hundred 
years, and this likely has the most to do with the high violent crime rates in these communities. 
Therefore, poverty has everything to do with crime, where skin color has nothing to do with it. 
With this in mind, why would impoverished people be playing more video games?  
Interestingly, preference for video games over other forms of entertainment was 
significantly correlated with African American populations and other research seems to confirm 
this. The Kaiser Family Foundation in 2002 found that black Americans spend more time 
playing video games compared to other racial demographics (KFF, 2002) and two 2015 Pew 
surveys found that black Americans are more likely than other racial groups to rank video games 
as positive influences and are more likely to describe themselves as gamers compared to their 
white counterparts (Anderson 2015; Duggan, 2015). But why? This is a research question for the 
future, but we will beg the question none the less.  
It is entirely possible that the inhospitable environments that high violent crime rates 
foster lends itself to self-seclusion behaviors. If going outside is dangerous, staying inside is an 
intelligent risk assessment. What to do while you are inside? One can read books, watch TV, do 
homework, sell contraband, or of course play video games. The price of video game consoles can 
run between less than $100 for older game consoles to upwards of $1000 for high end desktops. 
Video games themselves can range from a few cents on older game consoles to upwards of $100 
for collectors’ editions. On top of this, it is known that in high violent crime rate areas, burglary 
rates are also high, begging the question of whether or not many games or game systems are 
stolen and sold on the illegal retail market. What does a $400 game console sell for on these 
markets? That is a question for future research to take aim at. Unemployment may also play a 
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role, as unemployed men may likely be sinking more time into video games compared to their 
employed counterparts. Again, this angle should be addressed for this line of research to hold 
significance.  
In between these extremes lie many possibilities that do not necessarily exclude people in 
poverty. Another research question for the future is to ask if more people in impoverished areas 
are playing older games that cost less to acquire or are earning more money to afford newer 
games and newer game consoles that release every five to ten years. More importantly, we found 
that poor internet access is highly associated with violent crime rates, though the association 
again is likely explained by poor economic standing. With no internet, what games are people in 
impoverished neighborhoods playing? Who are they playing with? What games are they 
playing? Do these behaviors differ significantly from higher income gamers? There are many 
guesses that can be ventured here, but only future research can answer these questions for sure. 
Despite all of this speculation, there is an important take-away on offer with this analysis. These 
measures for video game environment and play are nowhere near perfect, but they still seem to 
suggest that poverty is far more important in explaining violent crime in large cities.  
A few other important elements in this analysis deserve acknowledgement for future 
work. For starters, aggravated assaults can be measured differently in every city, and every state, 
even going by different names (i.e. battery). Also, COVID-19 did have a marginal impact on the 
statistical fidelity of this analysis, as it restricted access to computer labs with the appropriate 
statistical programs.  
111 
 
From the vantage point of statistics, a few important issues need to be pointed out. For 
starters, the standard errors for both models, but particularly for the aggravated assault model, 
are insanely high. In one place, the Gini index, the standard error is 670, which is absurd. In 
other places, software spending and population average, the standard error gets up to 74 and 35, 
respectively. There are a few important reasons for this. The first important reason is that with 
both homicides and aggravated assaults in large, cities, there are around ten to 15 cities that 
represent outliers. Recall that the mean homicide rate for the dataset is 10.73 per 100,000. St. 
Louis had an average homicide rate of 54 per 100,000, Baltimore sits at 46 per 100,000, and 
Birmingham sits at 38 per 100,000. Again only 14 cities had homicide rates above 20 per 
100,000 and more than 40 cities had homicide rates below 10 per 100,000. Seventy cities were 
below the national average for aggravated assaults, 414 per 100,000, where only thirteen cities 
ranged between 750 per 100,000 and 1,519.6 per 100,000. This was not accounted for 
statistically in this analysis. To address the influence of the outliers on the results, particularly 
the standard errors, the Cook's D needs to be estimated and evaluated. Then, depending on the 
outcome, the outliers that significantly affect the results will be excluded from the measurement 
of the impacted variable(s). Free from outlier influence, the regression analysis can then be rerun 
with lower standard errors expected. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Let’s take a step back here and ask the question that brought us here. Which explains 
violent crime rates in large U.S. cities more, traditional sociological explanations or the violent 
video game hypothesis? Based on these analyses, the answer is clear. Poverty and histories of 
racial segregation and neglect share the largest portion of responsibility for the current state of 
violence in the United States’ largest and most populous cities. Video games, or more precisely, 
video game spending and opinion trends, do not seem to have any important impact on American 
violence where it counts most. What does this mean for the conversations surrounding the true 
effects of video games on society?  
Video games have been a part of civilization now for a few decades now, about as long as 
cell phones and Civil Rights. They have infiltrated many of our daily lives and the hearts and 
minds of our children. Entire economies have emerged, employing thousands of people from 
retail store operators to top of the line designers. Video games have opened new frontiers of in 
storytelling, education, empathy, experience, and freedom. At the pace of current technological 
change and innovation, these experiences are only going to get larger, more expensive, more 
impressive and more realistic. The sheer range of potential that video games possess is 
staggering. From military training to anxiety prescriptions, video games are going to become an 
increasingly larger part of our future as a species. With the profound and influential impact that 
video games have and will continue to have on the daily lives of millions of people and society 
itself, it is paramount to take the technology seriously. 
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The potentially negative side effects of video games is a topic that cannot be ignored. To 
disregard video games as a simple pass-time with no other influences is irresponsible and 
unsupported by the evidence accumulated thus far. In the span of this thesis, many differing 
pieces of testimony have been presented that detail not just the negative, but the positive 
influences that video games can have on human behavior and experience. It is not out of the 
question that video games, particularly violent video games, have a role to play in the aggressive 
behavior of certain members of the population. Spending hours upon hours killing humanoid 
shapes and hearing the sounds of human-like anguish has to have some effect on the mind, and 
the research we have discussed shows that it does. But to what degree should we be worried 
about this effect? We have already discussed the fact that our ancestors were accompanied to 
death in ways that most modern humans are not. From bringing your children to public 
executions to watching people eaten alive by hungry animals, violence has always been a part of 
the human experience. The question now is, should violence continue to be a part of daily life? 
We worry greatly about the corrupting nature that violent media has on our children. This 
instinct that outside influences will corrupt our young is an old one. What else is capable of 
corruption? Who defines what corrupts and what inspires? The written chronicles of Alexander 
the Great influenced the legendary Caesar and Napoleon to conquer and kill hundreds of 
thousands of people in less than a lifetime. The writings of Karl Marx ignited the Russian and 
Chinese Revolutions of the 20th century, which killed millions upon millions of people. The 
most recognizable piece of literature in the world, the Bible, has inspired countless people to put 
aside their selfish desires and lift up the poor and unfortunate people in the world. While it has 
also inspired countless people to kill and judge others in the name of God. Supposedly, Catcher 
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in the Rye inspired Mark David Chapman to kill John Lennon. When we look at the history of 
these texts, do we not see the same trends? Catcher in the Rye was put on the restricted books list 
in public school because of its potential to corrupt the minds of children. The entire Cold War 
was flavored with the fear of the Communist Manifesto and its potential to kill Western 
Democracy. Wars have been waged over holy books for the past 2000 years. If simple words on 
pages can influence so much and inspire so much fear, what are video games capable of? What 
will video games be capable of in the future? When will the first video game influence geo-
politics and the tides of history itself? Only time will tell.  
Video games are just barely emerging from their infancy and have already reached as 
many or more people than Shakespeare and Orwell. Recall that video games, from Call of Duty 
to Candy Crush, are being played by upwards of 2.5 billion people: one-third of the earth’s 
population. It has been a mere three decades since the debut of proper First-Person Shooters, the 
Sauron of video game controversies. With the emergence of Virtual Reality (VR) on the horizon 
and the growing hunger for escape from the mundane, video games may in fact sow the seeds of 
the future. Which future will be reaped is another question entirely. 
This thesis has gone to show that video games may not impact violent crime as much as 
conservative pundits would like to put forward. However, this thesis does not inoculate video 
games from blame of any sort. More research needs to be done on the topic to truly understand 
its potential, and we are quite a distance from reaching that point. As technology evolves so to 
will video games, and the finish line of full understanding will ever retreat beyond our reach. 
Panic is not the answer to this uncertainty. Frantic finger pointing and scapegoating will not 
solve the problems that surround this new and powerful technology. What will help is solid 
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research, the types of which this thesis hopes to inspire. As of the completion of this thesis, video 
games do not seem to be a part of the causal chain that leads to most of the violent crime we 
know of.  
Scapegoating is often a simple way to solve a complex problem. In the face of terror and 
anxiety, humans are all to ready to place the blame on their fellow travelers. For time 
immemorial plagues, war, and general misfortune could be explained because some unsavory 
sect of society angered the gods or cursed the fortunes of a once great and proud tribe. Most 
times this instinct has been wrong, and it has cost the lives of countless innocents who drew the 
ire of their fellows at the wrong time and the wrong place. It seems that in the 21st century the 
virtual world itself has been singled out by many as the cause of the modern horror that is public 
mass killings. However, this pixelated scapegoat finds its defenders in research and modern 
science in the hopes that our cherished violent virtual worlds can be spared the fate that so many 
sacrificial lambs of antiquity were not lucky enough to evade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abadie, A., & Dermisi, S. (2008). Is terrorism eroding agglomeration economies in central 
 business districts? Lessons from the office real estate market in downtown Chicago. 
 Journal of urban Economics, 64(2), 451-463. 
Adachi, P. J., & Willoughby, T. (2011). The effect of violent video games on aggression: Is it 
 more than just the violence?. Aggression and Violent behavior, 16(1), 55-62. 
Adachi, P. J., & Willoughby, T. (2013). More than just fun and games: The longitudinal 
 relationships between strategic video games, self-reported problem solving skills, and 
 academic grades. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 42, 1041–1052 
Adekoya, R. (2018, September 10). Identity Politics Does More Harm Than Good to Minorities. 
 Retrieved October 24, 2019, from https://quillette.com/2018/09/01/identity-politics-is-
 doing-more-harm-than-good-to-minorities/. 
Aldao, A., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. (2010). Emotion-regulation strategies across 
 psychopathology: A meta-analytic review. Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 217–237 
Anderson, M. (2015, December 17). Views on gaming differ by race, ethnicity. Retrieved April 
 9, 2020, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/17/views-on-gaming-
 differ-by-race-ethnicity/ 
Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (1997). External validity of “trivial” experiments: The case 
 of laboratory aggression. Review of General Psychology, 1(1), 19-41. 
Anderson, C. A., & Dill, K. E. (2000). Video games and aggressive thoughts, feelings, and 
 behavior in the laboratory and in life. Journal of personality and social psychology, 78(4), 
 772. 
Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive 
 behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial 
 behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychological science, 12(5), 
 353-359. 
Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 
 53, 27–51. 
Anderson, C. A., Berkowitz, L., Donnerstein, E., Huesmann, L. R., Johnson, J. D., Linz, D., ... & 
 Wartella, E. (2003). The influence of media violence on youth. Psychological science in 
 the public interest, 4(3), 81-110. 
117 
 
Anderson, C. A., Carnagey, N. L., Flanagan, M., Benjamin, A. J., Eubanks, J., & Valentine, J. C. 
 (2004). Violent video games: Specific effects of violent content on aggressive thoughts 
 and behavior. Advances in experimental social psychology, 36, 200-251. 
Anderson, C. A., Gentile, D. A., & Buckley, K. E. (2007). Violent video game effects on 
 children and adolescents: Theory, research, and public policy. Oxford University Press. 
Anderson, C. A., Sakamoto, A., Gentile, D. A., Ihori, N., Shibuya, A., Yukawa, S., ... & 
 Kobayashi, K. (2008). Longitudinal effects of violent video games on aggression in Japan 
 and the United States. Pediatrics, 122(5), e1067-e1072. 
Anderson, C. A., & Carnagey, N. L. (2009). Causal effects of violent sports video games on 
 aggression: Is it competitiveness or violent content?. Journal of Experimental Social 
 Psychology, 45(4), 731-739. 
Anderson, C. A., Shibuya, A., Ihori, N., Swing, E. L., Bushman, B. J., Sakamoto, A., ... & 
 Saleem, M. (2010). Violent video game effects on aggression, empathy, and prosocial 
 behavior in Eastern and Western countries: A meta-analytic review. Psychological 
 bulletin, 136(2), 151. 
Anderson, C. A., Suzuki, K., Swing, E. L., Groves, C. L., Gentile, D. A., Prot, S., ... & Jelic, M. 
 (2017). Media violence and other aggression risk factors in seven nations. Personality and 
 social psychology bulletin, 43(7), 986-998. 
Aptowics, C. O. K. (2016, February 4). Could You Stomach the Horrors of 'Halftime' in Ancient 
 Rome? Retrieved October 17, 2019, from https://www.livescience.com/53615-horrors-of-
 the-colosseum.html. 
Archer, J. (2004). Sex differences in aggression in real-world settings: A meta-analytic review. 
 Review of general Psychology, 8(4), 291-322. 
Archer, J. (2006). Testosterone and human aggression: an evaluation of the challenge hypothesis. 
 Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 30(3), 319-345. 
Archer, J. (2009). Does sexual selection explain human sex differences in aggression?. 
 Behavioral and brain sciences, 32(3-4), 249-266. 
Arseneault, L., Moffitt, T. E., Caspi, A., Taylor, P. J., & Silva, P. A. (2000). Mental disorders 
 and violence in a total birth cohort: results from the Dunedin Study.   
Bagla, P. (2019, January 17). The Kumbh Mela, As Seen From Space. Retrieved October 17, 
 2019, from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/kumbh-mela-2019-in-prayagraj-as-seen-
 from-space-1979331. 
118 
 
Baller, R. D., Anselin, L., Messner, S. F., Deane, G., & Hawkins, D. F. (2001). Structural 
 covariates of US county homicide rates: Incorporating spatial effects. Criminology, 
 39(3), 561-588. 
Baltimore Sun. (2019). Baltimore City Homicides. Retrieved from 
 https://homicides.news.baltimoresun.com/?cause=shooting&range=2019 
Baird, A. (2012). The violent gang and the construction of masculinity amongst socially 
 excluded young men. Safer Communities, 11(4), 179-190. 
Barlett, C., Branch, O., Rodeheffer, C., & Harris, R. (2009). How long do the short‐term violent 
 video game effects last?. Aggressive Behavior: Official Journal of the International 
 Society for Research on Aggression, 35(3), 225-236. 
Bartholow, B. D., Sestir, M. A., & Davis, E. B. (2005). Correlates and consequences of exposure 
 to video game violence: Hostile personality, empathy, and aggressive behavior. 
 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(11), 1573-1586. 
Bavelier, D., Green, C. S., Han, D. H., Renshaw, P. F., Merzenich, M. M., & Gentile, D. A. 
 (2011). Brains on video games. Nature reviews neuroscience, 12(12), 763. 
BBC. (2019, February 5). Liam Neeson says he's 'not racist' after controversial interview. 
 Retrieved October 24, 2019, from https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-
 47133868. 
Bellair, P. E., & Kowalski, B. R. (2011). Low-skill employment opportunity and African 
 American-White difference in recidivism. Journal of Research in Crime and 
 Delinquency, 48(2), 176-208. 
Bensley, L., & Van Eenwyk, J. (2001). Video games and real-life aggression: Review of the 
 literature. Journal of adolescent health, 29(4), 244-257. 
Benson, M. L., Wooldredge, J., Thistlethwaite, A. B., & Fox, G. L. (2004). The correlation 
 between race and domestic violence is confounded with community context. Social 
 problems, 51(3), 326-342. 
Berenson, T. (2019, August 5). President Trump Calls for Crackdown on Violent Video Games. 
 Retrieved October 1, 2019, from https://time.com/5644120/donald-trump-el-paso-
 shooting-speech/. 
Bethesda Game Studios. (2012). The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim (Microsoft Windows, PlayStation 
 3, Xbox 360) [The Elder Scrolls]. Rockville, Maryland: Bethesda Softworks. 
Bethesda Game Studios. (2015). Fallout 4 (Microsoft Windows, PlayStation 4, Xbox One) 
 [Fallout]. Rockville, Maryland: Bethesda Softworks. 
119 
 
Bevin, M. (2018, February 15). Leland Conway Show: School Shooting in Florida - WIOD's Al 
 Lewis, ABC's Ryan Burrow, Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin. Retrieved from 
 https://www.iheart.com/podcast/66-leland-conway-28199879/episode/leland-02-15-18-
 hr1-28951104/ 
Blau, J. R., & Blau, P. M. (1982). The cost of inequality: Metropolitan structure and violent 
 crime. American sociological review, 114-129. 
Blizzard Entertainment. (2004). World of Warcraft (Microsoft Windows, macOS) [World of 
 Warcraft]. Irvine, California: Blizzard Entertainment. 
Blizzard Entertainment. (2017). StarCraft (Microsoft Windows, macOS) [StarCraft]. Irvine, 
 California: Blizzard Entertainment. 
Boehm, C. (2012). Moral origins: The evolution of virtue, altruism, and shame. Soft Skull Press. 
Boot, W. R., Blakely, D. P., & Simons, D. J. (2011). Do action video games improve perception 
 and cognition?. Frontiers in psychology, 2, 226. 
Branas, C. C., Richmond, T. S., Culhane, D. P., Ten Have, T. R., & Wiebe, D. J. (2009). 
 Investigating the link between gun possession and gun assault. American Journal of 
 Public Health, 99, 2034–2040. 
Breuk, R. D., Clauser, C. A. C., Stams, G. J. J. M., Slot, N. W., & Doreleijers, T. A. H. (2007). 
 The validity of questionnaire self-report of psychopathology and parent–child 
 relationship quality in juvenile delinquents with psychiatric disorders. Journal of 
 Adolescence, 30(5), 761-771. 
Bunting, R. J., Chang, O. Y., Cowen, C., Hankins, R., Langston, S., Warner, A., ... & Roy, S. S. 
 (2018). Spatial patterns of larceny and aggravated assault in Miami–Dade County, 2007–
 2015. The Professional Geographer, 70(1), 34-46. 
Burraston, B., Watts, S. J., McCutcheon, J. C., & Province, K. (2019). Relative Deprivation, 
 Absolute Deprivation, and Homicide: Testing an Interaction Between Income Inequality 
 and Disadvantage. Homicide Studies, 23(1), 3-19. 
Bushman, B. J., & Anderson, C. A. (2009). Comfortably numb: Desensitizing effects of violent 
 media on helping others. Psychological science, 20(3), 273-277. 
Bushman, B. J., & Anderson, C. A. (2015). Understanding causality in the effects of media 
 violence. American Behavioral Scientist, 59(14), 1807-1821. 
Buss, D. M. (2006). The murderer next door: Why the mind is designed to kill. Penguin. 
Cáceres-Delpiano, J., & Giolito, E. (2012). The impact of unilateral divorce on crime. Journal of 
 Labor Economics, 30(1), 215-248. 
120 
 
Calvert, S. L., Appelbaum, M., Dodge, K. A., Graham, S., Nagayama Hall, G. C., Hamby, S., ... 
 & Hedges, L. V. (2017). The American Psychological Association Task Force 
 assessment of violent video games: Science in the service of public interest. American 
 Psychologist, 72(2), 126. 
Carnagey, N. L., Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2007). The effect of video game violence 
 on physiological desensitization to real-life violence. Journal of experimental social 
 psychology, 43(3), 489-496. 
CD Projekt Red. (2015). The Witcher 3: Wild Hunt (Microsoft Windows, PlayStation 4, Xbox 
 One) [The Witcher]. Warsaw, Poland: CD Projekt. 
City of New Orleans. (2017). City of New Orleans Open Data: Calls for Service 2017. Retrieved 
 from https://data.nola.gov/Public-Safety-and-Preparedness/Calls-for-Service-2017/bqmt-
 f3jk/data 
Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Bowdle, B. F., & Schwarz, N. (1996). Insult, aggression, and the 
 southern culture of honor: An" experimental ethnography.". Journal of personality and 
 social psychology, 70(5), 945. 
Cohen, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1997). Field experiments examining the culture of honor: The role 
 of institutions in perpetuating norms about violence. Personality and Social Psychology 
 Bulletin, 23(11), 1188-1199. 
Cooper, A., & Smith, E. (2011). Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008. Retrieved 
 October 19, 2019, from https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2221. 
Congressional Budget Office. (2019, January 28). The Effects of the Partial Shutdown Ending in 
 January 2019. Retrieved October 23, 2019, from https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54937. 
Connell, R. W. (1994). Poverty and education. Harvard Educational Review, 64(2), 125. 
Cummings, A. M., Gonzalez-Guarda, R. M., & Sandoval, M. F. (2013). Intimate partner 
 violence among Hispanics: A review of the literature. Journal of family violence, 28(2), 
 153-171. 
Cunningham, S., Engelstätter, B., & Ward, M. R. (2016). Violent video games and violent crime. 
 Southern Economic Journal, 82(4), 1247-1265. 
Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1983). Sex, evolution, and behavior. Boston: Willard Grant Press. 
Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (1988). Homicide. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 
Daly, M., & Wilson, M. (2017). Homicide: Foundations of human behavior. Routledge. 
Davies, M. M. (1997). Fake, fact, and fantasy: Children’s interpretations of television reality. 
 Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
121 
 
DeCamp, W., & Ferguson, C. J. (2017). The impact of degree of exposure to violent video 
 games, family background, and other factors on youth violence. Journal of youth and 
 adolescence, 46(2), 388-400. 
DeCasas, M. (2003). Protecting Hispanic women: The inadequacy of domestic violence policy. 
 Chicano-Latino L. Rev., 24, 56. 
Deller, S. C., & Deller, M. A. (2010). Rural crime and social capital. Growth and Change, 41, 
 221–275. 
DeNavas-Walt, C. (2005). Income, poverty, and health insurance coverage in the United States. 
 Diane Publishing. 
Devine, P. E. (1978). The ethics of homicide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
De Waal, F. B. (1995). Sex as an alternative to aggression in the bonobo. Sexual nature, sexual 
 culture, 37. 
DeWall, C. N., Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2011). The general aggression model: 
 Theoretical extensions to violence. Psychology of Violence, 1(3), 245. 
DeWitt, John & Frey, William (2018). Segregation Measures for U.S. Cities, 2010 [dataset]. 
 Ann Arbor, MI: SSDAN, University of Michigan Population Studies Center, 2018. 
 http://www.ssdan.net/racial-residential-segregation-cities-2010. 
Dholakia, N., & Reyes, I. (2018). Media, markets and violence. Journal of Marketing 
 Management, 34(11-12), 1032-1047. 
Diamond, A. (2001). Rethinking culture on the streets: Agency, masculinity, and style in the 
 American city. Journal of Urban History, 27(5), 669-685. 
Drawve, G., & Barnum, J. D. (2018). Place-based risk factors for aggravated assault across 
 police divisions in Little Rock, Arkansas. Journal of Crime and Justice, 41(2), 173-192. 
Drucker, J. (2011). Risk Factors of Aggravated Assault. Rutgers Center on Public Security, 
 16(1), 1-2. 
Duffin, E. (2019, September 24). U.S. household income distribution, by Gini-coefficient 2018. 
 Retrieved March 22, 2020, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/219643/gini-
 coefficient-for-us-individuals-families-and-households/ 
Duggan, M. (2015, December 15). Which Americans play video games and who identifies as a 
 "gamer". Retrieved April 9, 2020, from 
 https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/12/15/who-plays-video-games-and-identifies-
 as-a-gamer/ 
122 
 
EA Redwood Shores. (2008). Dead Space (Microsoft Windows, PlayStation 3, Xbox 360) [Dead 
 Space]. Redwood, California: Electronic Arts. 
Eisenberg, N. (2000). Empathy. In E. Kazdin (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychology (Vol. 3, pp. 
 179-182). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Egenfeldt-Nielsen, S., Smith, J. H., & Tosca, S. P. (2013). Understanding video games: The 
 essential introduction. Routledge. 
Eisner, M. (2003). Long-term historical trends in violent crime. Crime and Justice, 30, 83-142. 
Elson, M., Mohseni, M. R., Breuer, J., Scharkow, M., & Quandt, T. (2014). Press CRTT to 
 measure aggressive behavior: The unstandardized use of the competitive reaction time 
 task in aggression research. Psychological Assessment, 26(2), 419. 
Engelhardt, C. R., Bartholow, B. D., Kerr, G. T., & Bushman, B. J. (2011). This is your brain on 
 violent video games: Neural desensitization to violence predicts increased aggression 
 following violent video game exposure. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
 47(5), 1033-1036. 
Epic Games. (2017). Fortnite (Microsoft Windows, macOS, Nintendo Switch, PlayStation 4, 
 Xbox One, iOS, Android) [Fortnite]. Cary, North Carolina: Epic Games. 
2018 Essential Facts About the Computer and Video Game Industry. (2019, April 30). Retrieved 
 October 1, 2019, from https://www.theesa.com/esa-research/2018-essential-facts-about-
 the-computer-and-video-game-industry/. 
2019 Essential Facts About the Computer and Video Game Industry. (2019, August 19). 
 Retrieved October 1, 2019, from https://www.theesa.com/esa-research/2019-essential-
 facts-about-the-computer-and-video-game-industry/. 
Eurostat. (2017). Recorded Offenses by Category: Intentional Homicide. Retrieved October 17, 
 2019, from https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do 
Ewoldsen, D. R., Eno, C. A., Okdie, B. M., Velez, J. A., Guadagno, R. E., & DeCoster, J. 
 (2012). Effect of playing violent video games cooperatively or competitively on 
 subsequent cooperative behavior. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social 
 Networking, 15(5), 277-280. 
Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D., & Loayza, N. (2002). Inequality and violent crime. The journal of 
 Law and Economics, 45(1), 1-39. 
Fairclough, S. J., Boddy, L. M., Hackett, A. F., & Stratton, G. (2009). Associations between 
 children's socioeconomic status, weight status, and sex, with screen-based sedentary 
 behaviors and sport participation. International Journal of Pediatric Obesity, 4(4), 299-
 305. 
123 
 
Fazel, S., Wolf, A., Chang, Z., Larsson, H., Goodwin, G. M., & Lichtenstein, P. (2015). 
 Depression and violence: a Swedish population study. The Lancet Psychiatry, 2(3), 224-
 232. 
FCC: Eighth Broadband Progress Report. (2012, August 23). Retrieved from 
 https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/eighth-
 broadband-progress-report 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2018, September 10). Uniform Crime Report: Violent Crime in 
 the U.S. 2017. Retrieved October 19, 2019, from https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
 u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/violent-crime. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2019, September 13). Uniform Crime Report: Violent Crime in 
 the U.S. 2018. Retrieved October 19, 2019, from https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-
 u.s/2018/crime-in-the-u.s.-2018/topic-pages/violent-crime. 
Ferguson, C. J. (2008). The school shooting/violent video game link: Causal relationship or 
 moral panic?. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 5(1‐2), 25-37. 
Ferguson, C. J., Smith, S., Miller-Stratton, H., Fritz, S., & Heinrich, E. (2008). Aggression in the 
 laboratory: Problems with the validity of the modified Taylor Competitive Reaction Time 
 Test as a measure of aggression in media violence studies. Journal of Aggression, 
 Maltreatment & Trauma, 17(1), 118-132. 
Ferguson, C. J., & Rueda, S. M. (2009). Examining the validity of the modified Taylor 
 competitive reaction time test of aggression. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 5(2), 
 121. 
Ferguson, C. J., Coulson, M., & Barnett, J. (2011). Psychological profiles of school shooters: 
 Positive directions and one big wrong turn. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 11(2), 
 141-158. 
Ferguson, C. J., & Garza, A. (2011). Call of (civic) duty: Action games and civic behavior in a 
 large sample of youth. Computers in Human Behavior, 27(2), 770-775. 
Ferguson, C. J. (2015). Do angry birds make for angry children? A meta-analysis of video game 
 influences on children’s and adolescents’ aggression, mental health, prosocial behavior, 
 and academic performance. Perspectives on psychological science, 10(5), 646-666. 
Fisher, J. C., & Mason, R. L. (1981). The analysis of multicollinear data in criminology. 
 Methods in quantitative criminology, (J. Fox. New York). 
Frias, S. M., & Angel, R. J. (2005). The risk of partner violence among low‐income Hispanic 
 subgroups. Journal of Marriage and Family, 67(3), 552-564. 
124 
 
FromSoftware. (2011). Dark Souls (Microsoft Windows, PlayStation 3, Xbox 360) [Dark Souls]. 
 Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan: Namco Bandai Games JP: FromSoftware. 
Fry, D. P., & Söderberg, P. (2013). Lethal aggression in mobile forager bands and implications 
 for the origins of war. Science, 341(6143), 270-273. 
Funk, J. B., Buchman, D. D., Jenks, J., & Bechtoldt, H. (2003). Playing violent video games, 
 desensitization, and moral evaluation in children. Journal of Applied Developmental 
 Psychology, 24, 413-436. 
Futrell, A. (2006). The Roman Games: a Sourcebook. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Geary, D. C. (2010). Male, female: The evolution of human sex differences. American 
 Psychological Association. 
Gebru, T., Krause, J., Wang, Y., Chen, D., Deng, J., Aiden, E. L., & Fei-Fei, L. (2017). Using 
 deep learning and Google Street View to estimate the demographic makeup of 
 neighborhoods across the United States. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
 Sciences, 114(50), 13108-13113. 
Gentile, D. A., Saleem, M., & Anderson, C. A. (2007). Public policy and the effects of media 
 violence on children. Social Issues and Policy Review, 1(1), 15-61. 
Gentile, D. (2009). Pathological video-game use among youth ages 8 to 18: A national study. 
 Psychological science, 20(5), 594-602. 
Gentile, D. A., Anderson, C. A., Yukawa, S., Ihori, N., Saleem, M., Ming, L. K., ... & Rowell 
 Huesmann, L. (2009). The effects of prosocial video games on prosocial behaviors: 
 International evidence from correlational, longitudinal, and experimental studies. 
 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(6), 752-763. 
Gentile, D. A., Choo, H., Liau, A., Sim, T., Li, D., Fung, D., & Khoo, A. (2011). Pathological 
 video game use among youths: a two-year longitudinal study. Pediatrics, 127(2), e319-
 e329. 
Gentile, D. A., Li, D., Khoo, A., Prot, S., & Anderson, C. A. (2014). Mediators and moderators 
 of long-term effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior: Practice, thinking, 
 and action. JAMA pediatrics, 168(5), 450-457. 
Gentile, D. A., Bender, P. K., & Anderson, C. A. (2017). Violent video game effects on salivary 
 cortisol, arousal, and aggressive thoughts in children. Computers in Human Behavior, 70, 
 39-43. 
Giancola, P. R., & Parrott, D. J. (2008). Further evidence for the validity of the Taylor 
 aggression paradigm. Aggressive Behavior: Official Journal of the International Society 
 for Research on Aggression, 34(2), 214-229. 
125 
 
Global Burden of Disease Collaborative Network. Global Burden of Disease Study 2017 (2017). 
 Seattle, United States: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), 2018. 
Global Health Data Exchange (GHDE) - Global Burden of Disease Results Tool. (2017). 
 Retrieved October 2, 2019, from http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool. 
Global Trends. (2015). The Near Future: Tensions are Rising. Retrieved from 
 https://www.dni.gov/index.php/global-trends/near-future. 
Godfrey, B., & Lawrence, P. (2005). Crime and Justice 1750-1950. Willan Publishing. 
Goldstein, J. S. (2004). War and gender (pp. 107-116). Springer US. 
Gould, M. S., & Olivares, M. (2017). Mass Shootings and Murder-Suicide: Review of the 
 Empirical Evidence for Contagion. Media and Suicide: International Perspectives on 
 Research, Theory, and Policy. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis. 
Granic, I., Lobel, A., & Engels, R. C. (2014). The benefits of playing video games. American 
 psychologist, 69(1), 66. 
Gramlich, J., & Schaeffer, K. (2019, October 22). Pew Poll: 7 facts about guns in the U.S. 
 Retrieved October 22, 2019, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
 tank/2019/10/22/facts-about-guns-in-united-states/. 
Green, C. S., & Bavelier, D. (2012). Learning, attentional control, and action video games. 
 Current Biology, 22, 197–206. 
Greenfield, P. M. (2014). Mind and media: The effects of television, video games, and 
 computers. Psychology Press. 
Greitemeyer, T., & Osswald, S. (2010). Effects of prosocial video games on prosocial behavior. 
 Journal of personality and social psychology, 98(2), 211. 
Greitemeyer, T., Osswald, S., & Brauer, M. (2010). Playing prosocial video games increases 
 empathy and decreases schadenfreude. Emotion, 10(6), 796. 
Greitemeyer, T. (2018). The spreading impact of playing violent video games on aggression. 
 Computers in human behavior, 80, 216-219. 
Gruber, Jonathan. 2004. Is making divorce easier bad for children? Journal of Labor Economics 
 22, no. 4:799–833. 
Gun Violence Archive. (2017). Mass Shootings in 2017. Retrieved from 
 https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/mass-shooting?year=2017 
Hamer, J. (2011). Abandoned in the heartland: Work, family, and living in East St. Louis. Univ 
 of California Press. 
126 
 
Hare, B., Wobber, V., & Wrangham, R. (2012). The self-domestication hypothesis: evolution of 
 bonobo psychology is due to selection against aggression. Animal Behaviour, 83(3), 573-
 585. 
Harries, K. D., & Stadler, S. J. (1986). Aggravated assault and the urban system: Dallas, 1980-
 81. Journal of Environmental Systems, 15(3), 243-253. 
Hicks, Josh (October 18, 2013). "How much did the shutdown cost the economy?". The 
 Washington Post. Retrieved October, 23, 2019. 
Howard, P., Busch, L., & Sheets, P. (2010). Comparing digital divides: Internet access and social 
 inequality in Canada and the United States. Canadian Journal of Communication, 35(1). 
Hsieh, C. C., & Pugh, M. D. (1993). Poverty, income inequality, and violent crime: a meta-
 analysis of recent aggregate data studies. Criminal justice review, 18(2), 182-202. 
Hudson, L. (2018, February 16). Kentucky governor blames video games for school shootings. 
 Retrieved November 26, 2018, from 
 https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/16/17020768/video-games-violence-shootings-
 kentucky-governor-matt-bevin 
Huesmann, L.R., & Moise, J. (1998). The stability and continuity of aggression from early 
 childhood to young adulthood. In D.J. Flannery & C.R. 
Huesmann, L. R., Moise-Titus, J., Podolski, C. P., & Eron, L. D. (2003). Longitudinal relations 
 between childhood exposure to media violence and adult aggression and violence: 1977-
 1992. 
Huesmann, L. R., & Kirwil, L. (2007). Why observing violence increases the risk of violent 
 behavior in the observer. Cambridge University Press. 
Huff (Eds.), Youth violence: Prevention, intervention, and social policy (pp. 73–95). 
 Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press 
Huff-Corzine, L., Corzine, J., & Moore, D. C. (1986). Southern exposure: Deciphering the 
 South's influence on homicide rates. Social Forces, 64(4), 906-924. 
Huff-Corzine, L., Weaver, G. S., Corzine, J., Wittekind, J. C., & Petee, T. A. (2001). The 
 Importance of Disaggregation in Specifying the Southern Subculture of Violence. New 
 Directions in Homicide Research, 177. 
id Software. (1993). DOOM (Version 1) [DOOM]. Texas: id Software. 
Iten, G. H., Steinemann, S. T., & Opwis, K. (2018, April). Choosing to help monsters: A mixed-
 method examination of meaningful choices in narrative-rich games and interactive 
 ratives. In Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
 Systems (p. 341). ACM. 
127 
 
James, N. (2018, June 20). Congressional Research Service: Recent Violent Crime Trends in the 
 United States. Retrieved October 22, 2019, from 
 https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1213141/m2/1/high_res_d/R45236_2018
 June20.pdf. 
Jones, A. (2009). Women who kill. The Feminist Press at CUNY. 
Josephson, W.L. (1987). Television violence and children’s aggression: Testing the priming, 
 social script, and disinhibition predictions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
 53, 882–890. 
Kaiser Family Foundation, K. F. F. (2002, October 24). Children and Video Games. Retrieved 
 April 9, 2020, from https://www.kff.org/other/fact-sheet/children-and-video-games/ 
 
Kanno-youngs, Z. (2019, October 1). Homeland Security Dept. Affirms Threat of White 
 Supremacy After Years of Prodding. Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/politics/white-supremacy-homeland-
 security.html. 
Karnedy, D. (2016). Kathryn Linder: rampage violence narratives: what fictional accounts of 
 school shootings say about the future of America’s youth. 
Kaufmann, E. (2018, November 4). White Privilege Is Real, but Well-Meaning White Liberals 
 Are Helping to Perpetuate It. Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://quillette.com/2018/10/27/white-privilege-is-real-but-well-meaning-white-liberals-
 are-helping-to-perpetuate-it/. 
Kellner, D. (2018). School Shootings, Societal Violence and Gun Culture. The Wiley Handbook 
 on Violence in Education: Forms, Factors, and Preventions, 53-68. 
Keister, L. A., & Moller, S. (2000). Wealth inequality in the United States. Annual Review of 
 Sociology, 26(1), 63-81. 
Kormos, C., & Gifford, R. (2014). The validity of self-report measures of proenvironmental 
 behavior: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 40, 359-371. 
Krivo, L. J., & Peterson, R. D. (1996). Extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods and urban crime. 
 Social Forces, 75, 619-650. 
Kubrin, C. E., & Weitzer, R. (2003). Retaliatory homicide: Concentrated disadvantage and 
 neighborhood culture. Social Problems, 50, 157-180. 
Kubrin, C. E., & Stewart, E. A. (2006). Predicting who reoffends: The neglected role of 
 neighborhood context in recidivism studies. Criminology, 44(1), 165-197. 
128 
 
Land, K. C., McCall, P. L., & Cohen, L. E. (1990). Structural covariates of homicide rates: Are 
 there any invariances across time and social space?. American journal of sociology, 
 95(4), 922-963. 
Lankford, A. (2016). Public mass shooters and firearms: a cross-national study of 171 countries. 
 Violence and victims, 31(2), 187-199. 
Law, R. (1993). The'Amazons' of Dahomey. Paideuma, 245-260. 
Lee, M. R. (2000). Concentrated poverty, race, and homicide. The Sociological Quarterly, 41(2), 
 189-206. 
Levine, J. (2017, December 20). Fox News Guest Rips Colin Kaepernick as 'Social Justice 
 Warrior' Who 'Doesn't Fit' With Capitalism (Video). Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://www.thewrap.com/fox-news-guest-colin-kaepernick-is-social-justice-warrior-
 who-doesnt-fit-with-capitalism/. 
Levy, J. S., & Thompson, W. R. (2011). The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation, and 
 Transformation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lo, S. K., Wang, C. C., & Fang, W. (2005). Physical interpersonal relationships and social 
 anxiety among online game players. Cyberpsychology & behavior, 8(1), 15-20. 
Lott, M. (2019, January 18). Socialism rising: Universities and 'radical' profs helping steer 
 leftward shift in politics, critics say. Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://www.foxnews.com/politics/socialism-rising-universities-and-radical-profs-
 helping-steer-leftward-shift-in-politics. 
Lowe, S. R., & Galea, S. (2017). The mental health consequences of mass shootings. Trauma, 
 Violence, & Abuse, 18(1), 62-82. 
Ludwig, E. J. (2019, October 23). Communist influences are destroying the US, faster and faster. 
 Retrieved October 24, 2019, from https://www.lifesitenews.com/opinion/communist-
 influences-are-destroying-the-us-faster-and-faster. 
Männikkö, N., Ruotsalainen, H., Miettunen, J., Pontes, H. M., & Kääriäinen, M. (2017). 
 Problematic gaming behavior and health-related outcomes: A systematic review and 
 meta-analysis. Journal of health psychology, 1359105317740414. 
Markey, P. M., Markey, C. N., & French, J. E. (2015). Violent video games and real-world 
 violence: Rhetoric versus data. Psychology of Popular Media Culture, 4(4), 277. 
Markey, P. M., & Ferguson, C. J. (2017). Teaching Us to Fear: The Violent Video Game Moral 
 Panic and The Politics of Game Research. American journal of play, 10(1), 99-115. 
Markey, P. M., & Ferguson, C. J. (2017). Moral combat: Why the war on violent video games is 
 wrong. Dallas, TX: BenBella Books.  
129 
 
Marshall, L. E., & Marshall, W. L. (2011). Empathy and antisocial behaviour. Journal of 
 Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 22(5), 742-759.  
Martinez Jr, R., Rosenfeld, R., & Mares, D. (2008). Social disorganization, drug market activity, 
 and neighborhood violent crime. Urban Affairs Review, 43(6), 846-874. 
McCall, P. L., Parker, K. F., & MacDonald, J. M. (2008). The dynamic relationship between 
 homicide rates and social, economic, and political factors from 1970 to 2000. Social 
 science research, 37(3), 721-735. 
McCall, Patricia, Kenneth C. Land, and Karen F. Parker. 2010. ‘‘An Empirical Assessment of 
 What We Know about Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: A Return to a Classic 20 
 Years Later.’’ Homicide Studies 14:219-43. 
McCann, A. (2018, June 7). 2018's Best Cities for Gamers. Retrieved November 1, 2018, from 
 https://wallethub.com/edu/best-cities-for-gamers/36270/#methodology 
McCarthy, R. J., Coley, S. L., Wagner, M. F., Zengel, B., & Basham, A. (2016). Does playing 
 video games with violent content temporarily increase aggressive inclinations? A pre-
 registered experimental study. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 67, 13-19. 
McGonigal, J. (2011). Reality is broken: Why games make us better and how they can change 
 the world. New York, NY: Penguin Press. 
Mentzoni, R. A., Brunborg, G. S., Molde, H., Myrseth, H., Skouverøe, K. J., Hetland, J., & 
 Pallesen, S. (2011). Problematic Video Game Use: Estimated Prevalence and 
 Associations with Mental and Physical Health. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social 
 Networking, 14(10), 591-596. doi:10.1089/cyber.2010.0260315. 
Messias, E., Castro, J., Saini, A., Usman, M., & Peeples, D. (2011). Sadness, suicide, and their 
 association with video game and internet overuse among teens: results from the youth 
 risk behavior survey 2007 and 2009. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 41(3), 307- 
Messner, S. F. (1982). Poverty, inequality, and the urban homicide rate: Some unexpected 
 findings. Criminology, 20(1), 103-114. 
Messner, S. F., & Sampson, R. J. (1991). The sex ratio, family disruption, and rates of violent 
 crime: The paradox of demographic structure. Social Forces, 69(3), 693-713. 
Miller, M., Azrael, D., & Hemenway, D. (2002). Firearm availability and unintended firearm 
 deaths, suicide, and homicide among 5-14 year olds. The Journal of TRAMA Injury, 
 Infection, and Critical Care, 52, 267–275. 
Monkkonen, E. H. (1989). Diverging homicide rates: England and the United States, 1850-1875. 
 Violence in America, 1, 80-101. 
130 
 
Montanaro, D. (2019, June 7). The Snowflake Test: 'Fox & Friends' visits firm behind job-seeker 
 exam that went viral. Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://www.foxnews.com/us/the-snowflake-test-fox-friends-visits-firm-behind-job-
 seeker-exam-that-went-viral. 
Monuteaux, M. C., Lee, L. K., Hemenway, D., Mannix, R., & Fleegler, E. W. (2015). Firearm 
 ownership and violent crime in the US: an ecologic study. American journal of 
 preventive medicine, 49(2), 207-214. 
Moore, M. D., & Bergner, C. M. (2016). The relationship between firearm ownership and violent 
 crime. Justice Policy Journal, 13, 1–20. 
Midway Games. (1992). Mortal Kombat (Version 1) [Mortal Kombat]. USA: Midway. 
Muggah, R., & Tobón, K. (2017). Citizen security in Latin America: Facts and Figures. Igarapé 
 Institute. 
Narvaez, D., Mattan, B., MacMichael, C., & Squillace, M. (2008). Kill bandits, collect gold or 
 save the dying: The effects of playing a prosocial video game. Media Psychology 
 Review, 1(1). 
Naughty Dog. (1996). Crash Bandicoot (PlayStation) [Crash Bandicoot]. Japan: Sony Computer 
 Entertainment. 
NetherRealm Studios. (2019). Mortal Kombat 11 (Microsoft Windows, Nintendo Switch, 
 PlayStation 4, Xbox One, Google Stadia) [Mortal Kombat]. Burbank, California: Warner 
 Bros. Interactive Entertainment. 
Nintendo EAD. (1992). Super Mario Kart (Super Nintendo Entertainment System) [Super Mario 
 Kart]. Japan: Nintendo. 
Nivette, A. E. (2011). Violence in non-state societies: A review. The British Journal of 
 Criminology, 51(3), 578-598. 
Olson, C. K. (2004). Media violence research and youth violence data: why do they conflict?. 
 Academic Psychiatry, 28(2), 144-150. 
Olson, C. K. (2010). Children’s motivations for video game play in the context of normal 
 development. Review of General Psychology, 14, 180–187 
Pan, D. (2018, November 20). US mass shootings, 1982-2018: Data from Mother Jones' 
 investigation. Retrieved November 26, 2018, from 
 https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/mass-shootings-mother-jones-full-data/ 
Parker, K., Menasce Horowitz, J., Igielnik, R., Oliphant, J., & Brown, A. (2017, June 22). Views 
 of guns and gun violence in the U.S. Retrieved April 26, 2019, from 
131 
 
 https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/06/22/views-of-guns-and-gun-violence/#ease-of-
 access-to-illegal-guns-seen-as-the-biggest-contributor-to-gun-violence 
Patrick, D. (2019, August 4). Fox & Friends: August 4, 2019. Retrieved October 2, 2019, from 
 https://www.danpatrick.org/fox-and-friends-august-4-2019/. 
Paul, S. R. (2019, October 14). Sen. Rand Paul: If socialists can't find a crisis, they'll create one. 
 Retrieved October 24, 2019, from https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/sen-rand-paul-
 socialists-crisis. 
Phillips, J. A. (2006). Explaining discrepant findings in cross-sectional and longitudinal 
 analyses: An application to US homicide rates. Social Science Research, 35(4), 948-974. 
Picchi, A. (2019, September 26). Income inequality in America is at its highest level in more 
 than 50 years. Retrieved October 23, 2019, from 
 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/income-inequality-in-america-is-at-its-highest-level-in-
 more-than-50-years-census-report-today-shows/. 
Pippen, T., & Sumler, K. (2017, August). Unequipped, Underfunded, Understaffed: Investing in 
 Your Officers to Manage Risk. Retrieved from 
 https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/unequipped-underfunded-understaffed/ 
Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. Penguin. 
Pinker, S. (2011). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined. New York: 
 Viking Books. 
Plante, C., & Anderson, C. A. (2017). Media, Violence, Aggression, and Antisocial Behavior: Is 
 the Link Causal?. The Wiley Handbook of Violence and Aggression, 1-12. 
PRIO. Peace Pesearch Institute Oslo. (2008). The Battle Deaths Dataset version 3.0. Retrieved 
 from https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-
 Dataset-version-30/. 
Przybylski, A. K., & Weinstein, N. (2019). Violent video game engagement is not associated 
 with adolescents' aggressive behaviour: evidence from a registered report. Royal Society 
 open science, 6(2), 171474. 
Trump, D. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2012, December 17). Video game violence & glorification 
 must be stopped—it is creating monsters! [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
 https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/280812064539283457?lang=en 
Riot Games. (2009). League of Legends (Microsoft Windows, macOS) [League of Legends]. 
 West Lost Angeles, California: Riot Gamess. 
132 
 
Robinson, L., Cotten, S. R., Ono, H., Quan-Haase, A., Mesch, G., Chen, W., ... & Stern, M. J. 
 (2015). Digital inequalities and why they matter. Information, communication & society, 
 18(5), 569-582. 
Rocque, M., & Duwe, G. (2018). Rampage shootings: An historical, empirical, and theoretical 
 overview. Current opinion in psychology, 19, 28-33. 
Rongquin, Y., Aaltonen, M., Branje, S., Ristikari, T., Meeus, W., Salmela-Aro, K., ... & Fazel, S. 
 (2017). Depression and violence in adolescence and young adults: findings from three 
 longitudinal cohorts. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent 
 Psychiatry, 56(8), 652-658. 
Roose, K. (2019, October 9). What Does PewDiePie Really Believe? Retrieved October 24, 
 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/09/magazine/PewDiePie-
 interview.html. 
Roser, M. (2016, December 13). Our World in Data: War and Peace. Retrieved October 17, 
 2019, from https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace. 
Roth, R. (2009). American Homicide. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
 Press. 
Russoniello, C. V., O'Brien, K., & Parks, J. M. (2009). The effectiveness of casual video games 
 in improving mood and decreasing stress. Journal of CyberTherapy and Rehabilitation, 
 2(1). 
Russoniello, C. V., O’Brien, K., & Parks, J. M. (2009). EEG, HRV and psychological correlates 
 while playing Bejeweled II: A randomized controlled study. In B. K. Wiederhold & G. 
 Riva (Eds.), Annual review of cybertherapy and telemedicine 2009: Advance 
 technologies in the behavioral, social and neurosciences (Vol. 7, pp. 189–192). 
 Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Interactive Media Institute and IOS Press 
Ryan, R. M., Rigby, C. S., & Przybylski, A. (2006). The motivational pull of video games: A 
 self-determination theory approach. Motivation and Emotion, 30, 347–363. 
Saez, E., & Zucman, G. (2016). Wealth inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence 
 from capitalized income tax data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(2), 519-578. 
Sampson, R. J., & Wilson, W. J. (1995). Toward a theory of race, crime, and urban inequality. 
 Race, crime, and justice: A reader, 1995, 37-56. 
Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W., & Earls, F. (1997). Neighborhoods and violent crime: A 
 multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science, 277(5328), 918-924. 
Scanlan, Q. (2018, May 20). Texas lieutenant governor suggests violent video games, abortion 
 show 'devalued life,' bear part of blame for gun violence. Retrieved from 
133 
 
 https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/guns-part-nation-texas-official-shooting-victims-
 dad/story?id=55300369 
Schmidt, A. (Producer), & Verhoeven, P. (Director). (1987). RoboCop [Motion Picture]. United 
 States: Orion Pictures. 
Shermer, M. (2018, November 9). Another Dream Deferred. Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://quillette.com/2018/11/08/another-dream-deferred/. 
Short Jr, J. F. (1997). Poverty, ethnicity, and violent crime. Westview Press, Inc. 
Shury, J., Speed, M., Vivian, D., Kuechel, A., & Nicholas, S. (2005). Crime against retail and 
 manufacturing premises: findings from the 2002 Commercial Victimization Survey. 
 Home Office online report, 37(05). 
Segal, M. (2019). Bloodshed in Cyber Cities: Video Game Climate and Homicides in Large U.S. 
 Cities. Homicide Research Working Group. 2019.  
Siegel, M., Ross, C. S., & King, III, C. (2013). The relationship between gun ownership and 
 firearm homicide rates in the United States, 1981-2010. American Journal of Public 
 Health, 103, 2098–2105 
Simon, D. (2018, May 21). Texas lieutenant governor blames abortions and violent video games 
 for school shootings, but not guns. Retrieved October 2, 2019, from 
 https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/20/us/texas-lieutenant-governor-dan-patrick-reasons-for-
 school-shootings/index.html. 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). Experian Simmons. SimmonsLOCAL US 2017. Retrieved October 
 24th, 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). Experian Simmons. SimmonsLOCAL US 2016. Retrieved October 
 24th, 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). Experian Simmons. SimmonsLOCAL US 2015. Retrieved October 
 24th, 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). Experian Simmons. SimmonsLOCAL US 2016. Retrieved October 
 24th, 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). EASI.  U.S. Consumer Expenditure Data 2017. Retrieved October 24th, 
 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). EASI. U.S. Consumer Expenditure Data 2016. Retrieved October 24th, 
 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). EASI. U.S. Consumer Expenditure Data 2015. Retrieved October 24th, 
 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
134 
 
SimplyAnalytics (2019). EASI. U.S. Consumer Expenditure Data 2014. Retrieved October 24th, 
 2019, from SimplyAnalytics database. 
SocialExplorer (2019). Population Density (Per Sq. Mile) [Map]. In SocialExplorer.com. 
 American Community Survey 2017 (5-Year Estimates) Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://www.socialexplorer.com/a9676d974c/explore 
SocialExplorer (2019). Percentage Population with Income At or Below Poverty Level [Map]. In 
 SocialExplorer.com. American Community Survey  2017 (5-Year Estimates) Retrieved 
 October 24, 2019, from https://www.socialexplorer.com/a9676d974c/explore 
SocialExplorer (2019). Marital Status for Population 15 Years and Over: Divorced [Map]. In 
 SocialExplorer.com. American Community Survey  2017 (5-Year Estimates) Retrieved 
 October 24, 2019, from https://www.socialexplorer.com/a9676d974c/explore 
SocialExplorer (2019). Gini Index of Income Inequality [Map]. In SocialExplorer.com. 
 American Community Survey 2017 (5-Year Estimates) Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://www.socialexplorer.com/a9676d974c/explore 
Somit, A. (1990). Humans, chimps, and bonobos: The biological bases of aggression, war, and 
 peacemaking. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34(3), 553-582. 
Squires, G. D., & Kubrin, C. E. (2005). Privileged places: Race, uneven development and the 
 geography of opportunity in urban America. Urban Studies, 42, 47–68. 
Stacey, J. T. (2016). The Effects of Video Games on the Rate of Violent Crime. 
Stamatakis, E., Hillsdon, M., Mishra, G., Hamer, M., & Marmot, M. (2009). Television viewing 
 and other screen-based entertainment in relation to multiple socioeconomic status 
 indicators and area deprivation: the Scottish Health Survey 2003. Journal of 
 Epidemiology & Community Health, 63(9), 734-740. 
Stretesky, P. B., Schuck, A. M., & Hogan, M. J. (2004). Space matters: An analysis of poverty, 
 poverty clustering, and violent crime. Justice Quarterly, 21(4), 817-841. 
Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. 2006. Bargaining in the shadow of the law: Divorce laws 
 and family distress. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 1:267–88. 
Stockdale, L., & Coyne, S. M. (2018). Video game addiction in emerging adulthood: Cross-
 sectional evidence of pathology in video game addicts as compared to matched healthy 
 controls. Journal of affective disorders, 225, 265-272. 
Stolzenberg, L., & D'Alessio, S. J. (2007). The effect of divorce on domestic crime. Crime & 
 Delinquency, 53(2), 281-302. 
Tandon, P. S., Zhou, C., Sallis, J. F., Cain, K. L., Frank, L. D., & Saelens, B. E. (2012). Home 
 environment relationships with children’s physical activity, sedentary time, and screen 
135 
 
 time by socioeconomic status. International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical 
 Activity, 9(1), 88. 
Telford, T. (2019, September 27). Income inequality in America is the highest it's been since 
 Census Bureau started tracking it, data shows. Retrieved October 23, 2019, from 
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/09/26/income-inequality-america-
 highest-its-been-since-census-started-tracking-it-data-show/. 
Thompson, K. M., & Haninger, K. (2001). Violence in E-rated video games. JAMA, 286(5), 
 591-598. 
Tremblay, R.E. (2000). The development of aggressive behavior during childhood: What have 
 we learned in the past century? International Journal of Behavioral Development, 24, 
 129–141. 
Truman, J. L., & Morgan, R. E. (2015). Nonfatal Domestic Violence, 2003-2012.  Journal of 
 Current Issues in Crime, Law & Law Enforcement, 8(4). 
UCDP. Uppsala Conflict Data Program. (2016). Disaggregated Datasets. Retrieved from 
 http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2011). Global Study on Homicide: 
 Executive Summary. Retrieved October 22, 2019, from 
 https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/Booklet1.pdf 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2019). Retrieved October 17, 2019, from 
 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/global-study-on-homicide.html. 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2019, September 17). Income and Poverty in the United States: 2018. 
 Retrieved April 9, 2020, from 
 https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-266.html 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2018, November 30). Population and Housing Unit Estimates. Retrieved 
 October 21, 2019, from https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest.html. 
Uttal, D. H., Meadow, N. G., Tipton, E., Hand, L. L., Alden, A. R., Warren, C., & Newcombe, 
 N. S. (2013). The malleability of spatial skills: A meta-analysis of training studies. 
 Psychological Bulletin, 139, 352–402. 
Ventura, M., Shute, V., & Zhao, W. (2013). The relationship between video game use and a 
 performance-based measure of persistence. Computers & Education, 60, 52–58. 
Wai, J., Lubinski, D., Benbow, C. P., & Steiger, J. H. (2010). Accomplishment in science, 
 technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and its relation to STEM educational 
 dose: A 25-year longitudinal study. Journal of Educational Psychology, 102, 860–871. 
136 
 
Waldstein, D. (2018, September 8). Serena Williams Accuses Official of Sexism in U.S. Open 
 Loss to Naomi Osaka. Retrieved October 24, 2019, from 
 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/sports/serena-williams-vs-naomi-osaka-us-
 open.html. 
Wallace, C., Mullen, P. E., Burgess, P., Palmer, S., Ruschena, D., & Browne, C. (1998). Serious 
 criminal offending and mental disorder: case linkage study. The British Journal of 
 Psychiatry, 172(6), 477-484. 
Ward, M. R. (2011). Video games and crime. Contemporary Economic Policy, 29(2), 261-273. 
Washington Post. (1993). SENATOR CALLS FOR WARNINGS ON VIDEO GAMES. (1993, 
 December 2). Retrieved October 1, 2019, from 
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1993/12/02/senator-calls-for-
 warnings-on-video-games/74450503-ed9a-4084-9910-b8e65ac6f0cb/. 
Weisburd, D. L., E. R. Groff, and S. M. Yang. (2012). The Criminology of Place: Street 
 Segments and our Understanding of the Crime Problem. New York: Oxford University 
 Press 
Wertham, F. (1954). Seduction of the Innocent. New York, NY: Rinehart & Company. 
Wheeler, A. P., & Kovandzic, T. V. (2018). Monitoring Volatile Homicide Trends Across US 
 Cities. Homicide Studies, 22(2), 119-144. 
Wheelock, D., & Uggen, C. (2006). Race, poverty and punishment: The impact of criminal 
 sanctions on racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic inequality. Ann Arbor, MI: National 
 Poverty Center. 
White, A. (2019, October 11). Iggy Azalea calls T.I. 'a huge misogynist' after he labels her his 
 'biggest blunder'. Retrieved October 24, 2019, from  https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
 entertainment/music/news/iggy-azalea-tip-ti-harris- feud-misogynist-blunder-twitter-
 a9151631.html. 
Whitt, H. P., Corzine, J., & Huff-Corzine, L. (1995). Where is the South? A preliminary analysis 
 of the southern subculture of violence. In Trends, risks, and interventions in lethal 
 violence: Proceedings of the third annual spring symposium of the Homicide Research 
 Working Group (pp. 127-148). 
Whyte, M. K. (2015). The status of women in preindustrial societies. Princeton University Press. 
Wilder, H. (2018). Mass Shootings: Masculinity, Not Psychosis or Psychopathy. 
Williams, K. R., & Flewelling, R. L. (1988). The social production of criminal homicide: A 
 comparative study of disaggregated rates in American cities. American Sociological 
 Review, 421-431. 
137 
 
Wilson, M., & Daly, M. (1985). Competitiveness, risk taking, and violence: The young male 
 syndrome. Ethology and sociobiology, 6(1), 59-73. 
Wilson, W. J. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. 
 University of Chicago Press. 
Wilson, M. L., Boesch, C., Fruth, B., Furuichi, T., Gilby, I. C., Hashimoto, C., ... & Lloyd, J. N. 
 (2014). Lethal aggression in Pan is better explained by adaptive strategies than human 
 impacts. Nature, 513(7518), 414. 
Wintemute, G. J. (2015). The epidemiology of firearm violence in the twenty-first century 
 United States. Annual Review of Public Health, 36, 5-19. 
Witte, J. C., & Mannon, S. E. (2010). The Internet and social inequalities. Routledge. 
Wolfgang, M. E. (1958). Patterns in criminal homicide. 
Wolpe, J. (1958). Psychotherapy by reciprocal inhibition. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
 Press. 
Wrangham, R. W., & Peterson, D. (1996). Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human 
 Violence. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Yang, B., & Lester, D. (1995). Suicide, homicide and unemployment. Applied Economics 
 Letters, 2(8), 278-279. 
Zinn, W. (1993). The empathic physician. Archives of Internal Medicine, 153(3), 306-312. 
 
